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Abstract 
 
 
The legal landscape in the digital age of copyright law is one of confusion and discord. Effective 
enforcement is difficult against websites, cumbersome and overly complex against individuals and a 
near impossibility against the tech-savvy. Therefore legislators are always left playing catch-up to the 
unrelenting change in technology.  In general, they seek to deal with the problem via new and 
increasingly stringent legislation. 
This thesis analyses these issues by studying the current state of copyright law in the UK, alongside 
the series of government commissioned reports on reform in this area. The thesis considers whether 
or not there is an appropriate balance reached between rights holders and consumers, deducing 
that the balance is currently too much in favour of rights holders, while still being largely ineffectual 
when attempting to adequately enforce those rights. Having established that legislation alone is not 
enough to face the challenges of copyright enforcement, the thesis looks to alternative and 
complementary methods of improving the balance of rights between copyright holders and users 
and ensuring better enforcement. The tax/levy model represents a strong solution to the problem, 
alongside other alternative revenue systems. The thesis concludes that the problem of copyright 
enforcement cannot be solved by any one single solution: the needs of all parties must be met as 
much as possible in order to ensure a workable balance and provide a strong framework capable of 
facing the challenges of the digital age. A balance between legislation, alternative revenue streams 
and education may be the only effective and appropriate way forward. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
To answer the question, ‘Does existing UK copyright law adequately address the issue of copyright 
enforcement in the digital age?’ a good starting point would be to consider the justifications behind 
copyright enforcement in the UK. 
Copyright law serves an essential societal function as it protects, and consequently also encourages, 
creativity. By providing a means of controlling a piece of work, individuals are able to be 
compensated for its use, thereby imposing a pecuniary value on the material.  It enables individuals 
to exploit their work and prevent others from doing so. This autonomous control over their own 
creations incentivises artists to constantly strive towards the development of new works. These 
rights allow their holders to maximise the potential of financial reward should their work be released 
into the public domain. If this were not the case, it may be that creators would feel less inclined to 
invest so much time, effort and money into creativity. 
 
But why is it so important that creativity is incentivised in this way? Encouraging creativity and 
innovation provides, in turn, a valuable benefit to society through literary and artistic creations. This 
societal benefit can be demonstrated in both sociological and economic terms. Firstly, creativity and 
the arts serve to enrich our lives, as well as spreading new and developing knowledge in the public 
domain. This can then serve to inspire new creativity and research, causing a constant need and 
desire for progress and the betterment of society. For a more detailed discussion of the discussion of 
the justifications for copyright see, for example, Moore and Ken. 1  
 
There has been much debate surrounding this, at times, controversial area of law. Some 
commentators take a utilitarian view, stressing the importance of copyright protection as a way of 
incentivising creativity by means of compensation, viewing it as a purely economic right.2 Others 
took a Lockean3 view that copyright protection is important because it reflects an author’s inherent 
ownership of their own material produced through their own hard work, deserving of reward, and 
therefore see it as a property right. This has been the foundation of copyright protection since the 
                                                             
1 Justifications for copyright are often traced as far back as the natural property rights theory of John Locke. 
Further discussion on its importance can be found, for example, in the following: Adam Moore and Ken 
Himma, ‘Intellectual Property’ [2011] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E Zalt (ed). 
2
 Some jurisdictions’ legislation focuses mainly on the utilitarian theory, such as in the US. See for example the 
US Constitution, Article 1 s 8 cl 8), the foundation of which is established in Jeremy Bentham, Principles and 
Morals of Legislation 1781 (Philip Schofield ed, Dover Publications, 2007). 
3
 Based on John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 1690 (Crawford MacPherson ed, Hackett Publishing 
1980).  
3 
 
Statute of Anne.4 Tehranian argues that this theory of natural property rights has largely shaped our 
copyright framework as it is today.5 This does appear to be true, as copyright protection has not, 
historically, tended to take any potential rights of users into account, instead focussing on the 
inherent right of creators to exercise full control over their own creations with long durations and 
penalties for infringers.6 Whether this approach has been successful so far will soon become 
apparent, with this paper arguing that it has not achieved adequate protection for rights holders, 
nor has it fairly balanced this protection with the interests of consumers. 7 
 
Secondly, the importance of the creative industries to our economy cannot be overestimated. 
Currently, the creative industries account for 6% of GDP in the UK, and, even more importantly in 
difficult times, have an estimated 6.5% annual rate of growth between 2012 to 2016, vastly 
outpacing the growth rate of the UK economy as a whole.8 
 
This leads to the key issue of balance between conflicting interests within the copyright framework.9 
Clearly, both rights holders and society as a whole have valuable and specific claims with regard to 
the importance of copyright. Legislators have sought to balance the encouragement of creativity and 
innovation with the public benefit of suitable access to works. Ultimately, the perfect balance is 
what the copyright legal framework seeks to achieve. Currently, the balance is approached in the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA). Its afforded rights can be defined positively, in that 
rights holders are able to make copies of their works, adapt works, and perform their works etc.10 
Rights can also be defined negatively as well, as rights holders can prevent others from using their 
works without the rights holders’ permission.11 The Act sets out that the duration of copyright is 
generally a lengthy  ‘70 years from the end of the calendar year in which the author dies’.12 The 
subject matter covered by the CDPA encompasses, for example, literary, musical works, artistic 
works, sound recordings, dramatic works, film recordings, broadcasts and typographical 
arrangements (e.g. web pages).  
 
                                                             
4 Enacted in 1710; see also George Putnam, Books and their Makers during the Middle Ages (1896) (Hillary 
House Publishing 1962) Part III. 
5 John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You (OUP 2011) 54. 
6 As in the CDPA, for example, in Chapter 2.1, 10-12. 
7 Chapter 5, 106. 
8 Creative Nation Report (CBI, January 2014) 
<http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/2535682/cbi_creative_industries_strategy__final_.pdf> accessed 10
th
 March 
2015. 
9
 Ian Kilbey ‘Copyright duration? Too long!’ [2003] 25(3) EIPR 105, 105. 
10
 Section 16(1)(a)-(e). 
11
 Section 16(2). 
12 Section 12(2) CDPA. 
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There is a clear distinction between two types of infringement set out in the CDPA: primary and 
secondary infringement. An infringer would be liable for primary infringement if he ‘without the 
licence of the copyright owner does, or authorises another to do, any of the acts restricted by the 
copyright’.13 Put another way, the infringer directly commits the infringing act by copying, providing 
copies to others, renting, performing, adapting, or otherwise disseminating the work to themselves 
or members of the public without the permission of the copyright owner. A secondary infringement 
involves a ‘middle man’ who physically produces the copy. The infringer is nevertheless still liable for 
secondary infringement if he imports14, possesses15 or provides the means for producing16 infringing 
copies of a work. This portrays a strong message that infringement is not to be tolerated in any form. 
It is interesting to note, then, how little this has permeated into the public mindset. This research 
will consider this gap between the expectations of consumers and its relationship with the 
marketing strategies of creative industry bodies, and how this might be redressed.17 
 
This thesis will argue that, taken as a whole, the CDPA seems to swing the balance in favour of rights 
holders, allowing them an extraordinarily broad range of rights and powers. There appears to be 
little or no mention of the rights of society as a whole, and the importance of the public benefit. 
However in spite of this, rights holders are still dissatisfied with the status quo, and with good 
reason. It is reported that over a quarter of internet users worldwide regularly access pirated 
material online.18 Since the CDPA was implemented, technology has forged ahead with astonishing 
and relentless speed. The change in technology has had an impact on the ability of copyright holders 
to protect their works and has led to an increase in the ease of which infringement can occur. There 
have been several legislative attempts, at both national and European level, to keep up with this fast 
pace. European law will be briefly referred to where relevant to the subject matter of this thesis, but 
the focus of this study is chiefly national level legislation. The Electronic Commerce19 and the 
Information Society20 Directives were both brought into force in 2000 and 2001 respectively. These 
Directives were designed to set out the rights and obligations in an internet age. Both directives 
require implementation into Member States’ national law but also allow for a degree of flexibility in 
                                                             
13  Section 16(2). 
14  Section 22. 
15 Section 23. 
16 Section 24. 
17 Through education, for example. See Chapter 4.4, 99. 
18
 IFPI Digital Music Report 2014 <http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Digital-Music-Report-2014.pdf > accessed 
5
th
 February 2015, 40. 
19
 Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178 (E-Commerce Directive). 
20
 Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167/10 (Information Society Directive). 
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interpretation. By the time the law was implemented, it was already somewhat out of date, as 
various technological measures were easily circumvented by tech savvy users.21 The Digital Economy 
Act (DEA) came into force in the UK in 2010, with the objective of trying to address the pace of 
technology and its effect on copyright enforcement.  
 
The key issue here is that legislators are always trying to keep pace with technological advances, but 
always, inevitably, reacting to changes rather than anticipating them. It is not possible to adequately 
legislate for the constantly unforeseen changes and new developmental directions taken by 
technological and digital advancement. The move from analogue to digital in particular shows how 
difficult it is for legislators to win the race. As Howell observes, users can easily do in minutes what 
took hours or even days to achieve in the days of analogue. 22 Copying a song onto a cassette tape 
was a tricky and laborious process, which often left the user with a poor quality copy. Now, it takes 
mere seconds to copy a song digitally, often with no loss of quality, no expensive equipment and 
very little technological skill required. 
 
Unfortunately, this shows that this has reduced the effectiveness of having such extensive rights 
over one’s own works, if the legislative framework is simply unable to enforce them adequately. The 
policing and monitoring of these digital activities is so much more difficult too, as increasingly easy 
ways to achieve anonymity online proliferate. Users may easily store huge quantities of illegal 
content on their hard drives, an ability which would have been inconceivable in the early days of the 
CDPA23  when computers the size of a small building had less memory than a basic modern day 
laptop computer. In addition, strict law enforcement in one country is unlikely to prevent the 
exploitation of copyrighted material in other jurisdictions. The digital market is global and therefore 
access to pirated material will inevitably remain possible to those determined enough to seek it out. 
The key to the solution is, as Wing posits,24 to attempt to remove the incentive to seek out this 
material by providing legal sources which offer a closer match to consumer expectations.25 
 
It is important to note that the fast pace of technology cannot be blamed for every problem facing 
copyright protection today. To argue this would be to imply that the legislative framework provided 
a perfect solution to effective copyright enforcement in the past, which was undoubtedly not the 
                                                             
21 Such circumvention is discussed in Chapter 2.1, at 14-17. 
22
 Claire Howell, ‘The Hargreaves Review: digital opportunity: a review of intellectual property and growth’ 
[2012] 1 JBL 71, 72. 
23
 1988. 
24
 Mark Wing, ‘The digital copyright time bomb in the BRIC economies, some ideas from the UK for the Indian 
market’ [2012] 54(4) IntJLM 302, 309. 
25 Chapter 4,73. 
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case. Older media such as television and radio allowed copyrighted material to reach the eyes and 
ears of the general public long before the dawn of the internet, posing many of the same problems. 
It was possible, for instance, to record material directly from the television, or photocopy26 written 
works, with devices available on the mass market.27 Some of the same arguments, such as where the 
burden of enforcement should lie,28 made during the last several centuries,29 remain pertinent 
today. However, the internet age has clearly allowed the processing of data to be undertaken 
instantly, on a large scale,30in a way unimaginable to the legislators enacting the Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act in 1988. It is this sheer volume of infringement on a global scale that has 
exacerbated the issue, bringing it to crisis point for all parties. 
 
There are also fundamental issues of perception within the field of copyright. In the internet age it is 
seen as the norm to want instant access to digital content whenever it is desired. Users no longer 
expect to wait months between a cinema release and a digital copy of a film, for example. Good 
quality digital copies of material are often available freely online and consumption is so common, 
that many see it as acceptable to participate in these infringing activities. Indeed, many may not 
realise that such common behaviour is in fact illegal.31 Even if they do, many will justify their 
infringement by concluding that the availability of material is simply not meeting their 
requirements.32 Users want fast, easy and quality access to works. If they cannot get what they want 
legally, they will inevitably turn to illegal sources. Compounding the problem is the commonly held 
belief that copyright cannot really be theft, because when stealing a tangible product, the victim in 
the situation is left with nothing.33  By making or accessing a copy of an intangible product, the 
original is still retained by the owner in its entirety. This view arguably stems from a lack of collective 
understanding about the way copyright law works, feeding in to the idea of the need for a 
nationwide (ideally global, given time) integration of copyright law into educational systems.34 As 
Sugden succinctly argues, ‘societal acceptance of legal changes occurs through individuals’ and 
                                                             
26 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photocopier> accessed 6th January 2015. 
27 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_Cassette_Recording> accessed 6th January 2015. 
28 Discussed in Chapter 2, at 30 and 40-43. 
29 Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy, Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth-
Century Britain (1695-1775) (Hart Publishing 2004), 4. 
30 Howell (n 22) 72. 
31 Ian Hargreaves, ‘Digital opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth’ May 2011 
<http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf> accessed 26
th
 June 2014, 68. 
32
 Kantar Media ‘Online Copyright Infringement Tracker Wave 4 (Covering period Mar 13 – May 13) Overview 
and key findings: Prepared for OFCOM’ < http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/telecoms-
research/online-copyright/w4/OCI_MAIN_REPORT_W4_FINAL.pdf> accessed 12
th
 March 2015, 5. 
33
 Thomas Field, ‘Crimes Involving Tangible Property’ [2012] 11 NHLJ 171, 171. 
34 Chapter 4.4, 99. 
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groups’ acceptance of the need for legal change’.35 Without some collective understanding of the 
importance of copyright law, any threat of punishment seems incomprehensible and risks continuing 
to be ignored. 
 
Moreover, the conflation of the property right with the entitlement to reward for one’s own skill and 
labour has exacerbated the discord between rights holder and consumer expectations. Griffin argues 
that the change in emphasis from the artistic to the economic value of copyrighted works has 
eroded the rationalisation of copyright in the public eye.36 Individuals no long see creators as the 
direct beneficiaries when they purchase legal material, but more often imagine huge profits for large 
corporations which now commonly own copyrights. The public tend to see the creator as the party 
expending the skill and labour – the creator - with little understanding or appreciation of the skill 
and labour of commercial entities.37 In order to ensure the copyright system maintains its validity, 
‘the perceived rationality of the regulatory system must be kept in mind’ by legislators.38 In addition, 
nationwide education detailing the realities of copyright law would go some way towards helping to 
bridge the gap between public belief and the reality of the legal landscape.39  
 
The situation is further complicated with the question over whether ‘deterrent’ measures are really 
considered to be a deterrent by the general public. Take, for instance, the maximum fine for 
copyright infringement which is now set at £50,000.40 If it were further increased, it may be thought 
that this would create an even stronger deterrent to commit infringing acts. But in reality it is likely 
that this would not be the case.41 Psychologically, a person in an ordinary financial position would 
struggle to envisage ever paying a £5,000 fine (the previous maximum fine), let alone £50,000. They 
would know that they would simply never have the money to pay that sort of sum. Therefore there 
is a definite detachment between the idea of this huge sum of money, and the reality of their own 
position in comparison. Moreover, many are not able to accept that simply downloading their 
favourite song or watch a film online occasionally allows them to fall into that category of 
‘infringers’. Individuals see huge fines as applicable to someone else, namely large-scale 
‘professional’ infringers, and as therefore not relevant to the average, otherwise law-abiding 
                                                             
35 Paul Sugden ‘The power of one! The failure of criminal copyright laws (piracy) to blend into the greater 
cultural consciousness!’ [2014] 36(6) EIPR 363, 372. 
36 James Griffin, ‘Copyright evolution – creation, regulation and the decline of substantively rational copyright 
law’ [2013] 3 IPQ 234, 250. 
37
 ibid 244. 
38
 ibid 252. 
39
 Chapter 4.4, 99 expands on this theory. 
40
 Digital Economy Act 2010, s 42. 
41 Further analysis of the ineffectiveness of deterrents can be found in Chapter 4.4, 99-104. 
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member of the public. This thesis will argue that a deterrent such as a large fine is not sufficient to 
successfully prevent infringement,42 analysing academic research, that of Laurence Ross43 and Tyler44 
in the main, to support this theory.  
 
In seeking to answer the posed question: ‘Does existing UK copyright law adequately address the 
issue of copyright enforcement in the digital age?’,  this thesis will scrutinise the law as it stands, as 
well as considering planned developments, in order to discover whether or not the law will ever be 
able to ‘keep up’ with the rapid advancement of technology. This research will take a literary 
approach, undertaking a critical analysis of current academic literature across a broad range of 
academic commentators in order to attempt to draw some conclusions and offer some possible 
solutions to the perceived problem.  
In Chapter 2, analysis of the CDPA, and DEA in particular, will seek to demonstrate whether or not 
the law is effective and/or appropriate in its attempt to enforce copyright laws and balance the 
expectations of both the rights of creators and the benefit to society (consumers), drawing on 
commentators such as Farrand45 and Garstka.46 To an extent, the government eventually recognised 
these problems and commissioned various reports to try to take a positive step in the right direction 
towards tidying up the outdated legal framework. This thesis will study some of these reports, with 
chapter 3 focussing on the Gowers, Hargreaves’ and Hooper reports. Drawing on academic 
opinion,47  it will determine whether these reports have produced any viable or realistic options to 
help redress the balance and, if not, why not?  
 
The thesis will then consider whether the legal approach alone is sufficient to effectively enforce 
copyright provisions and if it has, or ever will, solve these inherent problems, concluding that it will 
not, having now ‘done all that it realistically can’48 through legislation alone. A more rounded non-
legal approach will also be evaluated as a means of tackling the enforcement deficit.  Chapter 4 will 
                                                             
42 See Chapter 4.4, 99-104. 
43 Hugh Laurence Ross, Deterring the Drink Driver: Legal Policy and Social Control (Lexington Books 1982). 
44 Tom Tyler ‘Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective’ [1997] 29 New York 
University JILP 219. 
45 Benjamin Farrand, ‘The Digital Economy Act 2010 - a cause for celebration, or a cause for concern?’ [2010] 
EIPR 536. 
46 Krzyzstof Garstka, ‘The amended Digital Economy Act 2010 as an unsuccessful attempt to solve the stand-
alone complex of online piracy’ [2012] 43(2) IIC 158. 
47
 Including Joel Smith and Rachel Montagnon who consider the Hargreaves Review in ‘The Hargreaves Review 
– a “digital opportunity”’ [2011] 33(9) EIPR 596; and Martin Brenncke’s commentary in relation to Hargreaves’ 
suggestion to consider a US-style fair use exception for copyright, in Is “fair use” an option for U.K. copyright 
legislation? (Institut fur Wirtschaftsrecht, 2007). 
48 Wing (n 24) 309. 
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set out some key solutions proposed, aiming to identify and directly combat the various factors cited 
as major reasons for online copyright infringement.49 These alternative approaches, such as a new 
tax/levy system,50 could be used in conjunction with copyright law to better serve the interests of 
both users and rights holders. 
The final chapter will set out some conclusions as to the adequacy of the current legislative 
framework for copyright enforcement, and conclude that implementation of some complimentary 
solutions designed to address the key issues facing copyright law are required to better 
accommodate the digital age.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
49
 Factors include cost, ease of access, quality, and comprehensiveness of the source. See OFCOM Wave 4 
Report (n 32) 5.  
50 See Chapter 4.1, 74. 
10 
 
Chapter 2 Current Legislation in the UK  
This chapter will focus primarily on the Digital Economy Act (DEA), as a major, modern piece of 
legislation explicitly drafted to challenge the issues surrounding copyright enforcement. However it 
is first important to look at earlier legislation, insofar as it relates to the question of enforcement, on 
which the DEA is based. The sections on duration and restricted acts in the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act (CDPA) are essential to discuss, in order to set out the basic requirements needed even 
before the DEA can be applied. European and international law must be considered too, as they play 
a vital part in the scope of any potential UK legislation, and European law in particular has evidently 
shaped the DEA. Both the European Berne Convention51 and the World Trade Organization’s TRIPS 
agreement52 will be briefly examined, although the emphasis of this thesis will be on UK legislation. 
The safe harbour provisions in the E-Commerce Directive 2000, implemented in the UK via the E-
Commerce Regulations in 2002, and the further increase in copyright owners’ rights in the 2004 
Enforcement Directive will also be briefly used to set out the context of the global copyright legal 
landscape and any obligations incumbent on the UK legislature as a result.  
Chapter 2.1 Early legislation and the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act was introduced in 1988, instating UK compliance with the 
Berne Convention53. The Act was the first major piece of copyright legislation since 1956.54 It sets out 
the main categories of copyrighted works, as well as all of the basic requirements of a copyrighted 
work including duration,55  exceptions to restricted acts56 and types of infringement.57 Remedies are 
also provided.58 This section will focus on duration and restricted acts, as these provisions are most 
pertinent to the question of copyright enforcement insofar as it relates to the modern age.  
The duration of copyright is generally 70 years from the end of the calendar year in which the author 
dies.59 Until recently, the exception was sound recordings which stood at 50 years from the end of 
the calendar year in which the recording is made.60 Although the musical work itself is protected for 
                                                             
51Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, as amended at Stockholm 1967. 
52 WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994. 
53 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, as amended at Stockholm 1967. 
54 Copyright Act. 
55
 Section 12, CDPA. 
56
 Section 16(1). 
57
 Sections 17-27. 
58
 Sections 96-102. 
59
 Section 12(2). 
60 Section 13A(2). 
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70 years, the sound recording of it was not. It has since been amended to extend to 70 years,61 
bringing it in to line with other works, although the initial campaign for 95 years failed. This is a 
strong factor tipping the balance in favour of copyright owners. It is difficult to justify the long 
duration of copyright in the modern age, let alone a durational increase at this stage. It is seen as 
important to more than encourage, to actually incentivise creativity. This is achieved by providing 
comprehensive and exclusive rights over the work for a very long period of time.  
It is submitted that this is far too restrictive at the expense of the freedom of knowledge for the 
benefit of society as a whole.62 Such a lengthy duration is simply too strong a right which is becoming 
increasingly irrelevant in the modern age.  In a recent Government initiated report, Hargreaves 
confirms that copyright duration has periodically extended in recent decades, ‘In spite of clear 
evidence that this cannot be justified in terms of the core IP argument that copyright exists to 
provide economic incentives to creators to produce new works’.63 Hargreaves attributes this to 
lobbying in Parliament, branding it a consistent problem in this area, especially with the introduction 
of the Digital Economy Act.64 It may be that the ‘life plus 50 years’ requirement in the Berne 
Convention65 had the admirable aim of providing for the author’s children, but the advancement of 
society and the provision of social security systems has severely weakened this rationale.66 
Moreover, as Kilbey argues, this theory was not entirely convincing to begin with, as only a small 
minority of copyrighted works are sufficiently successful to provide for an income to support the 
author’s descendants.67 This argument can also be applied to the notion that duration provides for a 
return on publishers’ investments. It could be argued that these diminishing justifications should be 
set against the benefit to society in order to decrease, not increase, copyright duration. It is 
generally accepted that material in the public domain ‘serves as a valuable resource for creators, 
performers, researchers and educational institutions’.68 It is submitted that the excessive duration of 
copyright can therefore actually stifle the creativity it was created to encourage. In addition, it may 
also be perceived by sections of the public as too long a duration of protection and lead to user self-
justification of infringement. 
                                                             
61 Council Directive 2011/77/EU of 27 September 2011 amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of 
protection of copyright and certain related rights [2011] OJ L 265/1. 
62 For more on copyright justifications, see Irina Stamatoudi and Paul Torremans (eds), Copyright in the New 
Digital Environment: The Need to Redesign Copyright (Sweet and Maxwell 2000). 
63 Hargreaves (n 31) 93. 
64
 ibid. 
65
 Article 7(1). 
66
 Kilbey (n 9) 106. 
67
 ibid. 
68
 Nicole Dufft, Natali Helberger, Stef Van Gompel & Bernt Hugenholtz ‘Never forever: why extending the term 
of protection for sound recordings is a bad idea’ [2008] 30(5) EIPR 174, 176. 
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The restricted acts69 in the CDPA are comprehensive, and leave little room for manoeuvre. However 
sections 28 to 55 set out various limited exceptions to those acts, such as use in research, private 
study, critique and news reporting.70 These exceptions are rather vaguely defined in general as ‘fair 
dealing’ with ‘sufficient acknowledgement’. A detailed description of exactly what constitutes fair 
dealing is not provided. Therefore it is left to individuals to personally judge whether their use of a 
protected work falls within ‘fair dealing’ and provides ‘sufficient acknowledgement’, or not.71 
Although these terms may have been defined through case law, there is still a lack of certainty to 
their exact meaning. This may allow for flexibility but still leaves a degree of uncertainty. 
Section 96(2) CDPA states that ‘In an action for infringement of copyright all such relief by way of 
damages, injunctions, accounts or otherwise is available to the plaintiff as is available in respect of 
the infringement of any other property right’. This is quite an extensive range of remedies available 
to the injured party, especially when the broad range of rights and prohibited acts is taken into 
consideration. 
The basis for national legislation was the Berne Convention.72 This European-wide treaty set out the 
three-step test for use of copyrighted works. Article 9(2) permits reproduced of copyrighted material 
in special cases, if this does not conflict with normal exploitation of the work and does not 
unreasonably prejudice the rights holder’s legitimate interests, although the form of this legislation 
was left to the individual country. Article 13 of TRIPS73 reaffirmed the test as the basis for 
considering the scope of copyright exploitation, but the permissive nature of the obligation became 
mandatory.74 The difficulties with copyright enforcement clearly drove the World Trade Organisation 
to tighten up enforcement measures in a bid to control copyright infringement, which has been a 
problem long before the digital age.75 In other ways, too, the agreement went further than Berne, 
strengthening other aspects of copyright law. Article 9 enshrined the principle of inherent integrity 
of copyright by granting copyright status to works automatically without the need to formally 
register its existence. This seems to reflect the natural law interpretation of copyright as a right to 
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the inherent value of ownership of a personal creation and that individual’s right to control any 
exploitation of their own works. By extension this also addressed the economic aspect of creativity. 
Full autonomy over their own works naturally allows individuals to exploit them economically, or 
not, as they see fit. 
However, as Geiger notes,76 the subtle change in wording echoes the mutation of the status of 
copyright and weakens the previous, highly valued interpretation of copyright as an inherent right 
for creators. The landscape of the creative industry market meant that, now, the legitimate interests 
of the rights holder were enshrined in law. Contrast this with the legitimate interests of the author 
specifically referred to in Article 10 of the Berne Convention. The economic value of copyright 
interests has inevitably, and perhaps understandably, begun to triumph over the natural law right as 
this sets the tone for future copyright enforcement laws. 
The E-Commerce and Information Society Directives, for example, were the next major pieces of EU 
legislation to affect copyright law in the UK, enacted through the European Union in 2000 and 2001 
respectively. The E-Commerce Directive was incorporated into UK law through the Electronic 
Commerce Regulations 2002. Articles 12, 13 and 14 provide some protection for Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) in the form of the ‘mere conduit’, caching and hosting defences respectively. The ISP 
would escape liability if it was established that it had no ‘actual knowledge’ of the presence of 
unlawful content and, when knowledge was communicated, it must ‘act expeditiously to remove or 
to disable access’ to the information or work in question. Without this, an impossibly heavy burden 
would have been imposed on ISPs to prevent all infringing activity from occurring via, or in 
connection with, their services. However the phrase ‘acts expeditiously’ should be clarified. How 
much does the requirement to act ‘expeditiously’ outweigh any administrative or financial burden 
placed upon the ISP? This question will remain unanswered until the all elements of the Digital 
Economy Act become fully operational and a suitable case arises. In addition, copyright infringement 
is occurring hundreds of thousands of times daily. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect ISPs to expend a 
significant proportion of their time removing and disabling access every time they receive notice of 
infringement, which the ISP would then have to verify each time prior to taking action. 
The Pirate Bay case77 provides a good example of how the above ‘safe harbour’ provisions of the 
Directive may be interpreted. The website operators were found to be ‘hosting’78 infringing material, 
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and had actual knowledge79 of the infringement, as they had received multiple take-down notices 
from copyrights owners whose rights had been infringed.  Therefore the website operators were 
guilty of assisting in making copyright content available or contributory liability. The defendants then 
attempted to rely on safe harbour provisions but failed. Importantly, it was not required that they 
must know of specific offenders, or even which specific works were involved. It was enough that 
they had actual knowledge that infringement of some sort was occurring.80 This demonstrates how 
broadly ‘actual knowledge’ tends to be interpreted, and the associated difficulty of relying on safe 
harbour provisions. This broad interpretation of the ‘actual knowledge’ test set the tone for future 
judgments, such as the Newzbin and Newzbin2 cases, analysed in more detail later in the chapter.81  
The Pirate Bay case is significant because it highlights not only the use of blocking injunctions against 
a high profile piracy organisation, but it also brought to the fore the polarisation of the music 
industry and the disaffected (in their view) pirates, defenders of the users’ ‘right’ (again, in their 
view) to freedom of information. It also confirms that criminal sanctions are not particularly 
effective in copyright enforcement, as the website reappeared within days of it being taken down. 
The prevailing attitude of internet pirates’ contempt for the law is evident in their derisory language 
used throughout, with one of the founders even claiming that the website would be ‘impossible’ to 
shut down as it ‘has a life of its own’82, and the instant availability of a new Pirate Bay website once 
the old one had been blocked. But it is in the questionable interpretation of the idea of freedom of 
speech often held by high profile internet pirates which has helped to fuel the fire of conflict 
between rights holders and users. A long term educational approach would help to dampen down 
the conflict with a balanced, informed debate.83 
Following the E-Commerce Directive, a year later the Information Society Directive encouraged 
further EU harmonisation of copyright legislation, in preparation for the ratification of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty.84 It included provisions for protection against circumventing technological 
measures designed to protect unauthorised use of material.85 It also provided an exhaustive list of 
(optional) copyright exceptions, stating the need for fair compensation for the rights holder when 
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using copyrighted works under such an exception.86 The provisions of the Directive were 
implemented in UK legislation through The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, effected 
through amendment of the CDPA. 
A major criticism of this Directive is that the anti-circumvention measures can be considered to be 
anti-competitive and even stifle progress,87 leading to companies using lock-ins and other measures 
to prevent cross-compatibility for both hardware and software.88 Lee argues that progress cannot be 
achieved without a marketplace of competition founded on interoperable products and consumer 
choice.89 Although written in the context of US legislation, Lee’s point is nevertheless applicable to 
European jurisdictions, bound as we are to the key principle of commitment to fair competition and 
the prohibition of unfair trade practices in the single market.90 This interoperability may be needed 
not just for the advancement of technology in general, but may actually be required in order to 
provide access to copyrighted works for certain individuals who, through disability perhaps or many 
other reasons, cannot access the work in its original form.91 Rychlicki reminds us that copyright law is 
not the ultimate law and can therefore be trumped by other rights, such as those of societal 
interest.92 It is submitted that the reverse engineering of products or services for the purposes of 
enabling access to those who cannot access the work in its original form is just such a societal 
interest, as is the advancement of technology more generally through which interoperability is often 
required.  
Indeed, as Rychlicki notes, it could be argued that these anti-circumvention measures may 
contradict EU principles relating to the Information Society itself.93 The eEurope Action Plan directly 
refers to the need ‘to strengthen competition and interoperability’94 and the Information Society 
Directive itself stresses that ‘Compatibility and interoperability of different systems should be 
encouraged’.95 This emphasis on the importance of such activities in a global digital world renders 
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inexplicable the lack of clarification of, or even cursory reference to, this issue in the actual 
provisions of the Directive. Although there has been some development here in other areas of law, 
at e-government level for example,96 the issue was not resolved in the Information Society Directive, 
leaving interoperability and reverse engineering of copyrighted technology in a complex and 
somewhat contradictory legal position. 
 
The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 added section 296ZD to the CDPA which 
prohibits produces and services for sale, advertised or possessed for commercial purposes if they 
have only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent’97 or are 
‘primarily designed, produced, adapted or performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating’ 
circumvention’.98 The terms ‘limited commercially significant purpose’ and ‘primarily’ are not 
defined and leave a wide discretion for the judiciary to interpret the provision to block new 
technological developments, unless the developers can prove that the product or service was not, in 
fact, developed ‘primarily’ for use for circumvention of technological protection measures. 
These provisions could potentially impact on the development of interoperable products in 
particular, one of the key factors touted by Lee in the pursuit of progress through consumer choice,99 
making it very difficult for developers to produce hardware or software, for example, to be 
compatible with other products or services, without being caught by anti-circumvention measures. 
There is no requirement in the Directive, or subsequent UK provisions, that the circumvention must 
also include intent to infringe through that circumvention, so this would be no defence to 
developers looking to merely ensure that their new product or service would be compatible with 
another device or service, without going through a costly process of requiring full collaboration with 
the owners of that device or service100. Lee argues that this ability to build interoperable products 
without permission or cooperation is ‘vital’ to technological innovation,101 a principle which he 
argues is backed up by US case law.102 The outcome of the Microsoft case103 suggests that EU case 
law also supports this principle in theory, although the lack of clarification and specific guidance on 
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interoperability at EU level does little to promote the aim. In Microsoft, it was held that Microsoft’s 
refusal to allow interoperability had a damaging effect on consumer choice and put its competitors 
at a significant disadvantage, hindering technological progress.104 As Mylly observes, this case 
highlights the vital role of interoperability in the development of technology.105 But the case refers 
specifically to interoperability of computer programs, which is covered by a separate directive,106 
allowing users to ‘study, observe and test’ software ‘in order to determine the ideas and principles’ 
underlying its design and function.107 The principle of the importance of interoperability of computer 
programs established in this case can still be applied to other types of interoperability however, and 
it is submitted that the permission given by the Software Directive should be extended to reverse 
engineering of other technological devices and services that may not be described specifically as 
‘software’. 
Other EU countries have transposed the Information Society Directive in a similar way to the UK, 
causing the same problems to potentially arise. Germany’s interpretation of the anti-circumvention 
measures in the Information Society Directive also has the potential to cause just such a dampening 
effect for example, as it is similarly broad in its definition of anti-circumvention technology. Section 
95a(3)(2) and (3) set out that products and services are prohibited where they only have a ‘restricted 
economic purpose or benefit’ other than circumvention, or are ‘mostly...produced...in order to 
facilitate or make easier’ circumvention. 108 The terms ‘restricted’ and ‘mostly’ [nearest equivalents 
in translation] are similarly broad and again undefined,109 left to be interpreted and applied by the 
judiciary on a case-by-case basis. 
Thankfully, the SAS Institute110 case which came before the European Court of Justice has clarified 
one particular point with regard to reverse engineering. The case concerned whether or not 
functionality and interfaces of computer programs can be protected by copyright, as a competitor, 
World Programming, had used reverse engineering to emulate the functionality of SAS’s computer 
programs. On appeal, Lewison LJ also held that ‘neither the SAS Language nor the functionality of 
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the SAS System is protected by copyright’, confirming the High Court’s decision,111 and so the appeal 
was dismissed.112 In addition, Lewison LJ confirmed that, despite the licence stating that competitors 
could not use the program in order to develop a rival product, any such provision in a licence would 
be rendered null and void113  as such use is permitted by Article 5(3) of the Software Directive,114 as 
set out by Arnold J.115 Whilst this common sense ruling allowed reverse engineering in this particular 
instance, there are still no defined parameters for developers to abide by when using reverse 
engineering. With no guidelines to work within, progress may be stifled as developers hold back for 
fear of the unknown if their actions were to be challenged. The SAS Institute case also specifically 
involved computer programs, for which the Software Directive is applicable. The legal position on 
reverse engineering of other types of digital media therefore remains unclear. 
Europe might look to France for some inspiration for interoperability standards, enacted as part of 
the DADVSI law,116 which amended the French Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle (CPI). Article L 331-
5 states that technical protection measures (TPMs) should not have the effect of preventing 
effective implementation of interoperability, so long as this respects copyright. Moreover, suppliers 
of TPMs may also be required to provide information which is essential to interoperability.117 Initially 
these measures seem a promising provision for ease and speed of technical innovation. However, 
after much controversy including a high profile conflict with Apple,118 Article 14 at L 331-6 
introduced a way for copyright holders to partially bypass these provisions, in that they can withhold 
interoperability information if they can show that this would contravene the copyright owner’s 
express wishes. Case law may show whether or not this potential loophole can be exploited, but it 
would be unfortunate if it could, as it may undo all of the good work towards protection of 
interoperability that may be achieved by DADVSI.   
To ensure compliance, regulate interoperability and undertake a monitory role,119 Article L 331-17 
created the Autorité de Régulation des Mesures Techniques (ARMT). Jondet argues that this 
legislative framework, backed by the considerable powers of the ARMT, is robust and successfully 
                                                             
111 [2013] EWHC 69, 82. 
112 [2013] EWCA Civ 1482, 19. 
113 ibid 93. 
114 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programs [2009] OJL 111/16 (Software Directive). 
115  [2013] EWHC 69, 61. 
116 Loi 2006-961 du 1 aout 2006 relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l’information 
(DADSVI). 
117
 DADVSI Article L331-5. 
118
 Elinor Mills ‘Apple calls French law ‘state-sponsored piracy’’ (CNET News, 22 March 2006) 
<http://news.cnet.com/Apple-calls-French-law-state-sponsored-piracy/2100-1025_3-6052754.html> accessed 
3
rd
 March 2015.  
119 Article L 331-8. 
19 
 
protects TPMs whilst at the same time providing adequately for interoperability and therefore 
avoids the stifling of innovation, without compromising copyright.120 There is certainly some 
potential for inspiration in the French legislation for other European countries to explore. The 
competitive and innovative market created by interoperability provides a greater incentive for 
creators to develop new interoperable products and services with less fear of repercussions. The 
French legislature has clearly recognised that this is an important factor in the balancing of the 
protection of copyright with the encouragement of creators to build on and compliment the 
successes of others.  
Jondet may be correct in asserting that France has achieved a fair and workable legal solution to 
DRMs and interoperability.121 But Leistner and Spindler argue that monitoring costs for the sort of 
secondary liability associated with anti-circumvention and interoperability laws, coupled with the 
potential hampering of desirable technological advances in those countries without France’s level of 
interoperability protection, can lead to an inefficient and therefore unsatisfactory result. Levies, 
rather than liabilities, can be a more effective solution.122 Chapter 4.1 of this thesis sets out such a 
solution. 
The next piece of EU legislation to be considered is the2004 EU Enforcement Directive.123 This was 
essentially intended to ‘provide for the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the 
enforcement of the intellectual property rights’.124 Its repetition of the importance of consumers’ 
interests being ‘taken into account’125 implies a desire to balance rights holders’ interests with those 
of users as well. Yet as Huniar states, ‘the United Kingdom already providing a high level of 
protection for exclusive rights’ and the Directive serves to further increase ‘levels of protection for 
right holders’. 126  In reality it is therefore clear that the Directive merely enhances the rights of 
copyright owners, and does little to support the importance of access to material for the benefit and 
advancement of society as a whole, and nor does it acknowledge the lack of evidence for stronger 
enforcement equating to better protection for rights holders. 
The next major piece of legislation to be considered is the Digital Economy Act 2010. 
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Chapter 2.2 Introduction to the Digital Economy Act 
The Digital Economy Act was enacted in 2010 amid much controversy.  The Gowers127 report urged 
that ‘If this [industry agreement of protocols to prevent online piracy] has not proved operationally 
successful by the end of 2007, Government should consider whether to legislate.’128 Unsurprisingly, 
industry protocols had not cured the online piracy problem as research shows.129 The 2009 Digital 
Britain report130 preceded the enactment of the 2010 Act. In the report it was stated that legislation 
would be necessary and broadly set out two requirements to be imposed on ISPs. These involve 
notifying copyright infringers that they have committed an infringing act and to ’maintain and make 
available data to enable the minority of serious repeat infringers to be identified’.131 In addition, a 
code of practice would be set up. This would be regulated by OFCOM who would also be given the 
power to impose various obligations on ISPs such as blocking (site, IP, URL), content filtering and 
bandwidth capping.132  These measures would be implemented with the ambitious intention of 
reducing illegal file-sharing by ’70-80%’.133  
The Act itself was arguably rushed through Parliament as part of the ‘wash-up’ period.134 Clause 17 
was introduced at the last moment, having not been part of the Digital Britain report. Despite this, it 
was drafted in to the final version of the Act.135 This provision contained the ability to grant a 
blocking injunction against an ISP ordering it to block access to an offending website and was 
therefore a significant modification of the Digital Economy Bill, and therefore deserving of the 
appropriate amount of considered debate. These anomalies, combined with the speed with which it 
was rushed through Parliament, led to the Digital Economy Act’s rather controversial reputation as 
an unhelpful and unfair piece of legislation.136 To add to the general confusion surrounding the Act, 
the provisions it contains are largely amendments of the Communications Act 2003, and are treated 
as such. There are constant references to, and slight changes made to various sections of the 2003 
Act, at times rendering it confusing and difficult to follow. Despite claims that its major impetus was 
to provide clarity and educate the public, the Act is in fact so inconsistent and inaccessible, that even 
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those required to implement its provisions (such as ISPs) will have difficulties with interpretation. 
Therefore end users will arguably be even less likely to be able to comprehend it, and so moderate 
their own behaviour accordingly.  
The aim of the Act can be roughly divided into two key areas: outlining a new role of responsibility 
for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and targeting users with the ‘three strikes’ process. The 
provisions of the Act, particularly those considered controversial, will be discussed below. 
 
Chapter 2.3 Provisions of the Act  
It is important to note that the provisions of the DEA currently only apply to ISPs with over 400,000 
broadband lines. These account for around 93% of the market.137 Only a brief perusal of the 
copyright infringement provisions of the Act is required to identify one major reason for its criticism 
– the heavy burden placed upon ISPs. Sections 3 and 4 set out ISPs’ obligations to notify and provide 
lists of infringers if requested. This gives copyright owners significant powers whilst at the same time 
imposing an arguably onerous set of obligations on ISPs.  
In section 3, it states that if an ISP receives a copyright infringement report (CIR) from a rights holder 
it must notify the subscriber [infringer]of the report, if the initial obligations code requires the 
provider to do so. This indicates that the ISP is also responsible for evaluating the report received to 
deduce whether or not the initial obligations code would apply and therefore whether notification is 
necessary. A notification involves the collection of a considerable amount of information. Whilst 
most of this involves standard advice to the subscriber such as how to legally obtain copyrighted 
works, a notification must also include items such as detailed evidence of the exact occurrences of 
infringing activities. This may involve a considerable amount of time and expense for the ISP in 
question. Yet the CIR, compiled by the rights holder, must also include evidence of the apparent 
infringement, including exact timing of occurrences, just as the notification requires of ISPs.138 
Essentially this indicates that the rights holder bears the burden of obtaining most of the necessary 
information, with ISPs only adding guidance to the information received before sending the 
notification off to the offending subscriber. 
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 The compilation of a CIR would likely be an arduous process for an individual rights holder, many of 
whom will have little or no legal or technical knowledge, and may even require costly legal advice. It 
would appear then that this sort of protection is, in reality, only available to those entities large 
enough to have the resources to undertake such an investigation. It is perhaps unlikely that 
individuals who are rights holders would be able to gather the required evidence without detailed 
guidance at the very least. It would seem that the law is drafted to benefit the industry, with little 
consideration for the individual rights holder. This does not sit well with the notion of copyright and 
its effective enforcement being intended for the protection and encouragement of creativity, if this 
protection is not applied equally in practice. 
 Moreover, section 3 is confusing, and charges ISPs with the difficult task of attempting to verify the 
evidence provided by the rights holder. It is unclear from the text of the Act, but it would appear 
that ISPs cannot simply take evidence provided at face value, as, if this were the case, many innocent 
individuals may be issued with notifications due to ineffective or not fully substantiated evidence 
gathering. As the standard is merely ‘apparent infringement’, ISPs may have to deal with a very large 
number of CIRs from rights holders keen to attack any possible signs of potential infringement. 
There is little in this section to address these issues. As part of the Initial Obligations Code, OFCOM 
suggests that ‘a copyright owner (or an agent acting on their behalf) should, before submitting their 
first CIR (and from then on an annual basis), provide OFCOM with a quality assurance report, which 
details the processes and systems used by the copyright owner (or any party acting on its behalf) to 
gather evidence’. The quality assurance report requires a copyright owner (or their agent) to include 
a statement of compliance with relevant data protection laws’.139 These ‘relevant data protection 
laws’ are not clarified in the Code.  OFCOM will then approve (or not) the methods used by the 
copyright holder in compiling the CIR.140  Whilst this is intended to prevent an overwhelming number 
of badly undertaken CIRs, in reality it imposes a further burden on individual rights holders. The 
legislation will only support the large-scale corporations with the financial resources to take on these 
significant hurdles.  
 A further issue is the effectiveness of the CIR.  This approach to improving enforcement does not 
take into account the plethora of ways available to the savvy internet user to achieve anonymity or 
hijack innocent users’ identities to commit illegal acts. Thus the main culprits, those who are most 
likely to commit large scale, or at least very regular, copyright infringement, are the ones most likely 
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to be able to circumvent these measures. Therefore, identification of infringers still remains a major 
concern in need of attention. 
Section 4 then requires ISPs to furnish rights holders with an ‘infringement list’ if requested, or 
obliged under the initial obligations code to do so. This list is essentially to identify repeat offenders, 
and must include which of the CIRs made by the rights holder to the ISP relate to the subscriber in 
question. The reasoning behind the inclusion of this convoluted section appears to be that although 
copyright owners may be able to acquire a list of IP addresses themselves, they may not be able to 
find out which IP address(es) belongs to which individual subscriber and therefore to identify repeat 
offenders.141 This is because often ISPs issue subscribers with dynamic IP addresses, which alter 
automatically every time they connect to their internet service. However, as Farrand observes, 
further explanation is vital to avoid confusion here, yet is not provided.142 
This appears to be a consistent problem with the Act and in Farrand’s view leads back to the fact 
that it was rushed through Parliament, without the proper debate and scrutiny such a complex piece 
of legislation deserves. 143 As a result, the text at times reads more like a draft than a finalised piece 
of legislation, with Section 42, for example, referring to ‘making or dealing with infringing activities 
etc’. The use of ‘etc’ supports Farrand’s point, and is unacceptable in a legislative document. It is not 
possible to regulate one’s own behaviour, or indeed for the courts to do so, without clearly defined 
parameters. Whilst words such as ‘reasonable’ are often used in law and are open to judicial 
interpretation, in this instance ‘etc’ refers to a list of undisclosed, prohibited behaviours. 
Vagueness of legislation is not a new problem to copyright law. Larusson notes that the very ad hoc 
nature of its development over the years has inevitably led to ‘considerable uncertainty’.144 The 
fractured nature of the legislation makes it difficult for the individual to access one simple document 
containing all copyright laws in one place. There is much potential in the Copyright Hub to address 
this accessibility issue and provide the single, consolidated source of all legislation and guidance in 
copyright law that is so clearly required to promote clarity for all parties.145 
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Larusson also suggests that a further cause for uncertainty is the difficulties posed by transposition 
of EU Directives.146 This is an important point, as the very act of translation into another language 
raises the problem of interpretation and may unintentionally shift emphasis towards or away from 
the original meaning of the text, leading to the potential for over- or under- implementation. 
According to some commentators, 147  vagueness is very common at EU level as well, exacerbating 
the problem for national transposition. Brown takes this a step further, stating that the provisions in 
the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty were ambiguous, particularly in relation to the definition and scope 
of anti-circumvention measures for example.148 Article 11 requires ‘adequate’ legal protection 
against circumvention of effective technological measures in connection with the exercise of 
authors’ rights. Brown argues that the EU did not take the opportunity to improve this, instead 
replicating the vague language used in the Treaty.149 Whilst this lack of certainty does allow for 
individual countries to interpret EU Directives in a way which best fits with their legal framework, it 
relies entirely on individual nations to provide the detailed provisions which are so lacking in the 
Directive. If this is not achieved, the consumer at the end of the line is unlikely to be able to interpret 
and apply the provisions to their own activities. Although the balance between the lack of certainty 
through the absence of definitions and allowing flexibility within the law can arguably be a good 
thing for lawyers, it can leave users confused and uncertain about the law. 
Dimitrakopoulos also emphasises the political aspect to transposition of directives.150 Inevitably, 
national legislatures will seek to transpose EU law in such a way as to minimise its impact on current 
national legislation. The UK, for example, seeks to keep EU legislation separate from UK legislation 
which may be viewed as a somewhat defensive attitude to transposition.151 The broad variation of 
political standpoints, ranging from enthusiasm to outright scepticism, across Europe will inevitably 
lead to some variation in transposition and subsequent interpretation of EU legislation. This lack of 
total harmonisation is understandable, but nevertheless serves to add an extra layer of confusion 
and vagueness to the mix for those seeking to determine exactly what the law is, and to regulate 
their behaviour accordingly. 
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In order to fulfil the complex obligations in Section 4 of the DEA then, the OFCOM Initial Obligations 
Code proposes that a time-based, three strike notification approach is appropriate.152 Therefore if an 
ISP is required to send three notifications to an infringing subscriber, any infringement committed 
following this will be subject to sanctions. It is considered that ‘one month is an appropriate 
minimum time’153 between the first and second notification, and ‘a third notification should be sent 
if the subscriber has received two notifications within the previous 12 months’.154 This graduated 
response approach, commonly referred to as the ‘three strikes’ rule, has received a largely negative 
response, and has in fact been delayed by an application for judicial review.155  The warning letters 
approach was supposed to come into force in 2014, with the first notification letters due to be sent 
early that year. However, frequent delays mean that letters are unlikely to be sent until the end of 
2015.  
There is some concern over the format of notifications. Despite ISPs concerns over costs, OFCOM 
decided that all three notifications must be sent by first class post, not by email, although there is 
only a requirement to send the third and final notice by recorded delivery.156 Therefore there is no 
guarantee that the user will actually receive the first two notifications, and their third and final strike 
may be the first they hear of the situation. It is somewhat unusual to insist on written 
communication as ‘certainty of delivery is more important’ than ISPs costs, then to resist the 
mandatory use of a recorded delivery service in order to ensure receipt. If certainty of delivery is so 
important, this provision does little to promote it.  
This blanket three letters cease and desist approach appears to suggest that just 3 downloads per 
year is too many, assuming that the infringer is notified of all three occurrences. The legislation may 
be considered to be disproportionate here. The ordinary person’s idea of large scale downloading is 
completely disconnected from the legislation. However, when taken together, these relatively 
infrequent downloads can add up to a real economic loss for copyright holders. This feeds into the 
idea of an alternative business model for gaining revenue.157 It also shows that education is needed 
to teach society about the real losses associated with online infringement. Just because an individual 
is not physically taking a tangible item from another person, it does not mean that they are not still 
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causing real economic harm.158 Chapter 4.4 emphasises the importance of education as a tool to 
tackle infringement in the long term.  
Despite the presence of a similar legal framework in France,159 the graduated response system has 
been criticised as a draconian measure by various sectors,160 which may lead to many innocent users 
losing their internet access. In the modern age, this goes beyond being merely inconvenient. Many 
people depend on the internet in a multitude of ways, of which their livelihoods and vital contact 
with family and business contacts are just two that stand out. The potential consequences of 
internet disconnection are arguably not worth the potential benefit to copyright owners. Especially 
as, once again, it is the serial offenders who are mostly likely to be able to manipulate and 
circumvent such basic measures, leading vulnerable, (often) individuals to bear the burden.161 It is 
submitted that this is simply not a proportionate response. It is impossible to justify the removal of a 
vital service such as the internet from an individual who may wholly rely on it for many reasons, as a 
punishment for the relatively small loss of royalties suffered by the copyright holder caused by that 
individual.  
Sections 5-7 provide a detailed set of instructions for OFCOM regarding the initial obligations code.  
Despite the relatively extensive criteria however, OFCOM still has a relatively wide scope to develop 
the initial obligations. Sections 5 and 6 also provide that the code does not have to be fixed, and can 
be amended if necessary. This provides a flexible framework for the evolving digital world, but 
admittedly does so at the expense of legal certainty. 162 
Section 8 requires OFCOM to provide annual, or sometimes more frequent, progress reports to the 
Secretary of State once the initial obligations code has been implemented.  
Under sections 9 and 10, which refer to obligations to limit internet access, ‘Internet service 
providers and copyright owners must give OFCOM any assistance that OFCOM reasonably require’ 
for limiting internet access due to infringement. The Secretary of State can, following OFCOM 
reports, direct OFCOM to ‘assess’ whether or not to impose a technical obligation on an ISP to limit a 
subscribers’ access. This rather vague obligation does admittedly include the word ‘reasonable’, yet 
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this is not defined and each party’s interpretation of ‘reasonable’ will undoubtedly differ to a large 
extent. It is to be hoped that OFCOM is able to achieve a fair definition of ‘reasonable’ that does not 
impose too large a burden on ISPs. Case law will reveal whether or not this is the case.163  
Section 10(5) sets out the three steps OFCOM must include in its assessment:  
‘(a) consultation of copyright owners, internet service providers, subscribers or any other 
person; 
(b) an assessment of the likely efficacy of a technical measure in relation to a particular type 
of internet access service; and 
(c) steps to prepare a proposed technical obligations code.’ 
These vague instructions provide no detailed criteria to be followed, and is therefore apparently left 
to OFCOM to determine. How and when the subscriber is notified of this investigation is not defined.  
Section 13 of the Act seems to conflict with the subscribers’ obligations under section 3. Section 3 
states that a notification must contain ‘information enabling the subscriber to obtain advice, about 
steps that a subscriber can take to protect an internet access service from unauthorised use’. Yet 
section 13 states that any appeal made by a subscriber may be won if the subscriber can prove that 
he ‘took reasonable steps to prevent other persons infringing copyright’. The use of the ‘other 
persons’ implies that subscribers must also attempt to prevent infringing activity being committed 
by authorised users of his internet service, as well as unauthorised, despite advice concerning this 
being entirely absent from any notification received. Individuals may therefore be uncertain as to 
exactly how to protect themselves from liability.  
A notification should also contain advice relating to ‘reasonable steps’ to take in order to prevent 
‘other persons’ committing infringing acts. Yet the definition of ‘reasonable steps’ is not given and is 
therefore vague and uncertain. It is presumed that this means that the individual must inform 
authorised users that they must not commit infringing acts. It is wholly unclear whether or not this is 
sufficient. Must the rights holder remind users of this regularly? How regularly is sufficiently 
frequent? Is he required have the technological knowledge to explain in detail to authorised users 
how they may avoid infringement? And how could he possibly prove that he has done this? Users 
cannot surely be required to actively monitor internet usage. Most individuals do not have the 
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technological capacity to do so. Indeed, some may not be aware of online infringement if they have 
never participated themselves. A good example here is to consider a parent and child. The parent 
may provide the internet with very little knowledge of its use, whilst the teenage child may very well 
be au fait with infringement and how to exploit a good internet connection in that way.  
Ensuring that your WiFi is coded, to prevent unwanted usage, is common place. But not all 
protection measures are so simple. For example, games on mobile phones are often vague as to 
what is included for ‘free’ as part of the game, and what is to be downloaded at cost. Many people, 
particularly children, may well be unaware of the proper, legal way of doing this. Indeed, such is the 
nature of digital technology, that often one is not even aware that downloading is taking place. It is 
somewhat unrealistic to expect the subscriber to be able to prevent any authorised user from 
committing an illegal act, such as downloading a song or watch a film online. One would have to be 
well versed in the fast-paced world of illegal websites to be able to tell whether any user had been 
accessing a harmless legal website, or an illegal one, for example.  
Accessible, easily comprehensible information is essential for society as a whole to understand how 
to protect against infringement in the case of both authorised and unauthorised use of internet 
services. As it stands the legislation of copyright law is confusing and often unintelligible to persons 
not well versed in legal jargon. The Digital Economy Act has done nothing to improve this situation. 
Indeed, it has undoubtedly contributed to the already prevailing uncertainty.  
Moreover, a subscriber has a limit of just ‘20 working days from the date of receipt of a 
notification’164 to make an appeal. This is a short period of time for a layperson to react and make a 
case for appeal. The appeal will cost the subscriber £20, although thankfully this will be refunded if 
the appeal is successful.165 Individuals do not generally monitor their own usage, ignorant of any 
need to do so, and could not realistically be able to compile any meaningful information in any case. 
It is not made clear how much information a user can request from an ISP in order to help to build 
his case for appeal. 
Section 14 affords a substantial power to OFCOM; that is, to impose an ‘appropriate’ and 
‘proportionate’ fine of up to £250,000 for contravention of an initial or technical obligation. In other 
words, an obligation is imposed on an ISP. Rather ominously for ISPs, even this is not fixed, and ‘The 
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Secretary of State may by order amend this section so as to substitute a different maximum penalty’. 
This increases the already onerous burden placed on ISPs who appear to have been made essentially 
responsible for policing the internet and preventing online infringement. Although there is no official 
obligation to monitor, the various provisions of the Act arguably amount to the same thing. This 
substantial upper limit of the fine represents a tough approach to copyright infringement, tipping 
the balance further in favour of copyright holders’ exclusivity.  
The Sharing of Costs section166 does only a little to relieve the burden of costs on ISPs and refers the 
possible sharing of costs between ISPs and rights holders to be established in the initial obligations 
code. The draft legislation167 certainly sets out the various types of relevant costs, but essentially 
leaves the sharing of costs (that is, the title of this piece of draft legislation) to be determined by 
OFCOM. OFCOM has advised that it will order that ‘Copyright Owners should bear all of the costs 
incurred by OFCOM, the majority of costs incurred by the appeals body, and 75% of the costs 
efficiently and reasonably incurred by Qualifying ISPs in carrying out their obligations.’168 In addition, 
subscribers are forced to pay £20 to appeal against an infringement claim, however insubstantial the 
evidential basis for the claim may be. 169 However there has been a slight amendment to the costs 
sharing obligations, following judicial review.170 
The above provision does alleviate ISPs a little from what is a serious financial and administrative 
burden. However it does, of course, also mean that only those large corporations, or parties with 
many resources, will be able to afford to fully protect their rights. It would appear that individual 
rights holders have to afford a hefty financial investment in attempting to enforce their rights. This 
raises questions about the true motives behind copyright legislation. If our strong legal protection 
scheme is based on a steadfast belief in the importance and integrity of copyright ownership, why is 
its enforcement only realistically available to those who can afford to fight for it? 
The introduction of the concept of ‘qualifying ISPs’ is important too. These are defined as the main 
six ISPs.171 This is because, at present, it is considered that to impose such obligations on smaller ISPs 
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would be impractical and unfair. Although this has been challenged,172 it is so far set to remain. 
However this raises the problem that most public WiFi providers, such as hotels and libraries, are 
very likely to be subscribed to one of these ISPs and may therefore be the victim of action taken by 
ISPs who have no choice but to do so, if a user of the WiFi service was to commit an infringing 
activity.  
Sections 17 and 18 of the Act were to require ISPs to block access to infringing websites. Websites 
such as Youtube, where infringing videos are constantly being uploaded, would technically fall under 
this definition and could potentially be subject to an injunction under the Act. These ‘blocking 
injunctions’, set out in section 17, would afford the Secretary of State considerable power, but 
would be extremely difficult to successfully implement against the might of an organisation such as 
Youtube, owned by Google, not least due to the substantial contribution in revenue also gained by 
copyright holders through promotion of material on Youtube. As Garstka points out, an injunction 
against a website like Youtube would likely never happen,173 because any attempt to do so would 
not get past, for example, freedom of expression laws174  and those concerning the protection of the 
legitimate interests of other parties. 175 These other parties widely use Youtube for publicity 
purposes, for example bands upload new material to whet fans’ appetites and the film industry 
releases teaser trailers etc. For these legitimate users, the blocking of Youtube could be a 
devastating loss of the promotion and exposure so vital to success in their industry. 
 This may lead to difficulty ensuring that the injunctions were applied fairly and equally, without the 
Secretary of State being required to make any sort of value judgement on the website itself and 
other aspects of its contents in order to decide whether or not to impose a blocking injunction. This 
could lead to a two-tier system in which a website which was able to establish and evidence a strong 
legitimate interest for its users, as Youtube has done, would be relatively difficult to challenge under 
the law even if it were used for piracy as well. As a result of an OFCOM report,176 in 2012 the 
government announced that it would not be implementing the website blocking provisions (sections 
17 and 18 of the Act) as they would be ineffective and section 97A CDPA was already in existence, 
and becoming more prominently used by the judiciary.177 
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In addition, Garstka goes on to argue that the ‘inherent flaw’ in blocking injunctions is the tendency 
of blocked pirated websites to instantly reappear under a new name, or sometimes not even that 
but merely a new ISP. 178 When The Pirate Bay reappeared with the same name, traffic actually 
increasing on their new website following the publicity caused by the court case and blocking 
injunction.179 
The notion of ‘qualifying ISPs’ may be considered reasonable due to cost issues for small ISPs, but 
from an effectiveness point of view, it is clearly flawed, allowing infringers to continue to exploit 
copyrighted material freely via hundreds of non-qualifying ISPs. The law should never be 
discriminatory. Most likely this decision has been based on the practicalities of cost implications for 
smaller ISPs, but surely this issue alone should cause alarm bells to ring, and raise questions as to the 
fairness and practical suitability of this new system. Worse still, this application of the law to a 
restrictive category of ISPs leaves the Act vulnerable to manipulation. Individuals determined to 
continue to obtain copyrighted material in an illegal manner may be more likely to move to a 
smaller, non-qualifying ISP to evade liability under the Act.  
In addition, Cusack raises the possibility of qualifying ISPs claiming that this will have an anti-
competitive effect as customers may be incentivised to migrate to smaller operators.180 Whilst this 
may be a somewhat unconvincing claim, as it is difficult to justify the need to be competitive for 
users seeking to commit crimes, this example does serve to illustrate the complex interaction of the 
many different rights and needs that are affected by copyright law and infringement. This legislation 
clearly affects rights holders and consumers, but also significantly impacts on the activities of other 
sectors such as ISPs and businesses such as hotels, libraries and cafes which provide WiFi for their 
customers as a valuable selling point for their organisation.  This interplay between various different 
rights is undoubtedly difficult, but it is submitted that the various obligations imposed on ISPs, 
together with section 14’s potential £250,000 fine for failure to fulfil obligations, are too 
burdensome and it is at present difficult to justify their new role as ‘copyright cops’.181 Edwards 
questions the justification of this burden, bearing in mind the total lack of potential gain for ISPs 
from the process, other than potential litigation or customer ill will. There is not enough clarification 
for ISPs here either, as it is difficult to determine what may lead to a fine. Would the provision of 
                                                             
178 Garstka (n 46) 173. 
179
 Kate Solomon, ‘Blocking Pirate Bay obviously working as traffic shoots up’ (Techradar, 1 May 2012) 
<http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/blocking-pirate-bay-obviously-working-as-traffic-shoots-up-
1078679> accessed 21st January 2015. 
180
 Nick Cusack, ‘Is the Digital Economy Act 2010 the most effective and proportionate way to reduce online 
piracy?’[2011] 33(9) EIPR 559, 561. 
181 Lilian Edwards ‘Mandy and Me: Some Thoughts on the Digital Economy Bill’ [2009] 6:3 SCRIPTed 534, 537. 
32 
 
infringement information to rights holders be challengeable if it was too slowly provided, or 
incomplete? How speedy and accurate does the information have to be in order to escape blame? In 
Edwards’ rather forceful words, as a pre-cursor to Farrand on the DEA itself, the Digital Economy Bill 
did read as though it were ‘drafted in haste on the back of an envelope on a wet Tuesday’.182 It is 
unfortunate that its introduction through the wash-up period did not allow it to be sufficiently 
revised and redrafted to achieve its aim of clarity. 
Yet, as ISPs are in part facilitating infringement by providing internet connections to the masses, it 
would be fair to advocate the importance of their involvement in the protection process. It is 
submitted that the tax/levy system developed later in this paper183 could improve the fairness of the 
ISP obligations in the DEA by providing revenue to help to compensate ISPs more fairly for their 
involvement in the protection of rights holders, in their new role as ‘copyright cops’. This would be a 
more proportionate way to maintain the use of ISPs in the enforcement process. As Cusack 
concludes, given the difficulties with identification of infringement and the level of detail required in 
infringement reports, the burden placed on ISPs in particular in the Digital Economy Act is too 
onerous.184 Ultimately, the consumer is likely to pay the price as ISPs will have to look to their own 
pricing structures to try to recoup some of these costs.185  
Section 42 continues the attack on online piracy, amending section 107 of the CDPA to raise the 
maximum penalty for ‘making or dealing with infringing articles etc’ from £5,000 (in England and 
Wales) to £50,000, as previously mentioned. This tenfold increase follows Gowers’ recommendation 
to ‘match penalties for online and physical copyright infringement’.186 Whether or not this new 
maximum fine will act as a deterrent to persistent offenders is unclear, as is the vague use of ‘etc’ in 
the provision. It seems the drafters of the Act were trying to provide a flexible framework from 
which various interpretations would be possible. As discussed earlier, language such as ‘appropriate’ 
and ‘etc’ are used throughout the text of the Act, without any clear parameters being set to define 
them. The result is merely a confusing and uncertain set of provisions that make it somewhat 
difficult for individuals, without extensive legal advice, to regulate their behaviour appropriately.   
How the various provisions of the Act have been applied in case law will be analysed below.  
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Chapter 2.4 Application of the Act 
Although the Digital Economy Act has not yet been fully implemented, it is important to consider a 
few noteworthy cases which have been concluded after the introduction of the new legislation in 
2010. Judicial review proceedings, as well as the following cases, have highlighted some considerable 
issues with the new Act from the judiciary and within the wider context of copyright enforcement: 
Newzbin, Newzbin2, Dramatico v BSkyB and EMI v BSkyB.  
The implementation of the Digital Economy Act was delayed by judicial review proceedings.187 The 
claimants (BT and TalkTalk) challenged the Act on a number of grounds. These included whether the 
Initial Obligations were technical regulations, and infringed ‘certain Articles of the E-Commerce 
Directive’188 and the Authorisation Directive,189 whether they amounted to an obligation to monitor, 
and whether there was a privacy issue concerning the collecting of information for copyright 
infringement reports. 
The challenge failed on all grounds, bar a relatively minor one relating to administrative charges. 
However, the arguably weak and confusing reasoning behind the decision is worthy of consideration. 
The first ground was that the contested provisions should be unenforceable as they had not been 
notified to the EU.  It was stated that, in the first instance, it was difficult to determine exactly how 
the Initial Obligations Code would take effect, as it was yet to be enacted.190 It would seem that the 
claimants had perhaps been too quick to challenge the legislation. It will only be possible to properly 
establish the exact scope of the Initial Obligations once they are fully underway. The court held that 
the Initial Obligations would need to be notified to the EU once fully drafted, so the claimants 
challenge was premature. Therefore Mr Justice Kenneth Parker dismissed the first ground on this 
basis.  
The claimants also alleged that the Act contravened Articles 12, 15 and 3(2) of the E-Commerce 
Directive.191 It was said that the mere conduit protection provided in Articles 12 and 15 were 
intended to be interpreted very broadly. Parker J disagreed. He argued that to do so would be to tip 
the balance in favour of ISPs and away from copyright owners. Instructing ISPs to act to prevent 
current or likely future infringement, without making them directly liable for that infringement, is 
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suggested as the balance being more fairly struck.192 Yet this is simply not the case. The Act appears 
to consistently favour copyright owners over ISPs to a disproportionate level. Other interested 
parties, such as end users and any potential right to freedom of information, are treated as all but 
irrelevant.  
Article 15 specifically provides that ‘Member States shall not impose a general obligation on 
providers’.193 The claimants argued that the provisions of the Digital Economy Act amounted to 
exactly that. Again, unsurprisingly, the court disagreed.194 The reasoning given was nothing short of 
bizarre, presenting an unusual definition of ‘monitor’ and arguing that therefore the provisions in 
the Act ‘cannot accurately be called ‘monitoring’’. This is because ‘when the ISP sends a CIL 
[Copyright Infringement List] to a copyright owner’ it is merely asserting that ‘according to 
information held by the ISP, a particular subscriber, identified through the IP address or addresses, 
has infringed the owner's rights on a number of occasions (to be specified in the code).’ The 
judgment continues, stating that ‘The knowledge acquired is no more than a by-product of the 
different non-monitoring role that I have set out above’ and therefore is essentially a ‘passive role’. 
Put another way, the (emphasis added) ‘essential function of the ISP is not to investigate facts or 
circumstances, but to identify the wrongdoer’.195 It is unclear how an ISP can possibly identify a 
wrongdoer without any sort of action on its part. How can it identify any individuals without some 
sort of active investigation taking place? It may often be merely the checking of facts provided by 
others, such as copyright owners, but even this has to be done, and done correctly, to avoid being 
penalised.  
The court’s explanation is poorly expressed, and appears to constitute a weak attempt to bypass the 
‘no obligation’ principle. In reality there is nothing ‘passive’ about the significant role imposed on 
ISPs in acting on notifications received by copyright owners, and compiling copyright infringement 
lists and reports. These can and will be time consuming and costly procedures. The court’s reasoning 
in this instance has no solid foundation beyond a desire to impose this burden on ISPs, in spite of the 
E-Commerce Directive. 
The claimants also contended ‘whether the relevant processing of personal data is permissible.’196 It 
was argued that personal data should only be accessible if the data controller intends to commence 
legal proceedings. Parker J argued that this was unreasonable, as ‘The data controller might not 
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know at an early stage in processing the relevant data’ and ‘it might be only after the relevant data 
processing that he could sensibly decide whether it was appropriate to commence proceedings’.197 
This again affords significant powers to copyright owners and at the same time provides no real 
protection to the privacy of users. In addition, it implies that a large proportion of an ISPs work in 
compiling and sending out CIRs and CILs may be rendered pointless, as more often than not a 
copyright owner may ‘change his mind’198 and decide not to pursue a case after all. This appears to 
condone a very inefficient system, wasteful of both time and resources.  
The fourth ground for review was a supposed breach of the Authorisation Directive.199 The claimants 
submitted that ‘the provisions in respect of "qualifying costs", "relevant costs" and "case fees" are 
conditions of a general authorisation’.200 This was rejected, and it was held to be reasonable that the 
claimants must pay 25% of ‘relevant costs’ and case fees, although not ‘qualifying costs’. The reasons 
behind this decision to make ISPs responsible for costs relating to the enforcement of an individual’s 
private right are, again, not well explained. It is simply stated that ‘relevant costs’ and ‘case fees’ do 
not fall under the category of ‘administrative charges’. In fact, Parker J seems to suggest that ISPs 
are actually lucky to receive any compensation for ‘discharging their obligations under the DEA’ at 
all. He further states that ‘the DEA could have left ISPs to bear such costs entirely’. 
 It is unclear how this could possibly be considered equitable or proportionate. If these obligations 
were enacted in previous legislation, and the provisions for partial recovery of costs were contained 
in a new amendment, then this position would perhaps be understandable. But these obligations 
were imposed upon ISPs in the same piece of legislation as the initial provision for the recovery of 
costs. So it does not make sense to indicate that ISPs are somehow lucky to be receiving a small 
amount (although described by in the judgment as ‘substantial’201) of compensation for undertaking 
their (new) statutory obligations, when both provisions were enacted simultaneously in any case. 
Moreover, Parker J does not explain why it is justifiable for ISPs to have these statutory obligations 
and to bear a significant proportion of the costs involved. It appears to be part of a very rights 
holder-centric attitude, where ISPs have been arbitrarily chosen to be the parties essentially 
responsible for improving copyright enforcement. 
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The final ground related to discrimination and proportionality.  The inclusion of only the six largest 
ISPs in the Initial Obligations was held to be not discriminatory, but a proportionate decision by 
OFCOM. ‘Any alleged "migration" of infringers to smaller ISPs’ ‘could be addressed if it began to 
present real problems’,202 which it not a satisfactory response as it undoubtedly will, and indeed 
already does, occur. With regard to proportionality, the claimants questioned whether ‘the 
contested provisions represent a disproportionate restriction on the free movement of services 
and/or the right to privacy and/or the right to free expression or to impart and receive 
information’.203 This section of the text of the case presents further problematic statements. Parker J 
states that although ‘technical means of avoiding detection are available, for those knowledgeable 
and skilful enough to employ them,’  ‘the central difficulty of this argument is that it rests upon 
assumptions about human behaviour’. Here, he is effectively dismissing the argument that the Act 
will not affect those whom it is supposedly designed to target: repeat, large-scale offenders. The 
reasoning is simply that it is too difficult to predict human behaviour, and thus such a statement 
cannot be sufficiently relied upon in deciding the case for judicial review.  
Yet Parker J immediately goes on to do the very thing he warns against; using assumptions about 
human behaviour to decide on the likely success of the various (in this instance, educational) 
provisions in the Act. He states that ‘through systematic CIRs the recipient will be better informed 
about the nature of his conduct and of the likely consequences for others, and he may be disposed 
to cease’. This idealistic reasoning is not based on any sound foundation. Only a relatively minor 
group will be ‘disposed to cease’, those most likely being very small-scale offenders in any case. The 
judgment also advises that it is ‘not an unreasonable burden’ to require subscribers to restrict access 
to their WiFi in order to avoid liability. This is simply untrue as it in fact poses a substantial problem 
to organisations such as libraries and hotels. This judgment does nothing to explain or alleviate this 
problem. 
The case for judicial review was therefore, unsurprisingly, almost entirely rejected. Only one minor 
point was conceded. Therefore the Digital Economy Act has only recently been successfully 
implemented. Recent cases demonstrate how the DEA has been taken into account on occasions but 
ultimately marginalised.  
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An example of this would be the Newzbin204 and Newzbin2205 cases. The first Newzbin case held that 
the website, which was indexing torrents from which users could download illegal material, fell 
under the UK definition of authorisation.206 It was held that the website provided a sophisticated 
search facility, with no filtering system to attempt to protect copyright, despite the website linking 
to many major feature films. 207   It was stated that evidently the website owners would have been 
aware that at least some of these would be under copyright protection.208 In addition, the NZB 
facility (an integral part of the website) essentially allowed users to create and store an infringing 
copy of a work on their own computer.209 For these reasons, the website was subsequently ordered 
to be shut down. Almost instantly, it was reincarnated in the not so subtle form of Newzbin2210. In 
this second case, Mr Justice Arnold essentially assumed that the new website, being so similar to the 
old, would be considered to be ‘authorising’ infringement. This was therefore not really discussed in 
any detail. Instead an unprecedented order was made; BT was instructed to block access to the 
website altogether. This shows a clear shift in approach, as the service provider was targeted, rather 
than the website or the users. It was not possible to target the website in this instance, as it had 
relocated to a country outside this jurisdiction. Pursuing a major ISP, BT, was the next best thing. But 
this is not a satisfactory position, and does little to target the real problem. It may solve the issue in 
the short term, for that particular website, but is evidently not a plausible, long term solution. It 
simply ignores the practicalities of blocking all potentially infringing websites, through a slow court 
process, when in just minutes a new website may emerge.  
 It is important to note that this was done on the basis of section 97A of the CDPA, and did not take 
the Digital Economy Act into account. Although not yet fully implemented, the Act was the most 
recent and relevant piece of legislation, and arguably should have been considered in the judgment. 
This calls the validity of the Digital Economy Act into question.  If it is simply ignored, and such a 
significant result as website blocking is achieved without it, then what material difference does the 
Act make to copyright enforcement as it stands? In fact, the website blocking sections of the new Act 
have actually been rejected. That is, the main weapon used against infringing websites today comes 
not from the Act specifically designed to deal with online infringement, the DEA, but is from old 
legislation, conceived before the prevalence of the internet. 
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The interpretation of ‘actual knowledge’ in section 97A CDPA was afforded a broad scope, and  
Arnold J clearly stated that he did ‘not consider that this [section 17 DEA] provides any assistance 
with regard to the interpretation of the requirement for actual knowledge in section 97A’, believing 
it to have a ‘different [yet wholly unexplained] reach’.211 It was reiterated that ‘it is not essential to 
prove actual knowledge of a specific infringement of a specific copyright work by a specific 
individual’.212 There is no clear explanation as to why this might be. This case reads as if the outcome 
was decided from the beginning. Newzbin2 offered a paid, subscriber-only service, to a (relative to 
other similar websites) small, select group of individuals. It was not, in short, the most obvious and 
necessary target. It appears as if it was used as an excuse to impose such a blocking injunction, and 
work as a deterrent to others.  
Section 97A was once again the provision of choice in the more recent Dramatico v BSkyB213 case, 
applied with a similar result, in which there was again no reference to the Digital Economy Act at all. 
Initially, Arnold J sets out reasons why the ISP has been targeted and the various other parties have 
not.214 It is suggested that it would be ‘impracticable’ and ‘wholly disproportionate’ to pursue all 
users of the The Pirate Bay, or the website itself, due to both issues of cost and the fact that the 
website is based outside of this jurisdiction. Whilst this is true, it is an uncomfortable position to 
maintain; pursuing the ‘easy target’ can be unfair and moreover does little to tackle the root 
problem of infringement.  
Evidence submitted by the defendants in this case was compiled by a company ‘specialising in 
evidence gathering on the internet’.  This is further confirmation of the fact that only copyright 
owners with plentiful resources can realistically defend their rights. Due to the attitude of The Pirate 
Bay, establishing authorisation was relatively easy. It was held that ‘the operators of The Pirate Bay 
induce, incite or persuade its users to commit infringements of copyright, and that they and the 
users act pursuant to a common design to infringe.’215 This case proved that the ruling in Newzbin2 
was not an anomaly and the legitimate target in copyright infringement cases may well be the ISP. In 
fact these site blocking cases are becoming commonplace, despite their relatively ineffectual nature. 
In fact, The Pirate Bay had more hits on its new website after the publicity surrounding the trial, than 
it had ever had before.216 
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In EMI v BSkyB,217 the defendants were found to have actual knowledge of the infringements218 and 
Arnold J confirmed that ‘The [blocking] orders are necessary and appropriate to protect the 
intellectual property rights of the Claimants’. A blocking injunction was accordingly applied to the 
defendants. 
In this case, Arnold J considered that ease of circumvention (of the relevant blocking injunctions) 
was a factor. But he remained of the opinion that if it blocks just a small minority of users, it should 
be considered to be justified.219 This appears to miss the point of the legislation. It is surely the main 
intention of a successful copyright enforcement regime, to attempt to control large scale offenders 
first. Private individuals, who download one or two small items per month, say, are not particularly 
important, at this stage at least. By the above statement, Arnold J has clearly established the 
complete inadequacy of the current legislation. He further relies on the relatively large reduction in 
usage of the website Newzbin2 following his blocking injunction against BT, to prove his point. 
However, this is not quite so clear cut as it seems. Newzbin2 was a paid subscription service. Those 
using it would be very unlikely to continue to pay for something that may no longer be easily 
accessible, due to the complications of a high profile blocking injunction made against it. Individuals 
are simply not going to pay for a service they are no longer able to be guaranteed to receive. In any 
case, the popular payment facilitation entity Paypal actually blocked potential new users from 
purchasing a subscription using their service, thus bringing the website, eventually, to a halt.  
In addition, many of those who paid for the service would be more likely than users of free services 
to assume that what they were doing was in fact legal, as the subscription process would appear to 
‘legitimise’ the process to those less aware or perhaps non tech-savvy users. Therefore once they 
were aware that they were paying for an illegal service, they may likely stop. These two important 
factors would no doubt contribute to the considerable reduction in users of the Newzbin2 site 
alluded to by Arnold J. But most large scale illegal websites are free of charge and would arguably 
see far less of a reduction in service, as long as it was able to circumvent blocking provisions, than 
Newzbin2. Bearing in mind that those individuals setting up such websites are able to do so because 
of pre-existing, extensive knowledge of web technology in the first place, blocking injunction 
circumvention seems likely to be commonplace.  
Whilst it may be argued that the blocking injunction in Newzbin2 was successful, in that it brought 
about the eventual downfall of the website, in reality it will not significantly impact on the 
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prevalence of online piracy: the ultimate aim of the legal framework. As Garstka suggests, there 
appears to be a misjudgement among lawmakers that such injunctions would force users to 
abandon their favoured illegal source of material, and turn to legal sources.220 But surely it is equally 
as likely, if not more so, that these users will simply turn to another illegal source? 
The above cases evidence a new regime of targeting ISPs and imposing blocking injunctions. If this is 
as successful as the judiciary are claiming, it raises questions surrounding the relevance of the Digital 
Economy Act. It would appear that, so far, the Digital Economy Act has been essentially sidelined. 
Although not fully implemented, it should still have been considered worthy of interpretation in 
post-Act cases. If there is a newly emerging method of copyright enforcement being routinely used, 
then is there any point to this new legislation. It does not appear to fill any ‘gaps’ in the CDPA, as it 
merely places further burdens on ISPs. Bearing in mind the new trend of blocking injunctions, it 
appears that ISPs are already covered. The DEA arguably makes no practical improvement to 
previous legislation in this area, and is already becoming irrelevant. It seems unlikely that it will be 
effective or appropriate to the proper regulation of copyright online.  
 
Chapter 2.5 Current legislation – a successful framework?   
There are many reasons contributing to the submission that, overall, the Digital Economy Act is not, 
and will never be, a success in its current form.  
The chief complaint seems to be that the Act essentially targets the wrong infringers in the wrong 
manner, in spite of widespread agreement that targeting individuals is ineffective.221 Professional 
internet pirates simply will not be deterred from infringement by the receipt of a letter. Such 
individuals are likely to be able to seek alternative ways to continue to act illegally.  
In addition, too high a burden is placed on ISPs. This arguably contravenes the ‘no monitoring’ 
principle set out in Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive,222 and subsequently enforced in ECJ 
cases such as Scarlet.223 In this case, it was held that requiring an ISP to implement a filtering system 
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which would block access to any musical work via peer-to-peer file-sharing services without the 
required rights holder’s permission, would not strike ‘a fair balance’ between ‘the right to 
intellectual property, on the one hand, and the freedom to conduct business, the right to protection 
of personal data and the freedom to receive or impart information, on the other’.224 It would clearly 
be a disproportionate burden on ISPs and would mean placing the right to intellectual property on a 
more highly valued legal pedestal, disproportionately raising it above all three of the other rights 
mentioned above. There is no legal basis in either UK or EU law to support this imbalanced weighting 
of rights in favour of the right to intellectual property and the judgment reflected this. 
 
The argument surrounding the burden imposed on ISPs pertains to pre-internet interpretations of 
copyright liability and where this burden should lie. In CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer 
Electronics225 it was held that manufacturing and selling hi-fi systems with tape recording facilities 
did not amount to incitement to infringe copyright.  This was because no purchaser could 
‘reasonably deduce from the facilities incorporated in it or from the advertisements that the first 
defendants possessed or purported to possess the authority to grant any required permission for a 
record to be copied’.226 Lord Templeman confirmed that ‘authorisation’ means to grant or purport to 
grant to do the infringing act. It was held that Amstrad conferred the power to copy but not the right 
to do so.227 Therefore this meant that Amstrad did not authorise the infringing acts and CBS’s appeal 
was dismissed. Oswald argues that the Amstrad case indicates that control is key in UK law.228 This is 
confirmed in the previously mentioned Pirate Bay case, where Arnold J held that the founders of the 
website were able to remove illegal torrents but specifically decided not to exercise that control in 
relation to violation of the rights of copyright owners.229 Whilst authorisation would have been easy 
to find on the basis of their clear statement of intent to infringe on the website itself, it is still 
important to consider other factors referred to in the judgment and how they may be applied in the 
context of ISPs. Owen’s argument of control being central to such decisions is strengthened when 
considering the position of ISPs. What differentiates ISPs from the position of Amstrad in this case is 
control, as ISPs do or can have some control over the use of the service they provide. Therefore UK 
case law suggests that ISPs should take some responsibility for control of infringement, but it is 
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submitted that the burden placed on them by law is disproportionate when balanced against the 
reality of the extent of their control. 
 
Edwards believes that ISPs will surely think about moving offshore as a result of the onerous 
obligations imposed by the DEA.230 Driving ISPs away with prohibitive liability obligations to where 
legislators can no longer control them would not help copyright holders to protect themselves 
against infringement in long run. Cusack agrees that this burden on ISPs is onerous, and threatens 
them with a ‘disproportionate sanction’.231 This, he argues, is because the 25% share of costs 
allocated to ISPs232 is at odds with the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, insomuch as copyright holders are 
the sole beneficiaries in this arrangement. Yet ISPs are expected to bear an administrative burden, as 
well as a significant percentage of the costs, for no benefit at all.  
 
The positive impact of ISPs on copyright holders has not been included as part of the debate 
surrounding liability. It is too simplistic to suggest that the provision of internet provides pirates with 
an opportunity to steal content, without also recognising the fact that it without doubt affords 
copyright holders an invaluable opportunity, one which could only be dreamed of by pre-internet 
rights holders, to promote and sell their works to a global market of around 3 billion users.233 Whilst 
the internet has evidently opened up further avenues for abuse of rights, its economic impact on 
facilitating the lucrative exploitation of copyright ownership cannot be overestimated. This factor 
should have been given due consideration when considering whether, or to what extent to burden 
ISPs with costly and laborious obligations.  
 
Therefore it is clear that ‘the whole landscape of liability for the messenger needs to be reviewed’.234 
Clark argues that the obligations imposed on ISPs ‘overlooks the critical differences in relation to 
culpability’, corroborating Cusack’s beneficiary pays argument, and ‘undervalues and threatens civil 
liberties’ as a result.235 This reinforces the argument that the various rights have not yet been 
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appropriately weighed against each other in the context of copyright law. Proportionality is a key 
concept here which should be relied on both when drafting legislation and weighing up judgments in 
court proceedings. 
An additional problem with the current legislation framework is that the new Digital Economy Act is 
full of false presumptions. For example, it seems to be generally accepted that individuals, once 
notified of their transgressions, will instantly desist and turn instead to legal methods of obtaining 
material. It is not considered that perhaps the more likely result will be that they merely seek an 
alternative illegal means. Similarly, there is little or no real consideration of the various interests and 
motives of internet pirates. As Garstka notes, for some it is actually the fame that they are seeking, 
not necessarily economic interests.236 This particular group of infringers will see the new legislation 
as nothing more than a new challenge, to be overcome. When presented as a battle of wits, the new 
Act cannot hope to compete. Therefore, those committing the largest quantity of infringing activities 
are the very ones most likely to be able to circumvent the measures of the Act.  
This leads to a further issue: whether innocent subscribers may be erroneously targeted by OFCOM, 
without reliable proof of wrongdoing.237 As previous stated, for an individual with extensive 
technical knowledge, and a good incentive to succeed, an IP address can be faked or hijacked. This 
could lead to a Copyright Infringement Report being sent to the wrong individual, failing to reach its 
intended target. Farrand argues that there is an already significant and increasing ‘demand for 
anonymity in cyberspace’238 being met. And this is not something only available to the 
knowledgeable few, as websites helping the non-tech savvy to achieve anonymity are increasing in 
number.239 This will surely increase to accommodate the new legislation until those doing the most 
harm are successfully able to continue business as usual, while the odd teenager downloading a few 
songs a month, say, may possibly be targeted and deterred.  
In fact, as Cusack argued, the new Act may actually serve to ‘assist professional internet pirates’.240 
By notifying them that their activities are being monitored, it may prompt them to cease and begin 
using a new ISP, for example, or a new identity. It would act as a useful check, triggering a reaction 
which may save the user from being penalised, thereby incentivising user anonymity. 
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Again, the question of WiFi usage remains unanswered. There is no clear position for hotels and 
libraries, for example, on which to base their actions. Cusack also highlights the near impossibility of 
WiFi providers being able to document the personal details of all temporary users and their internet 
activity.241 This is not a realistic or proportionate obligation to impose on WiFi providers in practice, 
as the turnover of users is high and users can often be anonymous, in cafes or on trains for example. 
The threat of liability may outweigh the perceived benefit of providing this important facility, and 
may lead to internet access being considerably restricted to some individuals who rely on public WiFi 
availability. This would actually impact heavily on the livelihoods of those running online businesses, 
for example, as well as mere convenience and enjoyment for the general public. Whilst it is 
reasonable to expect WiFi providers to take common sense step to protect themselves, such as 
password protection, it is not realistic to expect them to be able to prevent the most tech savvy 
individuals from circumventing any blocking measures in order to use the WiFi connection to commit 
illegal acts. To follow this logic, nobody but the most technologically adept individuals would be able 
to provide a WiFi service as only they could be reasonably confident that they could prevent others 
from accessing illegal sources of infringing content. Commentators such as Edwards even argue that 
this amounts to ‘constructive prohibition of unsecured WiFi by the back door’.242 Cusack argues that 
this position seems at odds with the idea of a Digital Britain with internet access for all, if legislators 
are introducing new liability risks to the very businesses that provide these public services.243 This 
may result not only in hindering the development and availability WiFi but also may lead to 
unwanted control of WiFi and distort the roll out of WiFi across the UK. 
 
This important issue has not been given the attention it deserves. A Consumer Focus report244 
highlighted this manifestly unfair position. It stated that the requirement in section 13 DEA of 
subscribers to take ‘reasonable measures’ to ensure others did not use their internet connection 
unlawfully, is simply impractical and unrealistic. Moreover the apparent lack of definition for this 
term ‘results in a lack of legal certainty’,245 a common criticism of the new Act.246 Consumer Focus 
argues that OFCOM should assess whether the potentially harmful effect of this legal uncertainty is 
proportionate (as required to do so under section 124E(1)(k)) to the aim the Initial Obligations Code 
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intends to achieve.247 OFCOM has not done so. It appears to merely assume that this is already a 
given fact. This is somewhat understandable, as it may be forgiven for assuming that this important 
issue had already been considered and concluded as part of the drafting process of the Act itself.  
OFCOM could have used its powers under section 403 of the Communications Act 2003 ‘to make 
provision subject to such exemptions and exceptions as OFCOM think fit’. It could therefore have 
provided different criteria for those providing a public WiFi service. Admittedly this would need 
serious consideration, to avoid a situation where infringers set up such a service as a smokescreen 
for their illegal activities. Perhaps OFCOM felt this would be too bold an action for it to take alone, 
bearing in mind that there were no instructions relating to this issue in the Act itself. As it stands 
however, the Draft Initial Obligations Code is not acceptable, as OFCOM has not correctly fulfilled all 
of its obligations in relation to the Code.  
Another criticism of the Digital Economy Act, is its complete failure to tackle the facilitating 
software.248 (The tax/levy system proposed in Chapter 4.1 offers a possible way to address this). 
Instead, the Act focuses wholly on the obligations of ISPs and relies heavily on them to effectively 
solve the problem. This is not a practical, or fair, approach and undermines the balance between 
various interested parties’ rights. It is becoming increasingly apparent that pressure from large, 
influential copyright owners, such as film and record labels, has influenced recent copyright 
enforcement debates. It is true that the creative industries account for 6% of GDP in the UK, and, 
importantly, have an estimated 6.5% annual rate of growth between 2012 to 2016.249 This is 
evidently why the government has been so cautious in this area. But it does not mean that copyright 
law should be completely dominated by their interests as a result. In spite of this, attempts to 
appease these important contributors have not been successful in reality, as the increasing strict 
enforcement measures have yielded little beneficial results for the creative industries.250 A better 
balance is required to create a more suitable legal framework for all.  
Many are rightly concerned about the cost of the Digital Economy Act. The French equivalent of the 
graduated response system is HADOPI.251 This has been in force since 2010. At present, over 1.1 
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million notification letters have been sent,252 at a cost of tens of millions of Euros.253 Yet only 14 
people have actually been sued in 20 months. It is difficult to determine whether this is due to the 
success of the notifications, or the clear impracticalities, and costs, of suing all repeat offenders. In 
2014 HADOPI has been placed under review, after fears of costs spiralling and failure to fulfil its 
potential.254 There is concern that, eventually, this significant cost will be passed on by ISPs to users 
in the form of higher ISP fees. Copyright owners too, may increase their fees to accommodate the 
new costs of enforcing their rights. Therefore users will be left to bear the brunt from all sides. This 
will in turn provide further incentive for individuals to pursue illegal means of obtaining material. 
Thus innocent individuals will again be left to pay these increased costs, to subsidise the illegal 
activities of others. In addition, can this really be considered to be a proportionate response to the 
problem? If notifications alone can run into tens of millions of Euros, is this fairly justified when 
scrutinised against the potential losses to copyright holders? 
OFCOM’s Initial Obligations Code255 does little to reassure on this point of clarity. It was anticipated 
as a clarification of the many perceived vague points of the Digital Economy Act. Instead, it arguably 
creates yet more questions and provides few answers. The DEA clearly left the majority of the details 
to be developed by OFCOM in the Code, but this has not been achieved. There is a quality assurance 
process set out in sections 3.5 to 3.7, but this neither specifies detailed standards of evidence, nor 
how this evidence may be correctly obtained.256 This is despite directions to do so in sections 5 to 7 
of the DEA itself. 
Further to the above, there appears to be no penalty if any information or case turns out to be 
incorrect, although courts do have the power to strike out vexatious cases, 257 and normal practice 
dictates that claimants pay costs as a result. Edwards argues that, even so, it is of concern that there 
is no reference in the Bill (nor the subsequent Act) to any consequences of vexatious cases nor even 
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a reasonable duty of care.258 This lack of clarity and omission of vital information to the potential 
accused leaves non-lawyers in the dark with regard to their rights and legal obligations should they 
rightly or wrongly become the target of legal proceedings. 
It follows that such individuals can be largely at the mercy of powerful rights holders, and may find 
themselves involved in a dispute in which they are mistakenly accused and entirely innocent, but 
feel threatened by aggressive tactics into settling without taking advice. This type of ‘speculative 
invoicing’ as it is sometimes known, can and does occur. Measures should be taken to ensure that 
innocent users are not left vulnerable, and intimidated into paying ‘compensation’ for infringements 
not committed, in order to avoid a trial. Thankfully, this concern has since been addressed by the 
judiciary, in the Golden Eye case 259 for example. Joseph and Ward argue that speculative invoicing 
itself has not been condemned through case law, when the issue was raised in the Golden Eye case, 
allowing the intimidation of subscribers and the potential for vexatious cases to remain a problem.260 
In this case, Arnold J held that Golden Eye’s ‘interests in enforcing their copyrights outweigh the 
Intended Defendants’ interest in protecting their privacy and data protection rights’,261 concluding 
that Golden Eye was entitled to a Norwich Pharmacal Order.262However, the draft letter to the 
Intended Defendants (O2 customers) was ordered to be amended.263 This was because, whilst such a 
demand letter was not prohibited per se, the specific request for an unjustified £700 in 
compensation within a short timeframe was found to be unreasonable.264 Arnold J suggested that a 
request for a settlement sum, without specifying an amount, would be a more appropriate course of 
action.265 Therefore whilst speculative invoicing is not prohibited per se, threatening language and 
ultimatums within the content of such communications will clearly not be viewed favourably by any 
court.  
In addition, Arnold J made it clear that Norwich Pharmacal Orders should only be made where it 
‘proportionately and fairly’ balances the interests of both claimant(s) and defendant(s), taking into 
account the legitimate interests of the intended defendant as well.266 This language implies that the 
balance between the interests of copyright holders and other legitimate interests such as those of 
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privacy is being considered within the judiciary, even if there is little evidence of this balance within 
the legislative framework.  
A further example of the lack of clarity in the draft Initial Obligations Code, may be found in section 
2(4)(a) and (b). A qualifying copyright owner must establish ‘an estimate in relation to a notification 
period and...provide that estimate to the qualifying ISP and to OFCOM’. The Code would be very 
difficult to comprehend, and therefore to take advantage of, by the lay person. There is no 
explanation as to how an estimate is to be made, why it is required, and what will happen if it turns 
out to be incorrect. An individual would likely need to seek legal advice on how to obtain a proper 
estimate and submit it to the appropriate authorities. It is submitted again that this legislation is 
being drafted to suit the creative industries’ large corporations, rather than the individual. This 
should not be the case, especially as the supposed intention behind the legislation is the integrity of 
copyright, and the importance of its protection. It seems that only the protection of copyright 
owned by large corporations with plentiful resources matters here.  
Even the detailed Sharing Costs Impact Assessment267 failed to consider the economic impact of 
copyright owners inevitably charging higher prices to recover expenditure on accessing information 
and compiling CIRs. These higher prices will deter others from sampling or building on pre-existing 
works, thereby deterring creativity to some extent. If OFCOM were to believe its own research, then 
as many as 32% of users would stop infringing activities if cheaper (than present) legal alternatives 
were available.268 Cost was the most common factor given by infringers in the report that, if 
reduced, may influence them to stop infringing. Bearing this in mind, enacting legislation which will 
lead to substantially increased prices payable by users, does not seem like a wise move. Other major 
factors highlighted as potential reasons to stop infringing were convenience, ease of access to all 
material and speed of stream/download.269 If these issues were targeted, rather than completely 
ignored, in legislative (and non-legislative) proposals, then it would go a long way to significantly 
reducing illegal downloading. Only 16% of those who exclusively illegally download stated that 
nothing would induce them to stop.270  
The issue of the cost of copyright enforcement demonstrates just how inadequate this legislation is, 
creating an environment in which nobody wins, and everybody loses. Only those copyright holders 
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able to pay their 75% share of enforcement costs will be able to aggressively enforce their rights. 
The remaining 25% is offloaded onto ISPs with little justification for the extent of their involvement. 
This is likely to result in revenue being recouped by increasing prices for innocent subscribers. When 
this cost bearing disaster is coupled with the Act’s likely ineffectiveness,271 the result of the DEA 
provisions is an unsatisfactory position for everyone involved and demonstrates the need for an 
alternative revenue system designed to run alongside the legal framework.272 
The vagueness and complexity of UK copyright law in both form and content is a major concern. The 
many layers of legislation, as well as the political nature of EU Directive implementation adds further 
complications.273 Christie suggests that complexity alone would not be enough to warrant legislative 
reform, unless it can be shown that the complexity is not necessary. But, he argues, this is the 
case.274 The non-specific nature of many of the above sections of the Act does provide flexibility of 
interpretation to the judiciary, but comes at the expense of legal certainty, especially for non-
lawyers. This is problematic in such an area which is already so poorly understood by the public, with 
24% of infringers claiming that they would cease if it was clearer whether or not an activity was 
legal.275 This legal certainty for the consumer is especially important when taking into consideration 
the largely self-regulatory nature of copyright infringement avoidance. The vast majority of such 
activity is undertaken in the privacy of the home and it is therefore more crucial than ever that the 
individual fully understands their rights and limitations with regard to copyrighted works, so as to 
least avoid accidental infringement if nothing else. The new Act arguably does little to address this 
problem.  
As well as lack of clarity, it is submitted that the current legal regime contains too many flaws to 
allow successful enforcement of copyright law. The problem of where the burden of enforcement 
should lie has not been fully addressed, resulting in a significant proportion being assigned to ISPs. 
Whilst there may be some justification for this, in that ISPs certainly have a part to play in the 
process, it is arguable that the burden is too great276 and there is not sufficient explanation as to the 
fairness or proportionality of the role given to ISPs. The difficulties surrounding the identification of 
perpetrators of online piracy, with the prevalence of anonymity technology freely available online,277 
is simply not addressed by the graduated response method. Although this part of the Digital 
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Economy Act is not yet fully in force, it does not appear that the threat of warning letters has yet had 
any sort of deterrent effect. Only 14% of individuals stated that a letter threatening suspension of 
internet access from an ISP would ‘put them off’ (not in itself an indication that it would cause them 
to stop infringing altogether), falling to just 11% being potentially put off by a more general warning 
letter without direct threat of disconnection.278 This public disregard for such measures strongly 
indicates that the warning letter method is unlikely to lead to a successful result. When its own 
research proves to OFCOM that others factors are far more influential on infringers, it is unclear why 
it, and the government, continue to pursue the fight against copyright infringement with the 
provisions laid out in the Digital Economy Act. In its current form, it cannot accomplish the aim it was 
developed to achieve. As Cusack succinctly concludes, the Act imposes ‘punitive and unfair sanctions 
on an innocent majority for the offences of a criminal minority who remain largely unaffected by the 
DEA’.279  
In addition, there is the problem of WiFi restrictions and its direct conflict with the concept of a 
Digital Britain, encouraging greater internet accessibility280 with a legislative framework that is ‘clear 
and fair’ for all.281 Unfortunately, these factors lead this research to conclude that the current 
legislative framework in the UK is not adequate to properly enforce copyright law in the digital 
world.  The following chapter analyses some recent law reform proposals, and how these may, or 
may not, improve upon current legislation as it stands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
278
 OFCOM Wave 4 Report (n 32), 5. 
279
 Cusack (n 180) 564. 
280
 Digital Britain Report (n 129) 34. 
281 ibid Foreword. 
51 
 
Chapter 3 Recent Reviews of Copyright Law 
 
There have been many reports and reviews on this contentious area of copyright law over time. The 
focus of this chapter will be three of the recent major reports – Gowers, Hargreaves and Hooper. 
The main provisions, insofar as they relate to copyright law and online piracy, will be examined and 
analysed. 
 
Chapter 3.1 Gowers Review 
 
In 2005, Andrew Gowers was commissioned by Gordon Brown to perform an independent review of 
Intellectual Property. From the outset it recognises that major changes are required to tackle a 
growing problem. It states that ‘the UK’s music and film industries lose around twenty per cent of 
their annual turnover through pirated CDs and illegal online file sharing’.282 The Gowers Review sets 
out some potential solutions to the various problems associated with illegal use of copyrighted 
works. It makes some valuable points, but falls short of providing a satisfactory agenda for reform.  
 
The Review recommended ‘stronger enforcement of IP rights’ yet at the same time ‘greater balance 
and flexibility of IP rights’ as is consistent in the digital age.283 This potentially confusing set of 
objectives is not clarified. The underlying foundation of the report is based on the premise that the 
problem is that strong enforcement of these rights is vital, and it is merely strictness that is lacking. 
Perhaps it is time to consider the clear shift in users’ behaviour and attitudes towards copyrighted 
material. That is not to say we should merely allow individuals to ignore the law and thus discourage 
innovation altogether. It is important to consider why it is deemed so important to create more 
stringent enforcement of copyright owners’ rights, seemingly at all costs. This balance between 
protecting rights holders, and at the same time encouraging innovation and the sharing of 
knowledge, is often referred to, but, arguably, never addressed in this or subsequent reports. 
It is difficult, however, to argue that even this possible imbalance in favour of rights holders over 
users achieves what it sets out to achieve - the successful protecting of copyright owners’ rights - 
when one considers the lack of effective protection from infringement that the legislative framework 
provides to copyright. The inherent flaws in copyright and the difficulties associated with enforcing 
law which regulates private activity, often undertaken in an individual’s own home, have been 
exacerbated by the introduction of the digital age. Whether one takes a utilitarian view of the 
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economic incentive necessary to encourage creativity, or follows the principles of inherent 
ownership set out by John Locke, it is clear that the current underlying principles of copyright law 
emphasised by Gowers above are not being sufficient protected through legal constraint alone. Yet 
Gowers does not go on to suggest any non-legal, complimentary measures that could be used to run 
alongside a legal framework. It is a shame that lawmakers have, as yet, afforded too little attention 
to these possibilities of creating alternative ways to compensate owners for example,284 preferring 
instead to hope that increasingly punitive laws of enforcement will finally drive away infringement 
altogether. 
It is suggested in the report that a limited private copying exception would be prudent, and would 
improve clarity.285 This was a good example of how the law and common practice were simply not 
aligned in this area. Technology is always one step ahead of the law, and legislators are left playing 
catch-up. In reality, this refers to the prevalent existence of private copying already taking place at 
the time. Private copying, for example copying from vinyl to cassette tape, has been the norm for 20 
years or more, prior to this new exception eventually coming into force in June 2014286. It is made 
clear that such an exception would fall within EU Law, as long as ‘fair compensation’ was provided to 
the copyright owner. This could be included in the sale price.287 The meaning of fair compensation is 
uncertain in that there is no given definition of ‘fair’ or who would be required to define it, so 
presumably the judiciary on a case by case basis. In any case, if this compensation is included in the 
sale price as suggested, and if this were to lead to the increase in sale prices of works including a 
private right to copy, this would surely serve to actively increase online piracy, not reduce it.  There 
would be a further incentive for individuals to obtain illegal materials if one was forced to pay extra 
for the privilege of a copyable work. It also may lead to public confusion over how this change may 
affect the user’s right to copy. It may also be perceived by the user that as they are paying more for 
‘fair compensation’, then it must mean that they have more rights to use the work as they wish, 
rather than the limited uses provided by the exception in reality. Interestingly however, the new 
Regulations do not refer to ‘fair compensation’ at all, presumably assuming that this has already 
been built in to the price beforehand,288 or perhaps owing to a feeling that this idea won’t work, due 
to reasons outlined above. 
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The copying exception is also broadened to include all formats, even electronic storage areas.289 This 
is welcome news to cloud storage (secure, digital storage via the internet) users who may now 
legitimately copy their DVDs, for example, and upload them to their private storage, so that if the 
DVD were to become damaged or lost, the content will still be safely stored. 
Drafting a law to legitimise an already commonplace activity has certainly achieved a little more 
‘clarity’ at least. In the digital age with so many different devices available, it seems that copying a 
digital copy of a song, for example, from a computer to an mp3 player is considered by society to be 
a normal part of life.  
Section 42 CDPA already allows library archivists to make a single copy of a work. However this does 
not include sound recordings, television shows or films.290 The Gowers Review proposed to amend 
section 42 by 2008 to ‘permit libraries to copy the master copy of all classes of work.’291 This is a 
helpful concession to archivists. The most important of the three exceptions recommended by 
Gowers is arguably this one. It has certainly led to the most change, with the new Regulations 
allowing libraries to copy a ‘reasonable proportion’292 of works, irrespective of the format, and the 
ability to provide this copy to others for private study and non-commercial research. This gives 
librarians a wider scope to copy as well as greater certainty of law, provided they remain within the 
relatively broad scope of ‘fair dealing’ of course293.  Educational institutions are also afforded the 
power to apply the principle of ‘fair dealing’ to the use of a work under section 32, as amended. 
Backing up or preserving copies of works is very important too, in order to avoid potential losses 
and, sometimes, increase dissemination if that would be to the benefit of society. Section 42(1)(a), 
as amended, allows institutions to produce copies ‘in order to preserve or replace that item in that 
collection’ without reference to a single copy only, implying that where appropriate, more than one 
copy may be produced and stored. 
 
A further exception advised in the report is to provide for caricature, parody or pastiche.294 This was 
already allowed in European law,295 and there was no reason why it could not simply be transposed 
into UK law. However the timescale set by Gowers for these various changes to take place did not 
materialise. For example, he recommended that the copying exceptions should be implemented by 
the government by the end of 2008. In June 2014, some of these various exceptions are only just 
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coming into force, with the exception for quotation and parody due later in the year.296 This painfully 
slow uptake was symptomatic of the general political reluctance to tackle copyright law issues at the 
time. Gowers also states that ‘If the Government accepts and implements the Review’s 
recommendations, the Review believes that the portfolio of measures will ensure that the UK IP 
system is fit for purpose in the digital, global age.’297 This ambitious statement is arguably not true, 
as whilst the suggestions made in his report do go some way towards improving clarity of copyright 
law, they do not tackle other major issues such as failure of enforcement. In any case it is extremely 
difficult to ensure that a legal system is ‘fit for purpose’ in the modern age. As technology develops 
so fast, it can be difficult to accommodate these changes in a fixed legal framework. The few 
proposed exceptions in the report hardly conclusively and permanently prepare the UK legal system 
for any future technological advancement, and we must look to non-legislative measures to address 
this issue.298 
 
Gowers also recommended that ‘If this [industry agreement of protocols to prevent online piracy] 
has not proved operationally successful by the end of 2007, the Government should consider 
whether to legislate.’299In the Government’s response paper to the Gowers Review300 it was stated 
that a private copying and archivist exception would be taken forward, but one for parody would 
not,301 although this decision was later reversed.302 It also stated that draft legislation ‘will be laid in 
Parliament with a view to its coming into force in October 2010.’303 The legislation referred to has 
now taken the form of the Digital Economy Act.  
 
Section 42 of the Act adopts another of Gowers’ proposals, namely that the penalty of copyright 
infringement online is now a maximum of £50,000 as opposed to just £5,000 previously. Cybercrime 
is as illegal as physical crime; a simple statement, but one that needed confirming to society as a 
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whole. Without a proper system of educating the public as to the changes however, they are likely 
to go relatively unnoticed. 304  
 
Unfortunately, the Gowers Review gave a merely cursory acknowledgement of the chronically 
widespread problem of online piracy. In spite of this however, it at least demonstrated some 
recognition that there exists issues surrounding copyright law that require addressing by the UK 
government. It has subsequently served as a catalyst to the many following debates and reports 
surrounding copyright law, but ultimately lacked any real substance as it tended to focus too much 
on the small exceptions. The tentative progress recommended in this cautious paper was 
exacerbated by government inertia on this issue, as stated previously. Recommendations that 
Gower argued should be in place by 2008 were only implemented in June 2014. 
 
Chapter 3.2 Hargreaves Review 
This independent paper published in 2011 is a lengthy report led by Professor Ian Hargreaves. 
Commissioned by the government in 2010, there were high hopes for this report to provide some 
long overdue solutions to the many deep-set problems with UK copyright law. Instead, however, the 
result was something of a ‘mixed bag’, as was its predecessor, the Gowers report.305  Positively, 
some realistic and sensible statements were made at the outset. The fact that ‘The UK has the 
largest national creative sector in Europe’306 emphasises the importance of the publication of this 
report, and its subsequent implementation. Hargreaves evidently believes that the UK’s legal 
system, with regard to copyright, is ‘falling behind what is needed’.307 Crucially, the report notes that 
‘the Government has a severely time limited opportunity’ to create an up to date copyright system. 
However the government have yet to act on large areas of this report with urgency, choosing instead 
to commission yet further reports.308 As Hargreaves notes, only 25 of the 54 recommendations in 
the previous major investigation into copyright law were actually implemented.309 He goes on to 
repeat some of the suggestions put forward in the Gowers report. 
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The fact that the current law (at that time) was ‘too inflexible’ and ‘too difficult for non-lawyers to 
understand’ was one important admission.310 Clearly this was an unacceptable position. Hargreaves 
notes that several responses received during the Call for Evidence emphasised the complex nature 
of the copyright regime. One example given is the submission of the National Education Network, 
which refers to children attempting to undertake a learning activity as having to ‘traverse the 
vagaries of copyright and licensing. They will trip over ‘orphans’, bump into third party rights, be 
turned away by pay-for services, use licensed and make their own materials – often without knowing 
that there are multiple copyright dimensions to what they are doing, because, who can know all 
about copyright?’311 This succinctly summarises the hugely diverse and complex nature of the 
copyright regime. Hargreaves attributed some of this complexity to the ‘distorted policy outcomes’ 
due to ‘the persuasive powers of celebrities and important UK creative companies’. 312This, he 
claims, is emphasised by the increasing divergence of interest between rights holders and 
consumers.313 The point about lobbying is an important one, as it reflects an ad hoc legislative 
framework which is the result of endless conflict and disagreement surrounding the hierarchy and 
importance of rights surrounding copyrighted works. It is perhaps inevitable then that the Digital 
Economy Act is yet another victim of such destructive politics, increasing confusion, and it 
‘exemplifies the environment in which copyright policy is made’.314 Rather than concentrating on 
legislative methods for copyright protection and enforcement, it is also time to consider 
complementary measures such as a tax/levy which, although it does not directly deal with 
protection and enforcement in any significant way, should generate income to offset losses due to 
illegal activities.315 
 
In response to this inherent confusion for non-lawyers in the legal framework, Hargreaves proposes 
a new service from the Intellectual Property Office to issue formal opinions on copyright matters.316 
A version of this promising move in the direction of clarity and legal certainty for non-lawyers has 
only just been implemented, in May 2014,317 and it is hoped that over time its value will become 
apparent. At present it is limited to more general copyright principles, and is not able to advise on 
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specific circumstances or disputes, which is unfortunate. If successful, perhaps it should be 
expanded to take on a more advisory role, linked in to a programme of wider public education.318 
Hargreaves suggested one other key way to improve this confusing state of affairs by introducing 
some clarity to copyright ownership. The Digital Copyright Exchange (DCE)  was to essentially be a 
fully comprehensive database of copyright ownership and licensing. Yet at the same time, whilst 
being strongly incentivised, the scheme was to be voluntary. Clearly this was a majority, but not 
universal, solution then.  On the positive side, it was a major step towards achieving the clarity, 
transparency and cost efficiency badly needed in the digital copyright era. Hargreaves had 
established a good starting point for future reform. However his suggested time frame was 
considered ambitious,319 bearing in mind the enormity of the task. Indeed if the DCE has a major 
flaw, it is undoubtedly the administrative and financial burden of implementation, and subsequent 
maintenance. Whilst Hargreaves argues that it will require little attention once up and running, it is 
submitted that this is unlikely. Even if the initial set up is achieved, day to day monitoring will have 
to be rigorous in order to ensure it is kept absolutely up to date.  
Hargreaves states that it would not be solely the task of the government to bring about the DCE. The 
role of the politicians would merely ‘involve bringing together all relevant interests, and finding ways 
to overcome divergences of interest to secure the bigger prize in a way that takes account of the 
interests of all.’320 It is unclear from this statement exactly who would be responsible for all or part 
of the DCE. Equally it is left to others to decide who should bear the burden of costs and 
maintenance.  
Hargreaves also addresses the significant lack of copyright exceptions in UK law. He also 
recommends allowing private copying, use of material for parody and library archiving to be 
introduced as legal exceptions to copyright restrictions.321 The rationale behind this 
recommendation is that it would allow greater flexibility in UK law, which is permitted by EU law. It 
has been argued that ‘this approach may be viewed as a dilution of proprietors' rights which does 
not provide anything in return’.322 However Hargreaves sensibly reasons that ‘A limited private 
copying exception which corresponds to the expectations of buyers and sellers of copyright content, 
and is therefore already priced into the purchase, will by definition not entail a loss for right 
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holders.’323 Admittedly this does further complicate pricing issues, as, in reality, the expectations of 
buyers and sellers differ so greatly in the digital age that a genuine consensus is all but impossible. 
Indeed the vast difference in expectations between these two groups in the modern day is one of 
the main difficulties copyright law faces.324  Like Gowers, Hargreaves also fails to acknowledge the 
real reason behind the introduction of the private copying exception, namely that private copying 
has increasingly become the norm, despite its illegality, for decades.  
Nevertheless broadly speaking the introduction of the above copyright exceptions, as permitted by 
EU law, does go a little way to legitimising a more reasonable balance between rights holders and 
users. In December 2012 the government published a paper stating that this proposal would broadly 
be enacted via secondary legislation, which was due to come into force in 2013,325 having promised 
to do so in its response paper.326 In the end, the exceptions came into force in June 2014, with one 
still due in October 2014. 
Hargreaves also considers the US ‘fair use’ doctrine,327 noting that ‘the creative industries continue 
to flourish in the US in the context of copyright law which includes Fair Use’.328 The principle is a 
freer, more workable one than the limited copyright exceptions suggested. It would allow greater 
flexibility to accommodate advancements in technology and unforeseen developments. However UK 
Government lawyers have indicated that transposing a US-style fair use system into UK law would 
cause ‘significant difficulties’, in particular conflicting with EU law.329  
The interpretation of Brenncke330 supports this proposition, referring to Article 5 of the Information 
Society Directive which sets out an exhaustive list of (optional) copyright exceptions.331 Brenncke 
argues that the three-step test332 must also be applied to any future copyright exceptions by 
Member States and that this effectively prohibits the adoption of an entirely new exception such as 
the ‘fair use’ doctrine.333 Heide argued along similar lines prior to the implementation of the 
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Directive, stating that it would preclude any future copyright exceptions which may be devised to 
accommodate the changes to the future environment, including those caused by the internet age.334  
Perhaps there is more scope here than is suggested, however. In fact there is evidence, alluded to in 
the Review,335 that a ‘fair use’ defence of sorts could be transposed into UK law. Bently argues that 
enough scope is afforded to national powers to accommodate such a doctrine. 336 He argues that the 
language of the WIPO Copyright Treaty,337 which refers in its Preamble to ‘the need to maintain a 
balance between the rights of authors and the large public interest’, could be incorporated into 
Chapter III of our CDPA.338 This could be used to direct interpretation towards a broader 
construction of the listed exceptions, and to address this newly enshrined balance with a ‘fair use’ 
concept which takes into account the rights of authors and the rights of access to information.339 
This suggestion uses language directly derived from the WIPO treaty and therefore does provide one 
possible solution. It would help to expand the scope of judicial scrutiny in future cases, by adopting a 
more elastic ‘fair use’ doctrine which is better able to accommodate the rights of all parties on a 
flexible case-by-case basis. 
Hugenholtz and Senftleben supported this view, also arguing that there is in fact scope within EU law 
to create a system almost as flexible as the US fair use doctrine.340 This argument is perhaps not too 
much of a stretch, especially when bearing in mind the often broad interpretation of our own ‘fair 
dealing’ principle.341 Undoubtedly, however, the most desirable solution would be for the ‘fair use’ 
doctrine to be introduced as a new or adapted exception at European Union level, as Hargreaves 
suggests,342 thereby adequately recognising the obligation to balance copyright owners’ rights with 
the rights of users, as set out in the WIPO Treaty. 
The main thrust of the Hargreaves Review is to urge a ‘twin-track approach’ to be taken by the 
government.343 On the one hand creating copyright exceptions where possible under EU law, whilst 
simultaneously, and vitally, working with the European Union to create ‘a new mechanism in 
copyright law to create a built-in adaptability to future technologies which, by definition, cannot be 
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foreseen’.344 Here Hargreaves pinpoints a key issue in the modern age of copyright law. Enacting any 
new legislation is quite simply futile unless it can be suitably flexible to accommodate the endless 
evolution of digital technology. As Hargreaves suggests, any such mechanism cannot be created at 
UK level alone, but requires EU collaboration.345 There is, however, nothing to prevent the UK 
government from submitting a proposed legal framework to its European partners for consideration, 
interpreting the relevant Directive to ‘fit’ and therefore driving change at both national and 
European level. Hargreaves advocates arguing for a new exception at EU level, incorporating 
elements of a ‘fair use’ doctrine for example, as above, which would be more appropriate to 
accommodate future technological advancement.346 
The Government response paper on implementing the Hargreaves review was published in August 
2011. It ‘sets out the Government’s broad acceptance of its recommendations’347 but is typically 
vague in its statement of action. A further report is commissioned, to be undertaken by Richard 
Hooper CBE. Perhaps Gowers and Hargreaves, having both reiterated many significant proposals, 
should have been enough to instigate some new legislative changes. However these did not follow 
until after the publication of the Hooper report.348 
The response does at least accept the viability of the DCE,349 and begins a process of investigation 
into how such a body would operate. This was a positive step towards real progress in copyright 
reform. It also commits to publish ‘minimum standards for voluntary codes in early 2012’ for 
collecting societies. Prior to this, collecting societies arguably did not have ‘enforceable codes with 
independent review mechanisms’.350 
A final commitment made in the response paper was for the Intellectual Property Office to set out 
plans for a copyright opinions service.351  This system would particularly help educational institutions 
who are ‘often required to make difficult judgements’ in an area in which they have little or no 
expertise. These bodies can innocently and mistakenly infringe copyrights due to inherent 
uncertainty over what is legal.352 Teaching is therefore often unnecessarily limited by this. Although 
the new Regulations should help educational institutions by clarifying their position and legal ability 
to copy in certain circumstances, this exception is clearly not a ‘carte blanche’ and care will still need 
                                                             
344 Hargreaves (n 31) 47. 
345 ibid. 
346 ibid 5. 
347
 Government Response Paper (n 326) Foreword. 
348
 For example the copyright exceptions, enacted in June 2014, and to be enacted October 2014. 
349
 Government Response Paper (n 326) 5. 
350
 ibid 7. 
351
 ibid 13. 
352 ibid 41. 
61 
 
to be taken in order to ensure compliance with the law. Such institutions should welcome the new 
opinions service, which should provide an extra layer of legal certainty through advice in uncertain 
or marginal situations. However, government plans are yet to materialise. 
It is apparent that the Hargreaves review is something of a mixed bag. Whilst there is little in its 
contents to address the crux of the copyright and enforcement problem, it does present some good 
observations on EU collaboration and fair use exceptions, as well as the DCE proposal which did 
provide a good starting point for the later Copyright Hub. Importantly, the government also 
accepted in its response that ‘An efficient and flexible cross-border licensing framework is essential 
to the creation of a single EU market’.353 The problems entrenched into our outdated copyright legal 
framework cannot be rectified without consultation at European level.354 
 
Chapter 3.3 Hooper Report  
From the outset, it is evident that the 2011 Hooper report355 was drafted in response to concerns 
expressed in the Hargreaves Review.356 What is less apparent however is whether this report does, 
in fact, adequately address the issues set out by Hargreaves.  
It is perhaps unsurprising that the Hooper report begins as an evidence collecting exercise.357 
However, this is kept relatively short, with the main content focussing on reform proposals. The key 
feature of the Hooper report is the suggested creation of a not-for-profit, industry-led Copyright 
Hub.358 This would be based on ‘voluntary, opt-in, non-exclusive and pro-competitive principles’.359 
Essentially, the Hub would provide a centralised basis from which copyright owners, potential 
licensees and any interested party may register a work, easily discover the copyright status of a work 
or simply learn about copyright law. It targets the key problem area - large scale, low value 
transactions. The object is to provide clarity and negate the commonly held belief that copyright law 
is confusing and difficult to negotiate. Much of the report focuses on this, reiterating the importance 
of providing a ‘marketplace of rights’360, comprehensible to all. It is made clear that the ‘sectors 
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themselves as being in the best position to bring about the necessary advances’.361 If they ensure 
they do all they can, then it is for the government to ensure appropriate measures are in place to 
reduce copyright infringement.362 This view is supported by Owen who recognises that such a sector 
specific area of law lends itself to close industry involvement.363 Therefore a strong incentive is 
provided for securing the success of the Hub.  
However it is important to ensure that ‘a balance that is beneficial to both parties’ should be 
attained, ‘leading to further and sustained growth and innovation in the UK creative and internet 
industries.’364 Later in the report this is phrased rather differently. Hooper states that in fact the aim 
is to ‘balance the rights of rights holders with the ease of use requirements of rights users’.365 This 
‘ease of use’ problem remains important, although is supposedly almost eradicated,366 it is clearly 
not the only factor to be balanced against the rights of rights holders. The issues of cost and quality 
of material are of equal significance. A comprehensive and accessible resource at a fair price would 
provide stiff competition for some of the more sluggish and erratic illegal sources of digital content 
online. 
The Copyright Hub is certainly a slimmed down367 derivative of the less manageable Digital Copyright 
Exchange featured in the Hargreaves Review. A one-stop shop of this sort, will very likely partially 
achieve the objective of informing the public. Prior to the Hub’s implementation in September 2013, 
anyone wishing to discover the accessibility of a copyrighted work would struggle to do so. Music 
collecting societies can hold ‘incomplete data and worse still conflicting data’.368 But it is submitted 
that perhaps those more likely to use this new facility, are less likely to attempt to obtain it illegally 
in any case. Those illegal users will likely not be encouraged to start legally purchasing copyrighted 
material, simply because it is registered on a centralised database. Arguably then, illegal 
downloading would continue to thrive as before, at least initially. 
However, the Hub is primarily aimed at copyright holders. It provides a form of registration that will 
allow the identification of rights, enforcement and exploitation of their works. Reduced transaction 
costs and the possible increase in licensing agreements due to the simplification of the process are 
major advantages to copyright holders. In addition, providing a one stop shop should afford more 
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flexibility to copyright owners to better exploit their works. Instead of having to negotiate and 
transact with each individual licensee, licenses can be bought quickly and easily through one single 
source. 
 The positives for copyright owners created by the Hub are undeniably significant. Yet a possible side 
effect of this improvement to the position of copyright holders’ is the potential for reduced cost to 
consumers. So the Hub may have a limited positive effect on online piracy, in that by streamlining 
licensing, transaction costs would be reduced, and this reduction in costs should eventually be 
passed on to the consumer. License pools like the Hub are also used in the patents sector. Patent 
pools work the same way, facilitating collective licensing, resulting in the simplification of the 
licensing process for copyright holders. In addition, these pools, like the new Copyright Hub, help to 
alleviate the problem of ‘royalty stacking’. Royalty stacking refers to the paying of royalty charges to 
multiple different sources to obtain access to material protected by intellectual property laws. 
Whilst each individual charge may be small, combined the cost may become prohibitively high. By 
providing the ability to access multiple protected works from one source, transaction costs can be 
greatly reduced. Licensing pools can therefore be described as generally pro-competitive 
organisations, which is positive for both national and EU level development.369  
It is suggested that some critics fear that the Hub will fail, and result in a substantial loss of money 
and time. 370 Importantly, the monetary burden would likely be passed on to licensees. Although this 
issue has been downplayed, as ‘fear of failure is never a good reason not to try to improve an 
inadequate system’,371 it is in fact a genuine concern. Obviously it is true that all reform comes with 
some level of risk of failure. But the above statement appears to suggest that the only two options 
available at the time were to do nothing, or set up the Copyright Hub. This is evidently not the case. 
Perhaps a different system, not so administratively and financially challenging, would be preferable 
when considering the infringement reduction aspect of the Hub concept.  The current entity 
presents an expensive and laborious process, and has created a body which arguably will have little 
success in the battle against infringement, even if it does provide a streamlined licensing facility for 
rights holders. A European licensing system should significantly improve on this effect.372 
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Will the Hub also address the vitally important issue of accessibility? Certainly is provides a more 
accessible system for copyright holders and potential licensees, but less likely to significantly 
improve accessibility for the general public. The report does not discuss this concern. Indeed Hooper 
seems to be somewhat complacent about the accessibility of legally obtained material, stating that 
‘some of the “excuses” that have been put forward over the years for “justifying” copyright 
infringement on the fixed and mobile internet have been and are being eradicated, such as the fact 
that copyright infringing websites are easier to use by consumers than legal websites’.373 There is no 
evidence given to support this statement. There has arguably been no significant advancement in 
the accessibility and affordability of legal sources, apart from the music sector to some extent, in 
which websites such as Spotify have emerged.374 Indeed later in the report, it is stated that ’Lovefilm 
(now Amazon Prime) has a subscription streaming repertoire of 8,000 films over the internet but a 
much greater repertoire of 70,000 films is available (DVDs and BDs - Blu-ray discs) via the traditional 
route of the Royal Mail’.375 Clearly there is much room for improvement in the legal provision of 
copyrighted digital material, before it can genuinely threaten the illegal trade.376 The Copyright Hub 
may have some beneficial effect on services like Amazon Prime. Savings on both licensing costs and 
time should lead to subscription providers to be able to improve their services. 
Yet Burbidge, to some extent, agrees with the surmise that the music industry is already succeeding 
in providing readily accessible, low cost, legal material.377 She argues that ‘The same benefits will 
hopefully reach other rights-centric worlds thanks to the hub’.378 This position is arguably hard to 
justify. The music industry has by no means ‘solved’ the problem of internet piracy – indeed it is 
positively flourishing.379  It is also difficult to ascertain how the Hub would ensure material was 
priced according to current standards, if it is to address infringement issues at all. Whilst it was not 
set up for this reason, it is hoped that, through simplifying licensing, transaction costs would be 
reduced and these reductions would filter down to the consumer. Time will tell whether or not this 
will materialise. The industry must face the fact that consumers are no longer willing to pay high 
prices for digital products. The widespread perception, whether true or false, that digital music and 
books must be far cheaper to produce than hard copies, is entrenched in the public mind-set. It is 
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simple - prices must reflect this shift in market forces driven by societal demands,380 or illegal 
downloading will continue to be a large scale threat to the creative industries.381 The Copyright Hub 
may at least be a good starting point in the fight against infringement however. It may not be the 
solution to online piracy, but it is certainly a step in the right direction towards consolidating and 
streamlining copyright services. 
The 2011 report appears to present the same flaws found in earlier studies. In parts, action is 
encouraged without being specified. Refer to the section on ‘repertoire imbalance’ (the lack of 
digital copies of printed works) for example.382 Here Hooper urges that the industries should, 
‘especially the audio-visual industry where repertoire imbalance is the biggest issue, continue to 
reduce the problem of repertoire imbalance between the digital and physical worlds’.’ Arguably this 
is not so much a recommendation, but a statement of the obvious, but acknowledging the issue at 
least. The problem is recognised, but left to the sector to solve without so much as a vague 
suggestion of a practical, low-cost solution. Instructing the industry to ‘continue to reduce the 
problem’ provides little benefit unless accompanied by incentives to digitise, and without at least 
reference to another part of the report containing practical advice.   
The beginning of the report383 pays particular attention to educational institutions and the music 
industry. It concludes that licensing should be streamlined where possible, to reduce cost and 
complexity. It is unclear why educational institutions are highlighted as a key problem in this area. 
Illegal downloading of copyrighted material was, and is, somewhat more pressing. Although the 
streamlining of licensing is an important development, it does little to address the key issue of online 
piracy. This report seems to suggest that substantial progress is being made in this area however, 
which is arguably not the case.   
Encouragingly, the report recognises the ever changing nature of the digital age, and also 
recommends that ‘an overall steering group is formed, called the Copyright Licensing Steering Group 
(CLSG) with a wide mandate to ensure continuing cross-sector and where possible cross-border 
coordination.’384  It is generally accepted that keeping ‘one step ahead’ of internet piracy is 
extremely difficult with the relentless evolutionary nature of digital technology. It is hoped that this 
steering group would work to try to push forward the progress of the Hub, keeping it as up to date 
as possible. Again it is not particularly evident from the text exactly how this will be enacted or 
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achieved. The report appears to suggest a vague framework for the creative industries to adopt, 
without rigorously investigating its viability.  
Another development is the weight given to the need for a unique identifier to be assigned to each 
individual work.385 This is intended to aid in the protecting and enforcement of owners’ rights. But 
existing Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology such as this has its problems. If a particular 
DRM scheme is discontinued, for example, a work may be rendered inaccessible.386 In addition, 
other problems present themselves. For example, if an individual were to purchase copyrighted 
material as a present for another individual, who subsequently infringed that right, it would be 
extremely difficult to determine who to trace the claim back to. It would be patently unfair if the 
purchaser were to automatically bear the burden of blame for whatever was done to the purchased 
material. Even Apple’s CEO Steve Jobs has spoken out against DRMs in the past, stating that it is the 
music companies who have forced Apple to use DRMs, but that they ‘haven’t worked, and may 
never work, to halt music piracy’.387 
The report then establishes that the BBC should be obliged to take action on this venture, on the 
premise that ‘where the BBC leads, others will follow’.388 A huge corporation such as the BBC cannot 
be responsible for developing a universal system of unique identification, using tax payers’ money 
for a copyright protection system for the whole industry. Naturally the BBCs own benefit would be 
the primary motive behind any development. Individual rights holders need to be able to access and 
afford any technology or equipment required; otherwise the key aim of the Hub, for all copyrights to 
be registered, would be undermined.  
An important aspect of the Copyright Hub proposal was the decision to make it a voluntary ‘opt in’ 
register. This poses a serious difficulty. It would be difficult to expect all creators to become part of a 
register for many reasons. But the current alternative is not entirely satisfactory either. In reality, 
this ‘one stop shop’ will not be so, as not all rights owners will be registered. Therefore the current 
issues surrounding accessibility of information will be merely lessened, not eradicated.389 Any 
improvement is, of course, to be welcomed but it is also important to recognise the potential 
confusion that this extensive, but not all-inclusive, register may cause for the general public. 
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Individuals may infer, incorrectly, that material not on the Hub is not protected by copyright law. 
Given how poorly copyright law is understood by the general public, this is a real possibility.390 
In the recent government response paper, it is made clear that the Copyright Hub is supported by 
the government. But it is also stated that pre-Hub alterations to the UK system may be unnecessary 
and premature.391 Unfortunately it appears that copyright reform is to continue to be a painfully 
slow process. In addition the paper indicates that questions surrounding the scope and operation of 
the private-sector Hub ‘cannot be readily addressed until the Copyright Hub is a practical reality’.392 
This implies that the government is to have little role in its inception and development. This wait and 
see approach is perhaps not the best way to ensure that the Hub properly balances rights holder and 
user rights, or to tackle the most pressing associated issues. The Hub has now been a practical reality 
for several months (since July 2013), funded by the creative industries and governed by a not-for-
profit organisation in partnership with the government-funded Technology Strategy Board.393 The 
one stop shop it provides will undoubtedly aid with accessibility and ease of understanding for non-
lawyers. The easy to read guides explaining legal positions and directing individuals to the correct 
source to obtain licences and permission for use helps to consolidate and present information from 
different sources clearly and relatively concisely. However, without some sort of prompting, the 
majority of individuals are unlikely to be aware of its existence, still less to understand the necessity 
to use it. The suggestion for a nationwide educational campaign through schools, put forward in this 
thesis,394 would be a key way to make full use of this comprehensive resource and therefore allow 
the public to take advantage of the facility it provides, as well as the clear advantages it provides to 
copyright holders. 
In February 2014, the EU announced the proposed EU-wide collective management initiative, or the 
EU ‘Hub’ equivalent.395 This should facilitate the growth of our own UK Hub as well as reducing costs 
EU wide for this developmental project. As Rosati suggests, the UK Hub provides a real opportunity 
to progress the modern digital market if it serves as a model for the EU initiative as well.396 The 
concept still retains the inherent flaws discussed concerning Hooper’s UK Hub however, such as 
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coverage and cost, but the advantages of harmonisation at EU level could well outweigh these 
weaknesses.397  
The government response paper also states that, despite suggestion by both Hargreaves and 
Hooper, this government will ‘not embark on such a major programme of revision’; that is, to 
‘simplify it [Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988] and make it easier to apply’. Therefore no 
major revision of the cumbersome and uncertain legal framework of copyright will take place in the 
near future.  
It is submitted that the Hooper report proposes a rather unrealistic solution to the problem of online 
piracy and copyright enforcement, building on the proposals in the Hargreaves Review, which fails to 
adequately address all of the main copyright law issues. The Copyright Hub does have positive 
intentions to achieve clarity in this uncertain area, but in its current form, does not provide a 
solution to the problem of copyright enforcement in the UK. 
 
Chapter 3.4 Where now? 
In December 2012 the Government published a final report called Modernising Copyright.398 Despite 
its promising title, the main body of the report merely affirms its imminent implementation of the 
few copyright exceptions discussed in previous reports.399 The research exception is to include user 
copying and library copying, as well as archiving, which is an improvement on the previously 
suggested, very strict librarian/archivist only exception. Admittedly this is at the expense of clarity 
however, as any definition of the phrase is absent, and as there is no case law as yet, the scope of 
the exception is unclear. The new legislation was due to come into force in October 2013 but instead 
did so mid-2014.400  
The report also reiterates the government’s relative distance from the inception and development of 
the Copyright Hub. It promises to ‘support and facilitate the development of this industry-led work 
where necessary’, emphasising that ‘the industry has responded positively to the report’s 
recommendations’.401 If not the government then perhaps OFCOM should be involved in its 
regulation and/or the production of guidance. An independent body may be able to better balance 
the various parties’ interests and thus create a system which is accessible to all.  
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In terms of clarity, the various reports do emphasise education of society.402 This would, of course, 
enable more people to understand the scope and limitation of copyright, as well as how to 
legitimately access material. However the Copyright Hub does not promote clarity on a broader 
scale. Indeed individuals may be confused by the voluntary nature of the Hub, inferring that material 
not registered on the Hub is therefore probably not protected by copyright and free to use.403 The 
superiority of the creation of a Hub over merely uniting the existing, barely mentioned, collecting 
societies is not established. 
Also, bear in mind the other major factor promoted in the reports, namely cost reduction, ultimately 
for all parties. This would necessarily suffer as a result of the various educational campaigns and, of 
course, the significant financial burden of the Hub itself. It is also a concern that, eventually, the 
financial burden of the Hub will trickle down to fall on the consumer, whether it is a success or not.   
The Intellectual Property Office promises to ensure that ‘consumers and young people understand 
the importance of respect for and the harm counterfeiting of illegal downloads can do’,404 targeting 
schools for the most part.405 This is another rights holder-centric move designed to encourage the 
public to use available legal sources, even if they may be inferior to non-legal sources, or risk the loss 
of the UK’s vast creative industries. Again the real issue is ignored here. Most ordinary people know 
that most material is copyrighted already, without another expensive IPO campaign. Until viable 
legal alternatives are available, illegal usage will continue. Some emphasis should be placed on the 
creative industries to develop new business models providing accessible, low-cost material on a 
large scale. This is an important opportunity to help protect against infringement. The IPO’s 
educational activity is important but may be limited in its effect, as outlined, unless accompanied 
with other, more long term educational programmes, as discussed in Chapter 4.4. 
To supposedly aid the perceived unfairness of Digital Rights Management (DRM), the Government 
will ‘allow people to make requests electronically for override of DRM/TPM’ to help in situations 
where legitimate users are prevented from accessing material because of DRM issues. In reality, this 
is a very slight modification of section 296ZE (8) CPDA which allows such a request already, but 
states that ‘Any direction given under this section shall be in writing’. Even so ‘writing’ could be 
interpreted to mean electronic written correspondence so in fact this new provision is meaningless, 
and does not alter the status quo at all. It is yet more baffling when taking into account the current 
unpopularity of DRM. Many rights holders are choosing not to use DRM as it can prevent legitimate 
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users from accessing works.406 Whatever the government hopes to achieve with this provision, it is 
very unlikely in reality to have any effect whatsoever on copyright protection or enforcement.  
A Post Implementation Review was announced, to investigate the benefits and pitfalls of the system 
once in place, with the main source of data being ‘industry figures’.407 It seems that the legislature is 
only interested in the approval of the creative industries, leaving consumers entirely out of the 
debate. Industry figures may not be an accurate representation of the overall success of the 
copyright system, all views included. The suggestion of a balance between rights holders and users 
seems to have been abandoned altogether. In each consecutive report it has taken less prominence. 
As the report comes to a conclusion, it rather curiously announces that ‘the Government is aware of 
calls for a broader review of the relevant copyright legislation particularly the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988 (as amended), to simplify it and make it easier to apply. The Hargreaves Review 
made this suggestion, as have a number of others.’ This appears to suggest that widespread calls for 
reform have been issued from a variety of sources. Yet, inexplicably, this statement is immediately 
followed by ‘Having committed to no further major reviews of the IP system in this Parliament, the 
Government does not intend to embark on such a major programme of revision.’ It is submitted that 
the inherent flaws in the old copyright system are persistently ignored and downplayed in the digital 
age. The title of the report being ‘Modernising Copyright’, it is unclear why the legal regime is left to 
continue essentially unaltered, utterly outdated. 
The general recurring themes of the many various published reports on copyright reform have been 
clarity, simplification and the reduction of costs. These reports are littered with sometimes rather 
grandiose claims. For example, Hargreaves’ statement that ‘If the Review’s recommendations are 
acted upon, the result will be stronger rates of innovation and increased economic growth.’ 
Moreover, ‘IP law, including copyright law, would become clearer and be observed by most people 
without controversy.’ Considering the relatively minor suggestions put forward by Hargreaves, with 
the exception of the slightly cumbersome Hub, it is extremely unlikely that copyright law would 
suddenly be observed by most people without controversy. Surely it seems highly unlikely that the 
unsatisfactory range of expensive, incomplete and often low quality legal sources are going to 
instantly become the sole source of purchase, just because the copyrighted status of works is made 
a little clearer. For illegal downloading and usage to be eradicated, a lot more needs to be done.408 
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With regard to the copyright exceptions, true clarity is equally elusive. For example with regard to 
the educational exception, copying ‘fair’, but not ‘significant’409 extracts from books is acceptable 
without a licence. What this exactly consists of is uncertain, and arguably leaves teachers and 
educational institutions as confused as before. The exception for parody is rather similarly vague, 
described as ‘limited’410 with little elaboration. Thankfully these were at least partially addressed in 
the Regulations by reference to the ‘fair dealing’ doctrine, increasing legal certainty, but with no 
rigid definition of ‘fair dealing’ it will still sometimes be difficult for individuals to decide how much is 
too much. The Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón on the Deckmyn case411 held that parody 
should include a ‘humorous or mocking intention’412 and ‘elements sufficiently original’ so as not to 
confuse the parody with the original work.413 Beyond that, it is advised that parody should be an 
autonomous concept, and will be left to Member States to interpret as they see fit.414 Yet again, 
whilst this can be easier for lawmakers and the judiciary to adapt to new situations as they arise, it is 
at the expense of clarity and legal certainty for non-lawyers, which includes those who may wish to 
use this copyright exception in order to create such parody. 
It is submitted that the general aims of clarity and cost reduction have not been portrayed in the 
various reports and legal reform proposals, and will not be achieved in the forthcoming minor 
changes to copyright law. Arguably, this is because the basis for these reports is wrong. All start from 
a foundation built on various assumptions. These include the superiority of copyright owners’ rights 
and the importance of a vigorous protection of our current copyright laws, which in turn implies a 
belief that such vigorous protection is actually successful. Moreover, these laws are awkwardly 
added to and built upon legislation created in a time where many now commonplace technological 
advancements were not even contemplated (CDPA).   
The UK needs to revisit the concept, analysing the basis and rationale behind copyright as a whole. It 
is time to reconsider the principles behind copyright, in the light of modern technological 
advancements. All parties should be involved in this debate, and more weight should be given to 
legal academics who have provided a range of interesting and potentially viable solutions.415 More is 
needed to ensure a fair, balanced system of copyright, beneficial to all parties. A wide range of both 
interested and non-interested parties should be consulted. Non-legal alternatives should be 
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considered. The tax/levy approach set out in the following chapter is arguably a good starting point 
for a new, modern system of copyright. 
An analysis of the reports and reviews of copyright law over the last few years indicates that any 
changes to the law, such as the private copying and parody exceptions, will only have a minimal 
effect on copyright enforcement and online piracy. The main concepts in the reports have been the 
introduction of the industry-led Hub, and limited copyright exceptions to help with libraries and 
educational institutions. Government involvement has been so far limited, and a more hands-on 
approach may be required.416 That is not to say that there is no merit or progressive policy in the 
reports and reviews discussed in this paper. It is simply that they have only addressed the fringes of 
the online piracy problem, and not the core issues, despite piracy being the key obstacle to 
successful copyright enforcement. 
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Chapter 4 Complimentary Measures and Revenue Sources  
 
Having argued in the preceding chapters that legislation alone is not enough to combat 
infringement, this chapter will suggest some alternative and complimentary measures to run 
alongside the legislative framework. In the main, these solutions will attempt to address some of the 
key problem factors commonly cited as incentives to continue committing copyright infringement. In 
an OFCOM survey, only 16% of infringers who exclusively illegally download stated that nothing 
would induce them to stop.417 Of the rest, the main issues included cost (32%), quality, ease of 
access, availability (27%), speed and clarity regarding what is and isn’t legal (24%).418 As Wing notes, 
‘in order to survive, a cold hard look will have to be taken by copyright owners’.419  
 
If, as stated above, only 16% of those who exclusively illegally download refuse to stop, then surely 
tackling these key factors of costs, quality, accessibility, availability, speed and clarity, which affect 
84% of infringers in total, will lead to a significant reduction in levels of online copyright 
infringement. To put the figure into perspective, the report states that of their sample population, 
around 17% of internet users consumed some illegal content online, with only 4% of these users 
exclusively consuming illegal material.420 The statistic above shows that only 16% of those people 
could not be induced to stop consuming illegal material. This is a tiny proportion of internet users, 
and is a positive indication that resolving some of the key factors cited above should, in theory, deter 
the vast majority of infringers from illegal sources, a view largely corroborated by Wing who 
encourages ‘competition with the pirates’421 as the way forward. Hargreaves corroborates this view 
in his review, suggesting that whilst enforcement and education have so far struggled to impact on 
online piracy levels, there is evidence of success where creative industries have provided lower 
priced products in a form consumers want.422 
 
In the same OFCOM report, only 11% of infringers stated that a letter from their ISP would put them 
off.423 It is quite clear that the strategy set out in the Digital Economy Act is simply not adequate to 
tackle this problem, as a standalone solution. More is evidently required. Encouragingly, Wing points 
out that ‘there has been more evidence of success where creative businesses have responded to 
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illegal services by making available lower priced legal products in a form consumers want’.424 As 
almost one third of infringers cited cost as the main factor for their illegal activities, it must surely be 
a key area for the industry to target. More recently, University of Portsmouth research 425 provided 
further examples of justifications and motives behind infringement. Collins and Cox suggest that the 
research confirms financial savings as the key factor motivating infringers.426  It is also noted that 
there is limited evidence427 to support the suggestion that knowledge of the law or threat of harsh 
punishment will act as an effective deterrent.428  
 
However, the data does indicate that quality of illegal content is a main reason users may be 
encouraged to eschew illegal content in favour of higher quality, paid alternatives. This, Wing 
argues, is a key area in which legitimate content providers should be able to win over internet 
pirates, and should be further exploited.429 Pirated content is often low quality and can be riddled 
with viruses.430 This is one area in which internet pirates struggle to compete. The provision of safe 
and reliable, quality online content would be a major plus point for legitimate content providers, 
providing a real incentive for users to eschew illegal sources for its legal equivalent.  
 
Based on conclusions drawn from the research above, improving in key areas such as cost and 
quality of legitimate sources should lead to a real reduction in infringement. Some of the following 
complimentary measures should contribute towards the solution to these recurring issues. 
 
 
Chapter 4.1 Tax/levy system 
The tax/levy system is a serious contender in the hunt for a solution to the piracy issue.  Indeed it 
has recently been confirmed by the European Court of Justice that, in theory, it would be compatible 
with EU law.431 The Information Society Directive refers to the idea of ‘fair compensation’ in the 
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context of the currently available copyright exceptions,432 requiring rights holders to be adequately 
compensated for the use of their works under the current exceptions. The already established idea 
of fair compensation could certainly be applied to this tax/levy system. 
 
This method of collecting revenue should provide a better balance between the rights of all parties; 
creators, copyright holders and consumers, which is, after all, an idea advocated in the Preamble of 
the WIPO Treaty. Essentially the model entails a tax which is imposed upfront on services and 
products whose value is increased by file sharing 433 in return for permitting unhindered, non 
commerical peer-to-peer file sharing (online piracy).434 This ‘provides funds to be distributed among 
right holders without requiring them to establish a collective society and without relying on the 
readiness of consumers to pay a subscription fee’.435 Peukert rightly indicates that this represents a 
significant advantage over collective licensing. This is because collective licensing relies on the 
voluntary agreement of rights holders to create a society, and will, of course, only work if consumers 
are incentivised to pay for content.436 This is an ever present issue, even where there isn’t the issue 
of lack of complete content coverage, as is often the case with collective licensing.  
Perhaps one of the most comprehensive studies into this particular model is provided by Netanel.437 
The writer cites Germany as an example of a country with a similar system already in operation. 
Under the German Copyright Act,438 ‘personal copying [is] noninfringing, but [they] impose a levy on 
the sale of audio and video recording equipment, as well as recording media such as blank tapes and 
cassettes and copying equipment.439 By distributing the burden of cost among those most likely to 
facilitate file sharing and other infringing activity, rights holders are duly compensated and many 
current problems with enforcement are dissipated. Lessig refers to this as ‘compensation without 
control’.440 For such a system to work however, rights holders would have to accept this 
fundamental premise. For the minority for whom economic benefits are not the key motivation 
behind their creation, it may be a difficult position to accept. 441  
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But enforcement of copyright is currently so ineffectual, there does not seem to be any alternative. 
Clearly the German system referring to blank tapes and cassettes is now irrelevant. Most copyright 
infringement is now performed digitally. This was not a very future-centric piece of legislation, but 
the important thing to note here is the way the levy model was implemented. According to the 
Explanatory Memorandum,442 collective management organisations (CMO) would be responsible for 
collecting these tariffs and the Act set out exact tariffs. In 2008, this was amended, so that CMOs 
and the producers of recording equipment were to ‘agree on such tariffs themselves’.443 Although 
technology has moved on and to some extent left the law behind, in principle this demonstrates that 
this system could work in the digital age. 
 
However, it is not only since the dawn of the tech age that these problems have arisen of course. 
Infringement of copyright by photocopying books and cassette tapes was rife in the preceding 
decades and it all boils down to lack of control over what individuals do in their private homes.  
It is arguably too difficult to successfully regulate enforcement solely through the law, and as a result 
a better alternative must be sought for rights holders. This compensation with less control approach 
would certainly fit with the utilitarian view of copyright as a means of compensation and incentive 
for creators. However, the purely legal approach has simply not been successful enough to sway 
public opinion towards this sort of view.444  
 
Writers such as Litman argue for the opt-out tax/levy model.445 This is seen as an important way to 
quickly impose a new regime. All copyright holders are involved, unless they specifically exclude 
themselves. However Peukert argues that this would likely fall at the hurdle of compliance with 
international law obligations. 446 TRIPS requires complete compliance with Articles 1 to 21 of the 
Berne Convention, of which Article 5 prohibits the establishment of formality requirements such as 
this.447 Therefore an opt in model would be problematic without any major change at international 
level. It would also fall foul of the concept of ‘compensation without control’ inherent in this 
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model,448 creating a confusing two-tier system of rights holders who wished to retain control using 
the current legal protection framework and others opting in to the new system whose works would 
be open to exploitation. This clearly would not be a workable solution. 
Netanel sensibly suggests that ‘P2P-related consumer good[s] or service[s] should be exempt only if 
the levy on that item would be so small as not to be worth the costs of administration’.449 This is a 
sensible exemption as such costs would be pointless and burdensome. However one aspect of his 
proposed model may need further investigation, namely that ‘Suppliers would pay differential levies, 
in amounts reflecting, at least in part, the Copyright Office finding of how much the value of each 
product and service is enhanced by P2P file swapping.’450 He chooses not to elaborate on how 
exactly the Copyright Office would reach these specific findings. Clearly there would have to be 
some sort of monitoring system, to ensure that the Copyright Office’s conclusions seem fair, 
proportionate and unbiased. Griffin rightly warns against ‘the gradual development of assumptions 
as to the nature of what the funds are intended to achieve’ and that therefore ‘The means by which 
funding is devolved will need to carefully managed’.451 Further government involvement would be 
essential, with regular reviews of the Copyright Office’s progress taking place to ensure that the 
regime was properly regulated.  
 
Netanel reminds us that any concern that intermediaries would become increasingly obsolete 
because of the new digital business model, would be unfounded. There are many other functions 
still retained by many intermediaries, for example, record labels such as ‘distributing records, 
discovering artists who may have popular appeal, help assemble bands, package and market albums, 
and finance recording costs and concert tours’.452 Although written in 2003, Netanel’s opinion has so 
far proved to be correct.453 
 
Another major advantage of this model would be that ‘The economic interests of right holders, and 
the cultural interests of makers and recipients, can be dealt with under different regimes’.454 The 
endless conflict between rights holders seeking to retain and strengthen their rights, and users 
seeking to access and re-use copyrighted material, would be diminished. Each stakeholder would be 
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provided for. The balance between economic interests, in a sector clearly vital to the UK economy, 
and cultural importance would be somewhat better struck. As a starting point, this model would go 
some way to achieving a solution acceptable to all parties. Lim and Longdin argue that it is vital that 
‘wider societal interest’ ‘be kept firmly in view’.455 The above model arguably does just that. A 
significant obstacle to imposing new regulation in the area of copyright law is government 
reluctance to become involved in an area dominated by the creative industries which, as a whole, 
combine to become a major UK economic contributor. This model should provide an opportunity for 
government involvement that does not cause grief to the powerful creative industries, who would 
receive compensatory revenue from a new source. By properly compensating rights holders through 
a levy, it would then be possible to ensure that users have a non-commercial right to use 
copyrighted material at the same time. Thus, if copyright holders would welcome such a levy, they 
may have to give something in return. This right to use, known as the ‘user privilege’,456 could be 
protected by law and not be circumvented by copyright holders.457 In effect, the proposal is to create 
a compensatory levy which essentially legalises non-commercial piracy, instead of, in Lessig’s words, 
‘criminalising a generation’,458 and without successful results for those whom the law is designed to 
assist (copyright owners) in any case. 
 
Crucially, there would no longer be a distinction between those who could, and those who couldn’t 
afford to stand up for their rights in order to be compensated, on any side of the equation. Many of 
the infringement problems highlighted in this paper would be eradicated, with the added advantage 
of removing the current status quo in which rights holders and end users tend to be on one of two 
different ‘sides’ of a conflict. Infringement is wrong, that much is undoubtedly clear, but the 
increasing impossibility of adequate prevention in the digital age requires a drastic change of 
approach which allows rights holders to be compensated in a different way. The tax/levy system 
poses a real, permanent solution to the constantly changing cycle of infringement and attempted 
enforcement, greatly reducing the need for constant reviews, reports and law reforms in this 
complex area. However, the success of this system in actually reducing online piracy would hinge on 
the willingness of copyright holders to reduce costs and improve access to materials, addressing the 
key factors for infringement, as a result of their being appropriately compensated for infringement. 
In terms of redressing the balance of power between various parties, however, the levy would 
                                                             
455
 Louise Longdin and Pheh Hoon Lim, ‘P2P online file sharing: transnational convergence and divergence in 
balancing stakeholder interests’ [2011] 33(11) EIPR 690, 698. 
456
 Netanel (n 415) 40. 
457
 ibid. 
458
 Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (Bloomsbury Academic, 
2008), xviii. 
79 
 
properly compensate rights holders for inevitable copyright infringement, whilst at the same time 
decriminalising the public as a whole for non-commercial use of copyrighted material.  
 
There are, of course, some difficulties of implementation and maintenance to be overcome. Who is 
to bear the responsibility of this development would have to be determined. In addition, there is the 
issue of what to impose the levy on. At this stage, perhaps the best solution would be to impose the 
levy on broadband charges, as well as storage devices and copying equipment.459 Perhaps there 
could even be a sliding scale for the levy, depending to some extent on your internet speed and, 
therefore, your potential download capacity. Clearly online copyright infringement, by definition, 
cannot take place unless there is an internet connection. Although indirect, there is a necessity here 
which is not always present with other services and products sometimes used to facilitate file 
sharing. As most infringement now takes place in the digital world, placing levies on data storage 
devices such as hard drives, without also levying internet accessibility services, would be harder to 
justify. Whilst at present hard drives are often used to store illegally downloaded material, the use of 
online storage ‘clouds’ is becoming increasingly popular, and will continue to expand in the near 
future, so this should also be taken into account. 
 
It may be argued that this levy is requiring innocent users to subsidise the illegal actions of others. 
However this tax/levy model arguably mitigates some of that perceived injustice. By paying a little 
extra for their internet connection, all users will be able to freely access any digital content for non-
commercial purposes, without fear of reprisals. This means that all users would be able to take 
advantage of the new system. As the digitalisation of media continues to increase, the use of digital 
content online will only become more necessary, and it is in all users’ interests to ensure that this 
becomes easier, faster and, perhaps most importantly, cheaper. Leistner and Spindler argue that the 
strong economic advantages of such a levy [specifically on computers and data storage devices in 
their 2006 paper] would outweigh the small disadvantage of obliging the minority of users who will 
not access online content to pay for users’ utilisation.460 
 
In addition, there is some precedent for this type of course of action in other areas of law. A flood 
levy may be introduced to all home insurance premiums, despite the fact that many home owners 
may have deliberately bought property in areas with no risk of flooding to avoid such problems and 
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potential costs.461 This is arguably a weaker justification than the copyright levy, as there is 
absolutely no advantage for those homeowners in non-flood areas, whereas at least the broader 
access to copyrighted material would be available to all internet users, even if they did not wish to 
utilise it.  
 
Chapter 4.2 Alternative Revenue Systems 
 
Chapter 4.2.1 Micropayments  
Micropayments are an obvious solution to the problem of cost, speed and ease of access in some 
forms of digital media, particularly the gaming industry. Essentially, these are very small payments 
made by users, without the inconvenience of entering payment details on a regular basis, for 
nominal monetary transactions. Bearing in mind that almost a third of infringers claim that cheaper 
legal services would encourage them to stop infringing,462 it follows that successful use of 
micropayments should provide a substantial decrease in infringement.  
But as Milton argues, ‘the music industry was shockingly late to offer consumers a legitimate, user-
friendly way to buy online’.463 The writer is very much of the view that is it is ‘incumbent on you [the 
rights holder]’ to provide an easy, accessible, low cost service. He further argues that merely 
searching for stronger ways to enforce rights will never eliminate piracy altogether. The harsh reality 
is that rights holders are often perceived as simply asking too high a price for their products. 
Consumers are aware of the diminishing costs of the production, storage and dissemination of digital 
material, in contrast to ‘hard copy’ methods, such as books, DVDs and CDs, a claim disputed by many 
in the industry, but not all. David Derrico, an author who also edits and publishes ebooks, argues 
that perhaps publishers’ claims464 that costs to produce ebooks are the same as physical ones are 
somewhat exaggerated.465 Yet there appears to be a great reluctance among creative industry 
bodies to alter their prices according to the evolving market. Again consider e-books as an example. 
Even today the cost of e-books is fairly random – it can be less, but also can be as much, or more 
                                                             
461 Caitlin Morrison <http://www.insuranceage.co.uk/insurance-age/news/2191088/flood-levy-could-add-10-
to-home-insurance-premiums> accessed 12th January 2015. 
462 OFCOM Wave 4 Report (n 32), 5. 
463 Neil Milton ‘Micro-payments offer a solution to copyright infringement’ (The Lawyers Weekly, 27 November 
2009) <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=articleandarticleid=1050 > accessed 29
th
 December 
2014. 
464
 For example, Michael Hyatt ‘Why do ebooks cost so much? A publisher’s perspective’ 
<http://michaelhyatt.com/why-do-ebooks-cost-so-much.html> accessed 4
th
 April 2015. 
465
 David Derrico ‘Cost Breakdowns: E-books vs Printed Books’ <http://www.davidderrico.com/cost-
breakdowns-e-books-vs-printed-books/> accessed 28th March 2015. 
81 
 
than, the same publication in hard copy form.466 This is, understandably, immensely frustrating to 
consumers who feel that they are being ripped off. Having invested in their expensive e-reader, they 
feel that there must be some financial advantage to doing so. Awareness as to the costs involved in 
producing digital copies of publications is almost non-existent, with many still assuming that digital 
works should be far cheaper then hard copies.467 
This recurring perception among consumers that hard copies of books require many materials, 
factory machinery, storage etc whilst digital copies only cost money to create and comparatively 
little to reproduce is problematic. Prices are viewed as evidence of pure greed, and alternative, often 
illegal, methods of obtaining the material are sought. 468This is symptomatic of the confusing nature 
of the copyright legal system and the various myths and contradictory opinions that arise from it. To 
alter this, we also need to address the issue of consumer perception of copyright infringement by 
educating the public as to the true facts of the costs involved. 469  
 The technology to implement a micropayment system has already been developed in the gaming 
sector, which may well have contributed towards there being comparatively far less piracy in this 
industry,470 as Turbine provides the facility to operate ‘micro-transactions’ within downloaded 
games.471 Indeed the gaming industry can and should provide some inspiration to sectors less willing 
to accept the new digital landscape. Micropayments in gaming became high profile in 2008 when EA 
released ‘Battlefield Heroes’: a free to use game subsidized by advertising and micropayments.472 
These micropayments were not designed to impact on the playability of the game however. For 
example, individuals could purchase items of clothing for their game character, but not ‘better’ 
weapons with which players would outperform others to an extent which would deter non-paying 
users. 
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This bold move by a major player in the gaming world has arguably been successful. Statistics 
provided to IGN in 2009 have proved surprisingly positive.473 Over and above revenue realised 
through advertising, EA claim that buyers spend, on average, around twenty US dollars.474 Although 
it is not made clear what percentage of users are buyers, this is clearly a good result, so early in the 
development. Interestingly, 76% of expenditure was on ‘vanity clothing items’, rather than 
‘advancement widgets’ for acquiring a broader range of weapons etc. Perhaps this indicates that 
users obtaining legitimate, good quality, and, most importantly, free copies of games will feel more 
willing to spend very small sums on enhancements, once invested in the game. Arguably, many 
would not do so if they have had to purchase a copy of the game. The success of this business model 
suggests that psychologically, as well as financially, users seem more inclined to make in-game 
purchases when all major obstacles (these being cost, accessibility, quality and speed) are removed. 
The most obvious and important advantage to this business model is the complete lack of piracy. 
The game is provided for free. Users only pay very small sums voluntarily, for non-essential extras, 
and yet the industry still makes a profit through micropayments and advertising combined.  
Another example of success using this type of business model is the online game Candy Crush. The 
game itself is free, but users must pay for extra levels to progress further with the game. With an 
annual turnover of £300 million,475 this company makes it clear that users can and will invest 
substantial amounts of money into games, not in spite of, but because of it being initially free of 
charge. This allows the user to become ‘hooked’ and motivated to pay to continue their enjoyment. 
Many users, if unable to play at all without first registering and paying, may simply not bother as 
they have not yet been given an opportunity or incentive to want to pay, or become invested in the 
product or service.  
Whilst different to films or music, the gaming industry has demonstrated that it can utilise the 
micropayment system effectively. But the micropayment model could be considered by other 
creative industry bodies. As Wing states, ‘Sooner or later, simply in order to survive, a cold hard look 
will have to be taken by copyright owners’.476 Yet this does not seem to have been the case. 
Although there are an ever increasing number of legitimate websites purporting to offer such 
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services, they often provide a limited and inconsistent range of material,477 require a better quality 
internet connection than similar illegal websites, and are arguably still too expensive. For example, 
an individual would have to subscribe to many different film provision websites, in order to be able 
to access an almost full range of modern and old films. With Amazon Prime and Netflix both 
standing users at £5.99, the figures soon mount up. In addition, users are unable to keep or re-watch 
any of the films viewed on the subscription site, as soon as their subscription lapses.478  
Micropayments should be incorporated in to business models, where appropriate, in order to help 
create a fair and workable system for all parties.  There may be some scope in the film industry for 
example. Many people buy DVDs in order to access the plethora of extra content. Whether it be cast 
interviews, directors’ cuts, film commentary, outtakes, production interviews or deleted scenes, 
these extras continue to be offered with DVDs but are generally absent from online content 
providers. It would be easy to provide a film (perhaps for free, funded by advertisements, as 
outlined below479), then use micropayments to offer the various extras to consumers to generate 
extra revenue. Deleted scenes, in particular, can be hugely popular, with one scene from Mission 
Impossible: Ghost Protocol achieving 400,000 views in just two days.480 Similarly in the music 
industry, there is potential to produce band interviews and unreleased tracks for nominal charges. 
Unreleased tracks in particular would tempt fans, creating an air of exclusivity and increasing the 
fans’ involvement in the experience. The gaming industry has shown (above) that the more invested 
in an experience consumers are, the more willing they are to contribute financially to the 
experience. These would also serve as promotional material for gigs, gaining artists valuable 
publicity, as well as encouraging the purchase of further tracks from an artist’s catalogue once one 
song has been heard for free. 
However as Rita McGrath rightly notes, micropayments will never become the norm until a seamless 
and transparent system is developed.481 Users need to know exactly what and how much they are 
paying for content, and the transaction needs to be completed with minimal interruption and 
inconvenience to the user. The quicker the process, the more likely that the model will be successful, 
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argues Wing.482 A constant process of entering details and frustratingly frequent captcha483 entries 
will quickly become frustrating and likely be abandoned by those of us used to instant one-click 
purchasing processes (such as Amazon) and interruption-free online content. Some may argue that 
Bitcoin484 embodies that model. Unlike most transactions, Bitcoin does not involve banks and 
therefore does not incur transaction fees. Unfortunately the service has been plagued by hackers, 
scams and ‘extreme price fluctuations’.485 Truly reliable technology is urgently required to ensure 
the viability of services such as Bitcoin. Despite its problems however, the service continues to 
thrive. In March 2013, ‘The combined value of all Bitcoins in circulation surpassed $1billion’.486  
The micropayment model is arguably successful in the gaming world because it attempts to tackle 
one of, if not the major factor which induces infringement, namely cost, as cited previously. If care is 
taken to consider why infringement takes place, it can be easier to establish a way of tackling the 
issue. For too long, the UK government has essentially decided that what the creative industries 
want, they can have. But this clearly hasn’t worked to date, as online infringement continues to 
flourish. It is important then to investigate all parties’ perspectives in order to develop a proper 
strategy. The gaming industry has, at least in part, achieved this. The subconscious impact of 
purchasing a game, or worse, paying a monthly subscription, is apparently a substantial one. This 
subscription model is more popular in the film and music industry however, as it allows the user to 
access a broad range of films or albums, as opposed to a single game as in this context. There is 
certainly scope for the film and music industries to consider micropayments for ‘extras’, emulating 
the success of the gaming industry. 
Chapter 4.2.2 Advertisements 
Copyright owners should be able to source further revenue by the incorporation of advertising into 
their business models. Advertisements are already used extensively on illegal websites. In 2012, 36 
U.S. companies had advertising budgets of $1 billion or more, with Proctor and Gamble heading the 
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table at a huge $10 billion per year globally. 487 It is abundantly clear that the provision of advertising 
space is in great demand and can therefore be extremely lucrative. 
As indicated previously,488 the world of online gaming leads the way in using adverts to subside a 
free-to-play gaming model. Battlefield Heroes provided a gaming experience unmarred by 
interrupted play. 489  Instead, adverts are concentrated on the website and the beginning section of 
the game, so as not to spoil ‘in-game experience’ for users. 
It is not only the gaming industry using an advertisement-based business model however. Until 
recently, legal websites such as Crackle490 provided free full-length films, subsidised by adverts. 
Although the range of films available is presently very limited, it is a positive move towards a more 
up to date business model. Other websites such as The Guardian online newspaper,491 and even 
Youtube, use advertisements to fund themselves. Admittedly Youtube has the might of Google 
behind it, and therefore is perhaps not the most reliable indicator of the success, or otherwise, of 
the advertisement-based model, but it does provide a good example of how to maximise exposure 
and promote this model profitably.  
It would appear, then, that the use of advertisements, alongside alternative sources of income such 
as micropayments in the case of gaming and perhaps the film industry, to maximise revenue, should 
lead to a facility which costs an almost nominal fee to the end user, whilst at the same time 
providing profits to the rights holder. 
However, at the same time it is also important to target advertisers who are supporting illegal 
websites by using them for advertisements. In Grokster,492 the contribution of profits from 
advertising was taken into account and used as a factor to find liability against a website providing 
access to illegal sources of digital content. This should make it clear to potential advertisers that 
advertising on illegal websites is not acceptable. Perhaps fines should be used to discourage 
companies from risking advertising on illegal websites. Companies would then take more care to 
ensure that their advertisements were displayed legally and were not associated with illegal 
products or services, such as illegal streaming websites. It is estimated that piracy websites receive 
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around £137m in revenue from advertising every year.493 Addressing this problem should go some 
way to removing a significant proportion of their income, and thus reducing the pirates’ ability to 
provide a comprehensive and quality service. This should lead to consumers becoming increasingly 
dissatisfied with these sources of digital material and, it is hoped, drive them to better quality legal 
services.   
A 2013 report494 indicated that advertisements from many major brands, including Amazon, Visa and 
Microsoft,495 regularly appear on illegal websites containing pirated material. This poses a real risk of 
further confusing consumers who already admit to sometimes finding it difficult to determine the 
legality or otherwise of online content.496 It is feasible that an advertisement by a trusted brand such 
as Microsoft may imply legality to the consumer, and allay their doubts about the legitimacy of the 
source. Indeed, the presence of a trusted brand on a website was cited as the main indicator as to 
the legality, or otherwise, of a website by those unsure as to the legitimacy of an online content 
provider.497 The Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU), under their Operation Creative 
initiative,498 have created the Infringing Website List499 in order to aid companies in their efforts to 
avoid advertising on illegal websites. Without an incentive to use and abide by the list however, its 
effect will arguably be minimal.500 A fine for advertising on illegal websites, either wilfully or 
negligently, may perhaps provide just such an incentive. If both the brand advertised and the 
advertising company were in the firing line, this would encourage both parties to ensure that they 
are doing their best to avoid advertising inappropriately. The Infringing Website List does provide a 
useful tool for the advertising industry to self-regulate, however, which is likely the desired effect. 
The better equipped the advertising industry is to quickly and cheaply investigate the legality of their 
advertising space, the less likely they are to erroneously (or negligently) utilise illegal sources. 
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Chapter 4.2.3 Subscription-based business models 
The subscription-based business model is, overall, a solid one. This concept aims to tackle the 
perceived problems of lack of quality and convenience by providing unlimited access to high quality 
digital content for a monthly or annual subscription fee. For films, there are services by those such as 
Amazon Prime offering access to around 70,000 films. Spotify provides a free service initially, 
subsidised by advertisements, then after 6 months requires the user to pay £4.99 to receive ad-free, 
unlimited access to around 20 million songs.501 Users who do not wish to pay, continue to 
experience advertisements, and are restricted to 10 hours of streaming per month. Both Napster 
and Newzbin502 are also good examples of the potential success of this kind of business model. 
Although illegal, both websites provided cheap and easy access to digital content. It is simple; 
consumers are willing to pay when they are given what they want. 
 
In addition, legally licensed copies of works tend to be high quality, glitch free products. Users need 
not worry about blurry films or inexpertly edited content. The infringement factor cited as ease of 
access503 is addressed through user-friendly interfaces provided by subscription-based business 
models. Users are safe in the knowledge that their chosen service is virus, glitch and pop up-free, 
with quick and easy access to their favourite films and TV shows. Instead of sifting through links to 
various versions of their favourite film on an illegal website, only to find that many of the links have 
been deleted, users know that what they see is exactly what they get. Extra features, such as the 
ability to save quick links to their favourite TV programme, to record which episode the user is up to 
in a series, and to auto-play the next episode for convenience for example, can be used to enhance 
the experience and effectively retain consumer patronage. 
However there is a major flaw in the current legal versions of this model, which needs to be 
overcome if it is to provide a service that rivals illegal websites. The problem is coverage limitations. 
This is evident in two different ways. The first is the pace at which hard copies of films and music are 
translated into digital copies. This is referred to by Hooper as ‘repertoire imbalance’.504 Take Amazon 
Prime as an example. It has a repertoire of 70,000 films available by post, yet only 8,000 of those are 
available for online streaming.505 Worse still, the range of coverage is limited, as competitors such as 
Netflix have also managed to obtain (often exclusive) rights to many films and TV shows not covered 
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by Amazon Prime, leading to incomplete and seemingly random coverage by each website. The 
reasonable price of £5.99 per month may initially seem cheap for unlimited access, but if 
subscriptions to several different providers become necessary in order to access all of your favourite 
films and TV shows, the monthly costs will soon add up to become prohibitively expensive. An added 
complication here is the complete absence of subtitles available on subscription sites like Amazon 
Prime, rendering its content totally inaccessible to the approximately 9 million hearing-impaired and 
deaf consumers in the UK.506  
 
These flawed and incomplete services must be improved to provide a more comprehensive facility in 
order to compete with illegal services. As Wing argues,507 the creative industries are missing out on 
vital opportunities to outplay illegal providers by exploiting flaws in their services. The inconsistent 
supply of subtitles on illegal digital content can and should be exploited by legal sources such as 
Amazon Prime. Comprehensive provision of subtitles would hugely increase desirability to that 
significant market of 9 million individuals, who would likely eschew the difficult task of finding 
subtitled content illegally in favour of a comprehensive legal source.  
 
Hooper suggests that notions such as repertoire imbalance can be more about perception than 
reality, and that in fact there is a broader coverage than is generally believed.508 He also notes that 
the conversion of old recordings to digital format can be very costly for the creative industries. This 
reiterates the importance of a nationwide educational awareness campaign to debunk copyright 
myths and help the public to understand the reality of this complex area of law.509 Admittedly this is 
a long term strategy and would do little to solve the problem of public perception in the short term. 
The tax/levy model proposed in this chapter should be able to produce faster solutions for copyright 
holders in the meantime.  
 
The music industry is making a little more progress in this area than the film industry. Recently 
Spotify has accelerated its acquisition of back catalogues of artists’ work, such as the recent addition 
of Metallica’s full musical repertoire.510 In addition, other companies have recognised the need to 
keep pace with technology. One example is Nokia, a mobile phone provider, who ‘has taken 
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advantage of mobile music, by bundling unlimited downloading into the price of a handset’.511  This 
addresses one of the psychological aspects of infringement by removing the ‘cost’ of the service or 
content at the point of use, incorporating it into the purchase of a product which is in any case likely 
to be used for the consumption of such services. It is then perceived as inclusion in the price of what 
is already a higher priced article which the individual wishes to invest in, in any case. This one-off 
purchase can then be seen as providing ‘free’ music for purchasers of the phone, even though in 
reality this service has been included in the purchase price. These advances and adaptations of 
business models are finally starting to increase, but there is arguably still a long way to go.  
 
The second key limitation is the lack of coverage particularly regarding new and popular films. This is 
largely due to the cost of licensing with copyright holders. It is likely that the new Copyright Hub512  
and the pan-European licensing system513  will have a positive effect in this area. By streamlining 
licensing, and increasing its efficiency, this should lead to a reduction in transaction costs. However, 
as many major films are produced outside of Europe, in the US for example, this effect may be 
somewhat minimal. Only global collaboration could seek to overcome this obstacle entirely, 
although any collaboration at all can only be a good thing. Illegal websites provide access to major 
feature films almost immediately on release. No legal service is yet able to do this, due to 
transaction costs. This major flaw in the subscription-based business model will only be solved by 
improvements to the licensing system, analysed later in the chapter.514  If this problem of licensing 
costs can be overcome, we will see a real solution to the problem of illegal digital content sources 
offering a broader range of material than legal sites.  
Chapter 4.2.4 Lock-ins and technical content protection 
One clever way of securing permanent custom is the ‘lock-in’ system. This method is most 
commonly associated with companies such as Apple, and works very simply. Material such as music, 
apps and other digital content are coded so that they can only be used with an Apple product, such 
as an iPhone or Mac computer. Rather than working together to create maximum coverage and 
therefore a true monopoly on all digital content, some companies instead prefer to adopt this 
system, attempting to monopolise large proportions of the market in this way. To be successful at 
this, the product, such as is the case with Apple, must be very attractive to consumers. Then, once 
locked in, it is made difficult and disadvantageous for consumers to migrate elsewhere. Amazon’s 
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ebook catalogue is another good example, with the widest range of ebooks,515 but solely available to 
Amazon Kindle (ereader) owners. Some of the most common digital formats of ebooks, such as 
epubs, are therefore unavailable to Kindle owners, who are only able to access Amazon’s own 
ebooks on their ereader. Such lock-ins are certainly good for manufacturers, and potentially for 
copyright holders too, and because of this lock-ins may have the effect of reduced cost being passed 
down the line to the consumer. It is about finding the correct balance between providing a flexible 
product for consumers to address the market need for interoperability in the modern world, whilst 
still allowing copyright owners to exploit their product in a profitable way.  
 
 
The way companies enforce these ‘lock-in’ protection measures are unsurprisingly forceful. Apple 
claims that users who attempt to ‘unlock’ their iPhone so that they can access other digital content, 
are in fact violating its rights and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (US copyright law).516 Apple 
went further than this, even downloading its own browser, Safari, onto users’ computers during a 
routine Apple ‘software update’.517 Clearly this sort of aggressive marketing strategy has driven 
some users to seek alternative ways of acquiring digital content. Apple seems to be ignoring one of 
the key factors users cite as missing from the currently available legal sources of digital content: 
comprehensive compatibility. This is closely linked to the issue of cost. By tying users into one 
system, the company is then able to decide its own costs for products and services. Users who 
realise their mistake once tied in, are forced to either comply, undertake the expensive process of 
changing to another service losing all digital content obtained whilst with Apple, or seek an 
alternative cheaper and more comprehensive source. This alternative source may very well be an 
illegal one.   
 
When used aggressively, the ‘lock in’ strategy can be anti-competitive and does little to address 
consumers’ current issues with legal sources of digital material. Brown expands on this argument, 
stating that consumers are ‘extremely unhappy’ with technical protection measures like lock-ins, 
particularly where they prevent format shifting.518 He argues that if rights holders do not accept the 
balance required in copyright law then anti-circumvention laws will likely be brought into further 
disrepute, as consumer discussion and campaigning against such TPMs has become so much easier 
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to achieve through the internet.519 Brown’s argument feeds in to the battle analogy, which sees 
rights holders and consumers as two sides of a conflict, with both sides trying (and, it is submitted, 
largely failing) to win. As stated previously, a tax/levy system could help to break down this 
unhelpful position.  Allowing format-shifting and providing an excellent platform - Apple continues 
to be relevant here - adds to the potential positive impact of lock-ins and provide incentives to 
consumers to buy in to the concept. 
 
Following France’s lead,520 more collaboration and increased interoperability between different 
products and services could also have a positive impact, providing more flexibility and choice for the 
consumer whilst at the same time retaining the quality of the product or service. This may offer a 
key advantage over illegally sourced or adapted digital material, which can be poorer quality and can 
sometimes be incompatible with legal devices or services.  
 
Chapter 4.2.5 Live performances  
With regard to the music and film industries in particular, there is one major source of revenue 
which is, unsurprisingly, usually left out of copyright owners’ calculations when producing profit and 
loss reports. Clark argues that ‘revenue opportunities being afforded to touring, live performances 
and merchandising outstrip record sales by some distance’.521 Moreover, the live music industry 
seems to be going from strength to strength. Pollstar claims that ‘Between 1999 and 2009 concert-
ticket sales in America tripled in value, from $1.5 billion to $4.6 billion.’522 This trend was set to 
continue, as in 2012 the ‘Top 100 Tours in North America generated a combined gross of $1,125.9 
million, up 1.2 percent over last year [2011].’523 The continuing growth and popularity of live 
concerts can be attributed to one key fact: ‘There is no way to digitally recreate the excitement and 
atmosphere of a live concert.’524 Concert lovers will always pay to see their favourite artists live, 
irrespective of whether or not they own the track(s) performed. This is surely a key way in which 
copyright owners in the music can continue to obtain substantial revenue, to help subsidise a far 
cheaper retail value for their recorded material.  
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Live concerts would also be a perfect opportunity to implement an increased advertising regime, as 
suggested earlier in this chapter. Advertising should be a key factor in the reshaping of the copyright 
landscape. It offers a reciprocally beneficial arrangement to both the advertisers and the host forum, 
and, ultimately, the consumer at the end of the chain.  This could be achieved both through the 
website selling the concert tickets, as well as at the venue itself. This two-fold advertising campaign 
could realise even further profits. Not all artists are taking sufficient advantage of the alternative 
revenue sources available to them. Perhaps this is because, although it is in their own interests, it is 
not in the interests of the ultimate copyright owners: their record labels. Before too much pity is felt 
for recording companies however, it should be noted that, despite the prevalence of copyright 
infringement, ‘Digital music revenues to record companies grew by 8 per cent globally in 2011 to an 
estimated US$5.2 billion. This compares to growth of 5 per cent in 2010.’525 Claims that record 
companies will struggle and fail in the current climate do not seem to be upheld by the real facts and 
figures.  
 
It would appear that the creators themselves, those being the individuals that copyright law was 
supposedly developed to protect, generally support these alternative systems. Many artists have 
experimented with these methods, and have, by and large, been successful in doing so. For example, 
some bands have provided free copies of their music to fans to publicise their live tours, of which 
McFly, The Kinks and Prince are just a few. Indeed, Prince found his album giveaway to be so 
successful (it led to a record breaking, sell out concert tour) that he repeated the experiment with 
his next album.526 Beyonce recently released an album directly to iTunes, with no prior publicity.527 
Whilst it is undeniably unfortunate for high street record shops to have to suffer as a result of this, 
this cannot be a sufficient reason to deter the trend. High street retailers will simply have to adapt to 
the new changes in digital technology, just as producers of floppy disk and VHS cassette equipment 
(to name but a very few examples) were forced to do before them. The consumer and technology, as 
ever, will not wait.  
 
Yet it seems to be a commonly held belief that it should, or that providers of outdated technology 
have some sort of right to continue to profit from their increasingly redundant products. Duboff 
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states for example that ‘In the United Kingdom, digital growth during 2011, reported at 24.7 per cent 
by the BPI in February  2012, only offsets two-thirds of the decline in income from sales of physical 
 music products.’528 But why should digital sales have to ‘offset’ physical products? This epitomises 
the industry attitude in this area. The decline in sales of physical music products, is an unfortunate 
(for those involved in their production) but inevitable consequence of technological advancement, 
and user habits, and has been throughout recent history. There should be no obligation to, in some 
way, ‘subsidise’ this sector. Many retailers of physical music products have altered their business 
models to suit the now flourishing digital market, following the underlying market trend led by 
consumer demand. This is arguably how it should be. The simple fact is, less people are now buying 
DVDs as online digital content becomes increasingly common.529 This is not, despite music industry 
claims, due to online piracy, but due to technological advancement and the increasing digitalisation 
of products. Hence the need for industry recognition of changes in user practises and to adapt their 
business models to match, or at least take into account this change. 
 
For the most part, consumers tend to support this model too, as the consistent growth of concert 
ticket sales mentioned above indicates. This may be because live concerts are seen as special events 
by consumers, to be remembered long afterwards, and are psychologically categorised entirely 
separately to the purchase of a track or album. As Wing points out, for some there is no substitute 
for the experience. 530  The time and expense expended on organising and producing the event is 
more evident to the consumer, who is therefore more willing to pay a relatively large sum for a 
ticket. The atmosphere and environment of the event is all part of the experience, shared with other 
fans. This theme of interactive or experience-based business models can be linked to other sectors, 
such as the film industry, and indeed 3D cinema is one way to create this unique experience 
currently being used. As previously suggested,531 another way to exploit this idea would be to allow 
consumers to access a film or TV programme for free, then once the consumer is hooked, provide 
directors’ cuts, film commentaries, sneak previews etc using micropayments to gain revenue.  
 
The government has to some extent recognised the value of live music, enacting the Live Music Act 
2012. This allows a little more flexibility in live music venues, removing the need to obtain a license 
for live music under certain conditions. This promotes more flexibility in live music venues, 
facilitating this increasingly successful method of generating revenue.  
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Chapter 4.3 Licensing 
 
Changes to licensing procedures would be an essential part of an infringement reduction strategy. 
This is where the positive aspect of Hargreaves and Hooper’s Copyright Hub came into play. Prior to 
this, there were many different collecting societies which dealt with licensing agreements for 
copyright holders and transactions involving copyrighted material. However as previously 
mentioned, collecting societies often hold incomplete and conflicting data.532 This can lead to 
confusion and difficulties in discerning how to obtain licenses for copyrighted products. Being 
fragmented in this way makes it harder for copyright owners to exploit their works. By introducing a 
‘one stop shop’ in the form of the Hub, the idea is that licensing should be simpler and clearer. This 
will promote efficiency of licensing which, in turn, should lead to reduced transaction costs. Again, 
copyright owners are more easily able to exploit their works, and are no longer forced to transact 
with each individual licensee. 
Licensing costs are a significant contributory factor to online infringement. As Doctorow533 and 
Wing534 both argue, extortionate prices for new film releases, and worse, films being released at 
different times worldwide, is asking for trouble. ‘The fact that people eschew the black market when 
there is a legitimate alternative tells you that they're not thieves looking to steal.’535  In fact ‘they are 
potential customers whose purchases have been forfeited by a business that has violated rule 
number one: offer a product that people want to buy at the price they're willing to pay’.536   Put 
simply, if films, television programmes and music are released at different times in different 
countries, sometimes many months apart, potential customers have no option but to wait months, 
or obtain illegal copies of the film or song.537 In the digital age, consumers are no longer accustomed 
to ‘waiting’ and are likely to obtain new releases, or unreleased material, by any means possible. 
Wing questions whether these staggered release structures actually maximise revenue, or does it in 
fact ‘play into the hands of the digital pirate’ who is able to provide illegitimate copies for those 
unprepared to wait.538 Tackling these differing release procedures is vital then, to maximise legal 
availability of products for consumers. 
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The traditional business model for film-makers was to create three separate revenue streams: initial 
cinema release, video/DVD release, then televised release which can be broken down into paid and 
free TV streams.539 These three distinct sources would be separated by a significant amount of time 
– months or even years – in order to maximise profitability.540 But it is important to emphasise to 
industry bodies that by adapting this model to new trends, the new model should not lose out in the 
long term, because it is tailored to what consumers want. By ensuring film availability very soon 
after its cinematic release, the significant issues of speed and access would be addressed. 
Consumers who no longer expect to have to wait long periods will not feel the need to access illegal 
sources as they currently do, and therefore profits should continue. As Doctorow argues, this is not 
unique to the creative industries, but is common to all markets.541 In reality, he concludes, 
businesses have to balance profit maximisation within marketing structures that customers are 
willing to pay for, so that profits are not ultimately lost to a much higher degree by illegal activity 
later on down the line. He emphasises this point further noting that with the rise of social media, it is 
becoming increasingly less likely that customers will wait months to see a film or TV programme that 
all of their friends are discussing on Twitter or Facebook, revealing plotlines and leading consumers 
to feel that they are missing out. The argument of commentators such as Wing and Doctorow are a 
sound depiction of the market as it currently stands, which puts it at odds with the realities of 
societal demand. This is not a new issue born of the digital age. Individuals were able to copy VHS 
tapes long before the dawn of the internet,542 and VHS tapes often began with a copyright 
infringement warning produced by the Federation Against Copyright Theft in the 1990s.543 However, 
it is both the instantaneous nature of the internet and the ease and convenience of vast 
dissemination of illegal material to millions of people at the click of a mouse that have exacerbated 
the problem to such a degree that enforcement laws are becoming almost entirely ineffectual.544 It is 
true that, as it stands, ‘we all lose’,545 and market forces should be heeded by the film industry in 
order to produce a better release structure than the present one.  
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Whilst this staggered release timescale should have been reducing over the years, in fact it often 
appears to be increasing.546 Take the recent James Bond film Skyfall as an example. Having been 
released on 26th October 2012 in cinemas nationwide, a digital version of the film was not available 
for purchase until nearly three and a half months later (5th February 2013). Worse still, the DVD was 
not available in the UK until 18th February, over a week later than its North American release.547 The 
market is showing no signs of improving either, as Captain America: The Winter Soldier was released 
in cinemas in March 2014 and will not be released on DVD until September 2014. Until the gaps 
between cinematic release and digital release are greatly reduced, consumers will continue to feel 
‘forced’ to obtain their copies by other means.  Perhaps the DVD stage should be skipped, or at least 
timed exactly with online release, as good quality illegal copies of DVDs go live usually on the day of 
release. Allowing users to view the film legally online soon after the cinema release, or at the very 
least alongside the DVD release, would help to reduce user temptation to watch illegal copies.  
However, it is accepted that the above may not be straightforward, at least initially. Films in 
particular require colossal prior investment in development and production before any revenue is 
generated at all. Clearly filmmakers must be able to recover this investment in order for the film 
industry to continue successfully. It would be in nobody’s interest to suggest that filmmakers should 
accept that income must be drastically reduced as a result of the changes suggested above. 
However, the tax/levy model discussed earlier in the chapter should help to compensate rights 
holders’ future losses resulting from the instant provision of cheap, online versions of films normally 
released many months after cinematic release. The experience of the cinema cannot be easily 
replicated, and this revenue stream at least is unlikely to be too much affected. An example of the 
continuing public love of cinema is evident in the Captain America film grossing at $714,766,572 
million worldwide, with a production budget of $170,000,000.548 
European integration is a key issue with regard to licensing. A UK-wide Copyright Hub will only have 
limited effect. Due to the global nature of online copyright infringement, the more multi-national 
the integration, the better the protection that will be offered. At present licensing could arguably be 
seen as a barrier to international market trade. Thankfully, in 2014, new European legislation has 
been passed on a pan-European licensing system.549 This should help to facilitate and streamline the 
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licensing procedure yet further by performing a similar role to the UK Hub.550 By providing EU-wide 
standards for collective licensing, the EU will help to bring the various collective licensing systems 
across the EU more into line, increasing transparency and efficiency, whilst streamlining cost. The 
Directive allows for providers of online music services to obtain licences from collective 
management organisations (CMOs) across national borders, to further the aim of creating a digital 
single market. It sets out in detail the many requirements place on CMOs with regard to multi-
territorial licensing and appropriate management of licensing. Article 28 of the Directive also obliges 
CMOs to ensure ‘accurate and timely payment to rights holders’ which must include information 
detailing the period and territories for which the uses [being paid for] took place.551 The high 
standard for accountability and transparency in the Directive has received general praise. PRS for 
Music, for example, stated that such standards were welcome, and would serve to create ‘a more 
integrated, efficient and valuable single market for licensing music’.552 Rapporteur Marielle Gallo 
praised the new Directive, stating that it should allow ‘a Lithuanian singer to choose what collective 
management organisation he wants to hand over his repertoire’.553 This increase in choice for rights 
holders introduces an added level of competition between CMOs across borders, which should 
encourage any poorly governed organisations to strive to attain the ‘high standard of governance, 
financial management, transparency and reporting’ required by the Directive in order to remain 
competitive. It is hoped that the positive response to this Directive will lead to further European 
licensing integration for other digital media such as cinematic and literary works. Long term, any 
such cooperative streamlining of transactions and costs is welcome, and can only have a positive 
impact on the industry and its consumers. 
In order for the pan-European licensing system to be successful, it may be that full harmonisation of 
Member States’ copyright laws will be required. Rosati argues that such a regime may struggle to 
work efficiently if it is necessary for pan-European licensing to comply with 27 different national 
laws.554 Following Rosati’s argument, the new Directive may allow for too much discretion for 
Member States and therefore lacks the harmonious structure required to guarantee its success. The 
Directive calls for Member States to provide for ‘appropriate and effective mechanisms’ for 
                                                             
550 < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-79_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 2nd April 2015. 
551 Article 28(2). 
552
 PRS for Music Position Paper March 2013 
<https://www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/CRM%20Directive%20PRS%20for%20Music%20Mar
%202013%20English%20FINAL.pdf> accessed 1
st
 March 2015. 
553
 As stated by Eleaner Steyn in ‘Collective rights management: multi-territorial licensing and self-regulation’ 
[2014] 25(4) Ent LR 143, 144. 
554 Rosati (n 396) 675. 
98 
 
members’ participation in CMOs555 and for rights holders to receive ‘appropriate remuneration for 
the use of their rights’556 to name but two examples.  Evidently, such decisions are left to the 
discretion of Member States, allowing for a range of different interpretations on implementation for 
the Directive. This lack of cogent legal framework inevitably poses difficulties for the implementation 
of a full pan-European licensing system. Angelopoulos recognises that this problem is made worse by 
a lack of underlying doctrinal coherence at EU level, with national theories surrounding the nature of 
copyright out of sync.557 The legal uncertainty and conflicting interpretations at national level as a 
result of this will continue without a cross-border, unifying regime.558 As Angelopoulos notes, 
without agreement as to the nature of copyright, its scope and extent of protection, full European 
harmonisation may be difficult to achieve. 
Perhaps Rosati’s concerns over the theory of the pan-European licensing system have now been 
somewhat allayed by the reality of the new Directive. It is hoped that the competitive element 
created by the Directive will help to encourage development of the poorer national legislatures, who 
will be incentivised to provide better regulation of their CMOs in order to remain competitive. As 
previously mentioned, Member States will be acutely aware that the increase in choice for copyright 
holders, provided by the Directive, and that unhappy national copyright holders should be able to 
move to an alternative European CMO relatively easily. It is likely that they will strive to emulate the 
high standards of practice demonstrates by Member States such as the UK, with the Hub being the 
model for successful streamlining and consolidation of collective licensing. 
This attempt to level the playing field through the pan-European licensing Directive is certainly a 
positive step towards creating an EU copyright framework alongside which alternative and 
complimentary measures would sit well and help to create a more harmonious balance. The 
importance of this cannot be overestimated, in a global industry which contributes a massive 5.4% 
of GDP.559 Large markets such as the US have yet to be included in similar initiatives however. In the 
future, it is hoped that licensing can be expanded globally further in this way. 
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Chapter 4.4 Education and deterrents 
It has been suggested that educating the public as to the meaning and scope of copyright would go 
some way to targeting the problem of online piracy,560 This could be aimed at addressing two of the 
factors previously cited as reasons for infringement, namely accessibility and lack of clarity over the 
legality, or otherwise, of products or services. Many individuals are simply not aware that they are 
infringing copyright when they listen to and download music from Youtube, or even produce copies 
of a CD for friends. Public education then, is required. Exactly what form this educational 
programme will take is unclear however. Hargreaves confusingly suggests that the main educational 
tool in the Digital Economy Act is the notification process. This informs infringers of the illegality of 
their actions, giving them a chance to cease before they are penalised.561 But this approach reaches 
a very small minority of the population and in any case, only attempts to educate once some 
damage has already been done. This surely cannot be the only source of ‘education’ foreseen by 
Hargreaves. Yet despite his repeated urging for the necessity of education, there is no other 
suggested way forward apparent in his report.  
Howell notes a further problem with the above approach. That is, that ‘The report could find little 
evidence that the increasing of penalties reduces infringement in the long term’.562 It indicates that a 
survey ‘conducted just after the first RIAA announcement, showed a 50 per cent drop in the 
percentage of users acknowledging use of P2P services, from 29 per cent to 14 per cent. However, 
by 2005 this number had reverted to 24 per cent.’563 Clearly the deterrent effect of enforcement 
measures to date has been fleeting and temporary. Individuals, even once aware of their 
transgressions, do not appear to be sufficiently discouraged.  
Tyler564 argues that one of the main reasons for high infringement levels in copyright law in 
particular, is the risk factor involved. He suggests that whilst deterrents may work to a small extent 
in cases with a high rate of detection and conviction such as homicide, copyright infringement is 
perceived to be difficult to detect and therefore punishment may be seen as too unlikely to affect an 
infringement decision.565 Similarly, the opportunity to commit such a crime is comparatively high, 
with copyrighted material surrounding us in our daily lives. The author further claims that the main 
approach to copyright enforcement is to seek to protected created rights with threats, resulting in 
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‘widespread noncompliance with the law’.566 This is absolutely still relevant in the digital age, as the 
more platforms and sources of content are developed, the more open to abuse that content will be. 
The tenfold increase in penalties in the Digital Economy Act 567 only serves to confirm that Tyler’s 
proposition is still true of modern day enforcement attitudes. But no significant changes in 
infringement levels568 also corroborate the theory of ineffectual deterrents. 
The effectiveness, or otherwise, of deterrents has long been the subject of debate, and is not 
exclusive to copyright law. 569  In a 1981 study on deterrence in the context of drunk driving, 
Laurence Ross posited the theory that harsh penalties and strict enforcement of laws only produce a 
short term deterrent effect, with little long term effect on behaviour.570 Even the strict enforcement 
of drink driving laws by Scandinavian police, through road blocks and other strategies, only had a 
temporary deterrent effect. The writer argues that this is because the initial publicity surrounding an 
enforcement campaign leads to an overestimation of likelihood of punishment, but that this cannot 
be sustained. The belief in the likelihood of capture wanes over time, until levels of compliance drop, 
as the individual’s experience proves that such punishments and consequences are probably not as 
likely as initially claimed.571 The more time passes, the more the individual comes to believe that the 
risk of capture and punishment have been grossly exaggerated and falls back into old behaviours.  
This analogy can certainly be applied to copyright law enforcement, and is to some extent 
corroborated by research.572 Even pre-internet, the likelihood of detection when copying a book or 
tape in one’s own home was, in reality, very low. The internet age has produced an abundance of 
new opportunities for committing infringement, whilst at the same time decreasing the likelihood of 
detection as anonymity online is perfectly practicable. Laurence Ross’s theory is supported by Tyler, 
who notes that threats of harsh penalties are insufficient to gain widespread public compliance with 
the law.573 It would appear that even though deterrents initially seem to legislators like the quickest 
and easiest tool to ensure compliance with the law, in reality they are extremely difficult to 
implement effectively, and so do not have the desired effect in the long term.574 
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It is very easy to demonise infringers; to see them as deliberately trying to beat the system and to 
get away with stealing from rights holders. But this interpretation of a relatively widespread societal 
behaviour is arguably too simplistic. At best it is likely only to apply to a very small proportion of 
infringers. Tyler suggests that voluntary cooperation with the law is more influenced by morality and 
legitimacy, than by the potential for punitive legal sanctions.575 That is, both the individual’s 
perception of right and wrong, and whether or not the individual feels that they ought to comply 
with the law. Tyler sees this as crucial in explaining the prevalence of copyright infringement.576 The 
fact is that the majority of individuals simply don’t see it as morally wrong. Tyler states that formal 
law loses its power if and when it diverges from public morality and what the public as a whole sees 
as fair.577 This is absolutely true, and shows that only a change in public perception of morality will 
lead to the increased effectiveness of copyright law enforcement. Toughening up with threats of 
harsher penalties will not suffice. This is where education becomes imperative. To alter the public 
perception of copyright infringement, we must embark on a long term process of socialisation to 
create a ‘positive moral climate’.578 As Eining and Christensen advocate, society-wide education from 
a young age should be central to the development of this long term approach.579 
Similarly, if the notion of legitimacy of copyright laws can be achieved, individuals would be more 
likely to comply with the law, even if their moral principles did not correspond precisely with the 
law.580 Interestingly, Tyler found that people’s willingness to accept rules is often more dependent 
on how the rule was made, and if this decision-making process was fair, than the actual content of 
the rule.581 This may help to explain why individuals feel so aggrieved about copyright law, and react 
so contemptuously.582 Right or wrongly, many members of society see copyright law as created 
under the dominion of major creative industry bodies, to maximise profit and minimise consumer 
access and freedom of information.  
It certainly appears that way, as legislators regularly tighten up increasingly strict restrictions and 
penalties, with only the occasional, cursory reference to the improvement of products and services 
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for the consumer.583 This attitude is perpetuated by popular individuals such as The Pirate Bay’s 
Peter Sunde. It may be an entirely erroneous view, or it may not. The fact is that with no formal 
education surrounding this area of the law, it is perhaps unsurprising that opinions such as Peter 
Sunde’s are so ingrained in the psyche of  many consumers, as it is this skewed impression of the 
hostile intentions behind copyright law that is reaching consumers. There is no formal education 
system to inform and balance out the debate. Aggressive tactics from either side are not 
constructive, nor are they particularly successful in challenging infringement.584A more nuanced 
approach through fair and factual education would be a more practical solution. 
It is certainly true that, so far, ‘educating people about infringement does not seem to lead to a 
change in behaviour,’585 or at least not yet creating a significant, permanent shift in behavioural 
patterns. However, perhaps this is because education so far mainly attempts to preach to the 
converted. That is, individuals who are already committing illegal activities, many of whom may be 
likely to be aware that they are doing so in any case. A more sensible approach would be to educate 
children about the law of copyright in schools. Primary schools would need to be targeted with a 
nationwide educational campaign. This would ensure that the entire population would be 
sufficiently aware of what is and is not legal with regard to the dissemination of material.586  
In addition, this campaign would need to stress the moral argument against infringement. It is vital 
to remind the public that this is not an entirely victimless crime, as it is often perceived to be. 
Crucially, it would connect with each new generation before they reached an age at which they 
might potentially commit infringing acts, if taught early enough in the school curriculum. If children 
grew up knowing the scope and consequences of infringement, there is a higher likelihood that they 
would be deterred than under the current approach of notifying once the damage has been done. 
Education in terms of sending cease and desist letters which set out the law is more a case of 
reacting to wrongdoing rather than educating prior to the development of this illegal behaviour. If 
the downloading of illegal material is already seen as the norm, and part of everyday life, it would 
then be a case of trying to change an opinion already ingrained in society as a whole.  
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Entities such as International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) who have a vested 
interest in ensuring the sanctity of copyright protection have done a little to further this aim. Take 
for example, their collaboration with the charity Childnet to produce leaflets for parents and 
teachers, detailing how young people can keep safe and legal while enjoying music online.587 It also 
produced a free program called Digital File Check, which is able to remove or block any unwanted 
file-sharing program commonly used to distribute copyrighted files illegally from your computer. 
However individuals may not be willing to install such software, without knowing exactly what it 
might do. The IFPI obviously have a certain agenda, and it is unlikely that many individuals who have 
committed infringing acts would want to admit to it by first obtaining the software, and then 
potentially lose their illegally obtained content as a result. Therefore the market for this sort of 
program would be very limited. The impact of such campaigns will always be limited, unless there is 
some government involvement on a nationwide scale.  
There is good news in this area however in that the BBC is beginning to seek innovative ways to 
ensure future patronage. It is not only music artists who have used the potential of free material to 
tempt individuals to ultimately pay for more in the future.588 The BBC has recently released a 
Youtube-only nature documentary channel, aimed at teenagers.589 It aims to attract a new audience 
to what the BBC has to offer. Clearly it recognises the direction most new users are taking when it 
comes to material for entertainment. The channel is a good example of the acceptance of a short 
term loss in order to, it is hoped, reap long term rewards by attempting to secure the patronage of 
the next generation.  
 
As Howell notes above,590 research suggests that education has not yet led to any lasting reduction 
in infringement. However until a specific educational programme is implemented in schools 
throughout the country, it remains to be seen whether education would have any serious positive 
impact on incidents of infringement in the UK in the long term. At least it may go some way to 
addressing the ‘accessibility’ issue. Once individuals are aware of exactly where and how to access 
legitimate online sources, as well as recognising illegal sources, one major ‘excuse’ for illegal activity 
will be eliminated. In a similar vein, teaching society the potentially negative consequences of illegal 
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downloading should lead to a long term improvement in consumer compliance amongst those 
generally law-abiding citizens. 
 
Chapter 4.5 Can legislation be complemented by alternative methods? 
This chapter suggests that alternative and complimentary measures could help to significantly 
reduce copyright infringement online, by targeting the significant infringement factors of cost, 
quality, speed, ease of access, availability and lack of clarity over the legality of products or services. 
Many individuals who currently download illegally may well be induced to cease these activities and 
begin to use legal services to source their digital content as a result of some of these changes. It is 
worth noting also that this tax/levy concept, or compensation without control regime, represents 
the deconstruction of the copyright regime as a game to be won. This may reduce the incentive for 
even those pirates who indicate that nothing would induce them to stop their infringing 
behaviour,591 as it would reduce the element of fame associated with beating the system, cited by 
Garstka as a real incentive to infringement.592 
There is some evidence that the creative industries are adapting their business models to keep pace 
with technology and new consumer trends. The subscription-based business model is promising, if 
problems of lack of coverage can be overcome. The new Ultraviolet technology593 built into many 
new DVDs is interesting too, not least because it finally admits to normal common practice, 
facilitating the downloading of DVD content onto the users other digital devices.594 This also allows 
users to download material to a cloud-based digital storage facility. However there is still inherent 
confusion, in that how the digital content can be used varies from title to title, and depends on the 
company responsible for the film’s release. For example, some Ultraviolet products feature 
permission for the consumer to share the film with up to 5 friends. Confusion surrounding whether 
or not this is an option with other titles is bound to ensue. Moreover, despite these new, useful 
features, these DVDs still remain priced at the hopelessly outdated £11 to £16 mark.595 It is 
submitted that most individuals now see this pricing structure as prohibitively expensive, leaving the 
way open for subscription-based business models to really exploit this societal trend.596 
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The law alone cannot solve this problem. It is too difficult to ‘undo’ what has already been done 
without offering alternatives. That is, now that illegal downloading has become so ingrained into 
society as a normal everyday activity, merely continuing to legislate is likely to continue to be 
ineffectual. In any case, it is clear that ‘Criminalizing an entire generation is too high a price to pay 
for almost any end. It is certainly too high a price to pay for a copyright system crafted more than a 
generation ago’.597 The current legislation-focussed approach is somewhat outdated, and can only 
be effectively used to enforce the law and properly uphold protection of copyright if it is part of an 
overall regime that provides maximum flexibility and changes pace with the ever evolving world of 
technology.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion  
 
Ultimately this thesis is concerned with striking a balance between the rights of copyright holders 
and those of users, or the general public. This is key to ensuring the proper encouragement of 
innovation and creativity, whilst at the same time defending the public benefit gained from these 
creations.  This is no small challenge, as leaning too far in one direction could have disastrous results 
for the UK economy. Stricter copyright laws will likely drive aggrieved users to illegal sources, and 
anger copyright holders further. Yet clearly any appearance of ‘favouring’ the cause of users for 
more liberal access may risk driving away some members of the creative industries, a significant 
contributor to the UK economy,598 to conduct their business elsewhere. The process will require a 
fundamental change in attitude towards copyright issues, defining copyright holders’ rights in a 
positive way, that they be rewarded for their innovation. This contrasts with the current approach to 
copyright whereby the holder must seek to enforce their right when it has been abused and, often, 
the damage has already been done. This is a reactive approach, rather than an infinitely preferable 
preventative one. 
This thesis addresses the perceived gaps and weaknesses in current copyright legislation when 
addressing the imbalance of rights concluding that legislation alone has but limited effectiveness on 
online piracy. It is submitted that both the CDPA and, more significantly, the comparatively recent 
DEA target the wrong individuals in the wrong way.599 The new DEA rules are cumbersome and 
ineffective, having only a limited positive effect on a minority group. The reality is that legislators 
simply cannot keep up with technological advances and the new, innovative techniques constantly 
being developed by savvy internet users to circumvent the law. The false presumption that stronger 
measures equal a greater deterrent and will somehow lead to a vast reduction in online piracy 
overnight needs to be abandoned. Even the government-approved body OFCOM suggests that 
legislation will not deter the majority of infringers.600 In addition, the responsibilities placed on ISPs 
are arguably too burdensome, and this implied requirement to monitor does not fall under the 
intended remit of the function of ISPs.601 
The government appeared to recognise the need to address the balance of rights in this area, and 
commissioned several reports and recommendations by prominent lawmakers and politicians. It 
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looks to these reports as an indication of how the government sees the shaping of copyright 
legislation in the recent past and near future. However it is quickly apparent that the above issues 
relating to current legislation are simply not addressed in these reports.  Instead they fixate on the 
idea of a Copyright Hub, which, it is submitted, would only have limited positive effect. Although 
aspects of these reports were indeed contributory, none fully address the significant issues faced by 
copyright law in the internet age. Despite the repeated refrain of ‘clarity’ permeating the reports, it 
appears that of any of the recommendations, only the Copyright Hub, will actually promote this aim. 
Although even here, it may be that even further confusion is caused as copyright holders not 
registered on the Hub may be vulnerable to piracy as users mistakenly think their works are 
unprotected. So far, the government has largely ignored many of the recommendations for 
copyright reform found in these reports, preferring instead to pin their hopes on the Copyright Hub 
and the limited copyright exceptions introduced in 2014. This, unfortunately, will not be enough. 
Moreover, in order for it to stand a good chance of success, it is vital that copyright holders 
themselves are enthusiastic and engage fully with the Hub during its development.  
Evidently then, the constant development of legislation isn’t working as a standalone solution. We 
need to take a more rounded approach to copyright exploitation, considering the needs and 
expectation of all parties. Only then, by marrying together a range of both legal and non-legal 
approaches to the problem, will there be a chance of successfully balancing the rights of all parties. 
Recent reports and reviews of the law analysed in Chapter 3 have produced some positive results 
such as the Copyright Hub, and the improved copyright exceptions for both private copying and 
libraries and archives.602 The promising aspects of the Hub603 may be somewhat limited in their 
effect on online piracy, but nevertheless provide an important stepping stone towards clarity and 
streamlining of transaction costs which, it is hoped, may be passed on to the consumer. In this way, 
one of the major factors cited for copyright infringement online, cost, may be slightly improved. 
Similarly, the new copyright exceptions clearly recognise the needs of parties other than copyright 
holders. The private copying exception clarifies the legal position on an activity already undertaken 
as part of daily life. Extra protection for libraries and archives, as well as parody and pastiche, 
consider the public interest value of use of protected works.604 In spite of these positive outcomes of 
the many reports and reviews of copyright law, again the discourse never gets to the heart of the 
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issue: the need to address the chronic online copyright infringement problem. Without a multi-
dimensional approach to this challenge, real progress cannot be made. 
No single approach to copyright enforcement benefits all parties. But attempting to confront the 
problem from the same angle time and time again isn’t benefitting anyone at all. There is still no 
clear balance between the rights of copyright holders and users. The majority of legal emphasis has 
been put on stronger enforcement in order to appease powerful creative industries, despite 
research indicating the long term failure of deterrents.605 Ironically, by doing this and little else, it 
has had the opposite effect, leaving rights holders with the increasingly difficult task of actually 
enforcing their rights, whilst copyright infringement still flourishes. It does not matter how strong 
anti-infringement legislation is if rights holders are still finding it as difficult as ever to prevent 
infringement and adequately enforce their rights. The law still doesn’t achieve what rights holders 
hope, and what the law intends, to accomplish. This thesis therefore argues that the current 
copyright enforcement regime can be said to be both ineffective and inappropriate.  
It is also clear that the public understanding of copyright law needs to be challenged.606 As suggested 
in chapter 4, this is where alternative solutions to the copyright ‘problem’ become crucial.  A solid 
foundation in the national system of education would provide the next generation of users with a 
better understand of the legal, financial and social effects of copyright infringement. Although 
improvements are evidently crucial, it is important that the system is fully supported and enforced. 
Without a basic public understanding of how copyright law works, any attempt to enforce laws will 
be doomed to fail. 
The tax/levy model607 would arguably improve the current imbalance of rights markedly. By putting 
such a system into place, rights holders can allow their creations to be widely accessible, and be 
guaranteed compensation in return. In addition, perhaps revenue from this model could be used to 
support ISPs in a more monitory role. As it is, the duties assigned to ISPs are arguably unfairly 
burdensome,608 but it is undeniably a factor in helping to challenge infringement online. Some 
financial assistance through a tax or levy could support a stronger, more active monitory role. All of 
these options help to make infringement less easy, and altogether less attractive. Combined they 
can have a significant impact on copyright infringement, redressing the balance of rights.  
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In reality, the facts can be stated very simply: providing realistic alternatives would undercut pirate 
sites, eradicating their market advantage. Research supports the idea that providing high quality, 
easily accessible material at a low cost would contribute most towards a drastic reduction in online 
infringement.609 By addressing the factors cited,610 we can go some way to markedly reduced 
copyright infringement online. The public attitude to the products and services protected by 
copyright is very much one of instant gratification. The proposed tax/levy model would serve to 
remunerate copyright holders for their inevitable loss of full control over their works, with the hope 
that this will lead to better services for consumers, provided by rights holders feeling more secure 
financially as a result of the compensation levy. Indeed, it is arguable that infringement is so easy 
and therefore endemic that copyright holders now no longer retain control over their works in any 
case.  Language such as the regularly occurring ‘normal exploitation’ of works, to be expected by 
rights holders according to the CDPA, reflects the outdated nature of the legislation. The ‘normal 
exploitation’ envisaged by historic legislators is arguably unrecognisable as that of the digital age. 
Rights holders need to accept that the status quo is no longer viable, and cannot therefore be 
maintained. It is as much in their own interests as those of users to support and encourage the 
development of a new system of copyright exploitation.  
The complimentary approaches analysed in Chapter 4 at least partially address each of the main 
factors cited as reasons for infringement. Beginning with the tax/levy model, this proposal directly 
addressed the most common reason for infringement – cost. It offers an alternative avenue of 
compensation for rights holders, so that non-commercial use of their works ceases to be a 
devastating blow to their income earned through exploitation of their works. Users would be able to 
freely access digital content, for non-commercial purposes, without threat of punishment. This levy 
would also help to address the thorny issue of balancing the rights of all parties. Copyright owners 
would be better compensated for inevitable use and would no longer be forced to seek redress 
against elusive and tech savvy infringers. Non-commercial users would be able to take advantage of 
this compensation without control strategy, funded through a fairer taxation system which levies all 
products and services associated with file sharing, proportioned according to how much its value is 
enhanced by this activity.611 It is hoped that by providing proper compensation, this will encourage 
copyright owners to provide cheaper, more comprehensive services, as well as reducing the ‘game 
to be won’ incentive612 by legalising non-commercial use. Whilst this may be unlikely to significantly 
                                                             
609
 OFCOM Wave 4 Report (n 32). 
610
 As discussed in Chapter 4, these are cost, quality, ease of access, speed, availability and clarity over what is 
and is not legal. 
611
 Netanel (n 415) 60. 
612 Garstka (n 46) 166. 
110 
 
reduce piracy, what it can do is to provide an alternative strategy to complement enforcement. 
Enforcement of the law as it stands is ineffectual. Infringers are undeterred. It is submitted that 
legalising non-commercial piracy whilst adequately compensating copyright owners for their loss of 
control over their works in such situations provides a compromise that all parties should be able to 
live with. 
Other proposals analysed in Chapter 4 should address other factors cited as reasons for 
infringement, and therefore cause a reduction in infringement. Micropayments can be a real 
alternative solution to cost. They have been used with particular success in the gaming industry, but 
it is submitted that there is scope in the film and music industry to exploit this method of receiving 
revenue.613  
The idea of advertisements as a means of raising revenue for access to copyrighted works is twofold. 
Firstly, it provides a clear solution to the issue of cost. Use of advertisements to raise extra revenue 
allows content to be available more cheaply to the consumer as a result. How the advertisements 
are deployed is key, however. Use of adverts is achieved successfully in the gaming industry by 
allowing uninterrupted playback, with advertisements concentrated on the website itself and at the 
beginning of the game, as well as in-game product placement.614 Spotify, a music subscription 
service, also offers an effective strategy. Subscription is free for the first 6 months, funded by 
advertisements.615 Secondly, the issue of big brands advertising on website providing illegal content 
must also be tackled, in order to eradicate the majority of funding required by illegal website to 
continue their activities. Without sufficient funds, such websites would find it increasingly difficult to 
provide the comprehensive coverage and high quality works expected, allowing legal sources to 
provide an increasingly superior alternative with which to tempt consumers. In addition, resolving 
this issue would impact favourably on the legitimacy factor cited by infringers, that is, whether or 
not a website is legal. After all, the sight of a familiar or reputable brand on a website was cited as a 
key indicator as to the legitimacy of the source.616 
Subscription-based business models have the opportunity to address the cited factors of quality, a 
key aspect in which legal sources should excel as Wing notes,617 and ease of access. Legally licensed 
copies of works tend to be high quality, glitch free products. Users need not worry about blurry films 
or inexpertly edited content. The convenience factor (ease and speed of access) can be addressed 
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through user-friendly and glitch-free interfaces provided by subscription-based business models.618 
Spotify provides a good example of how well some of these alternative revenue sources can 
complement each other. The combination of initial advertisement funding, then subscription fees, 
allows Spotify to provide a flexible service to consumers in a form they want, without losing 
revenue. 
Lock-in strategies have been used effectively, particularly by Apple, to provide an immersive overall 
experience for consumers as well as potentially reducing costs to the consumer.619 Sophisticated 
interoperability of locked-in products, such as computers and phones, can please consumers, but it 
is important to also ensure interoperability with consumers alternatively-sourced content in order to 
steer clear of anti-competitive practices which may be dimly viewed by those tech savvy users who 
cited ease of access and availability as factors leading to infringement. Live performances are 
irreplaceable as a source of entertainment and revenue for the music industry in particular. The 
provision of free content online has been a successful strategy for musicians promoting tours,620 
whilst at the same time mitigating the cost factor for consumers. 
Licensing is a big area of potential development when taking many infringement factors into 
account, availability in particular. The UK Copyright Hub and the pan-European licensing system, 
through streamlining of the licensing process, will reduce transaction costs and such savings should 
then be passed on to the consumer. In addition, the increased flexibility and consolidation within 
licensing should work hand in hand with the subscription-based business model approach discussed 
above, increasing the ability for these legal content providers to supply a greater range of content, 
improving coverage limitation issues, a current flaw in the subscription-based business model, and 
increasing availability to consumers.  
A nationwide educational campaign though the school curriculum, reaching the public before the 
infringing mindset has become ingrained, would tackle the final factor cited as a reason for 
infringement - lack of clarity as to what is, and is, not legal. Enforcing the law once the damage has 
been done is important, naturally, but addressing the issue in a preventative rather than reactive 
way would work towards a long term strategy to tackle the widespread confusion and conflicting 
beliefs surrounding the nature of copyright and the legalities of exploitation of copyrighted works.  
It is submitted, therefore, that copyright enforcement is not achieving a successful result at present 
because it simply does not address key reasons for copyright infringement. In order to successfully 
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reduce online piracy, solutions to alleviate the perceived factors need to be introduced to 
complement the legal system. A combination of approaches is required, then, in order to achieve 
this end. Ultimately, the aim of this research is to put forward solutions whose cumulative effect will 
ensure that all parties benefit. 
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